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ABSTRACT
The photochemical industry produces materials sensitive to
light, thereby making possible satisfaction of the world's craving for
photographic images. It was among the first industries to extend its
markets and operations abroad, irrespective of individual countries in
which its member firms had their origins. This extension began at the
dawn of the twentieth century, during an epoch well before most member
firms had diversified their product lines. The experience of this
industry thus provides a relatively pure field for inquiry into some
issues that are central to understanding of business internationalization.
This thesis reconstructs the internationalizatioon of six
surviving photochemical producers from a strategic perspective. This
perspective suggests that the carrying out of strategic intents leads to
certainty in the incurrence of volume independent costs. The asymmetry
between certainty of cost incurrence and uncertainty of revenue generation
is reduced by the restraint or elimination of intra-industry competition
and by the search for markets wherever they can be found or developed.
Internationalization of this industry is thus seen to have been largely a
market seeking phenomenon.
The nature of markets, of knowledge, of strategy and their
interrelationships are analyzed to establish linkages between the
experience of this industry and certain ideas that have been advanced by
international business scholars. These include the notions of cultural
distance, demand similarities in international trade, cost advantages of
managerial hierarchies over markets, oligopolistic reaction,
internalization, and the role of differentiation in goods markets
imperfections.
The choice between retention and externalization of rights
inhering in prior ownership is introduced in exploring the advantages
enjoyed by managerial hierarchies over alternative institutions for
executing transactions across national frontiers. Strategic
considerations, which is to say concern with outcomes over the long run,
are seen to militate in favor of retention.
On the cost side, it is suggested that international application
of the markets vs. hierarchies model subsumes choices between perfect and
highly imperfect market mechanisms on the one hand and on the other,
between externalization of product resale rights and their retention by
the manufacturer. Retention is a necessary condition for appropriating
the benefit of large scale economies that. can arise in performance of the
marketing function.
Successful differentiation efforts are seen to have a
psychological basis that transcends cultural barriers although it is not
completely universal. This contributes to the development of an
oligopolistic industry structure that operates globally except where
national markets have already been preempted.
Technical knowledge is retained by its original owner when
externalization of the rights to its exploitation is seen to diminish the
owner's long-term revenue potential.
It is argued that strategic interest prompts internationalizing
firms to retain resale and knowledge exploitation rights because of the
disparity in time and resources required between the shrinking of cultural
distance and the acquisition of technical knowledge.
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Chapter I
Introduction
The contemporary world is hardly conceivable without
photography. Pictures, images and information conveyed by photochemical
means are pervasive if not ubiquitous in daily life. The industry
catering to the world's insatiable appetite for such images exploits the
physical phenomenon that certain salts containing silver turn dark when
exposed to light. Although this phenomenon had been known since early in
the seventeenth century, the technologies required to exploit it
commercially were not developed until the nineteenth century. That
century and its successor spawned a host of enterprises dedicated to the
production of photosensitive materials. Few of these survived, and the
photochemical industry eventually became highly concentrated. It is now
dominated by some half dozen companies which sell their output on a more
or less global scale.
The objective of the following historical essays is to describe
the circumstances under which the surviving companies came to
internationalize their business or, in one instance, failed to do so. The
enterprise histories covered are those of
Agfa from its beginnings in 1867 to 1964.
Gevaert from its beginnings in 1890 to 1964.
Agfa-Gevaert from its de facto merger in 1964 to the present.
Ilford from its beginnings in 1879 to the present.
Konishiroku from its beginnings in 1873 to the present.
Fuji from its antecedents in 1919 to the present.
Eastman Kodak from its beginnings in 1880 to 1932.
These companies, which today generate the preponderant majority
of the industry's output, had their origins respectively in Germany,
Belgium, England, Japan and the U.S. As the above dates suggest, the
extension of their markets and operations to foreign countries can be
traced back to the dawn of the twentieth century in a majority of cases.
This occurred well before most of them had diversified their product lines
beyond those serving chemically based photography. The industry was thus
one of the first to become involved internationally and thereby provides a
relatively uncluttered field for inquiry into the internationalization of
business, irrespective of country of origin.
The above dates also indicate a long time span rich in changes
in the business environments in which these companies operated and in
events, decisions and developments within the individual firms. The
reaching of the stated objective is thus a formidable task. Even if it
were possible to chronicle all the events bearing on the subject at hand,
to do so would contribute little to understanding of the subject. Some
organizing framework is needed if sense is to be made of a maze of
undifferentiated facts. The main purpose of this introduction is to
develop that framework. This will be done by defining historical
relevance, business strategy, internationalization and the relationship
between these last two concepts.
The chapter also describes the principal strategic commitments
that characterize the photochemical industry and are believed to have led
to its internationalization. It further alerts the reader to some
limitations arising from the nature of the research conducted upon the
conclusions that can be drawn. Finally, it outlines the structure of the
entire thesis.
Historical Relevance
In the words of the Talmudic metaphor used by Bronowaki in his
explanation of how the search for knowledge is conducted, we must put a
fence around the subject of inquiry, temporarily ignoring our intuitive
notion that every event in the universe is somehow connected with every
other event. Some facts must be considered as relevant and others as
irrelevant.1 The standard of what constitutes relevance for the present
purpose is guided by the philosophy of history expounded by Carr in
What is History ? Carr's point of view represents a reaction to those
held by nineteenth century historians from Ranke to Acton. Their work was
guided by the notion that the historian's obligation is fulfilled by a
recital of pure facts that tell exactly what happened. Carr expresses his
reaction by stating that "the belief in a hard core of historical facts
existing objectively and independently of the interpretation of the
historian is a preposterous fallacy." 2 Fact and interpretation are
seen to be nearly inseparable. The discovery of new facts modifies prior
interpretation which in turn influences what further facts are to be
sought. This is not to suggest that history is merely what historians say
it is or that all possible interpretations are equally valid.
To circumvent the possible ambiguities that may arise from this
view of history, Carr distinguishes between historical facts and ordinary
facts about the past. In his mind, an ordinary fact becomes a historical
fact when the interpretation in support of which the ordinary fact is
cited becomes accepted as valid or significant. Interpretation thus
guides what facts are selected for presentation.3  The meaning of these
abstractions can be illustrated by reviewing two nearly contemporaneous
events in the history of the Eastman Kodak Company.
Event 1. In 1898, George Eastman went to London to float the
shares of a new company to be known as Kodak Ltd. The purpose of this new
British corporation was to acquire the business and property of all then
existing Eastman Kodak corporate entities. These included the Eastman
Kodak Company, a New York corporation formed in 1892 but with antecedents
going back to a single proprietorship founded by George Eastman in 1880.
They also included the Eastman Photographic Naterials Co. Ltd., a nine
year old British manufacturing and sales subsidiary, and recently formed
sales subsidiaries in France and Germany.4
Event 2. Within six months of the formation of Kodak Ltd.,
the company opened a retail sales branch in Brussels, the Belgian
capital.5
The formation of Kodak Ltd. represents the formal
dedomiciliation of a major enterprise. As such, it may be an interesting
fact, even an astounding and extraordinary fact. But it is not, in the
present context, considered a historical fact in Carr's sense of the term.
On the other hand, the opening of a Brussels retail store, a
fact deliberately chosen here for its apparently utter triviality to
emphasize the contrast, is treated as a historical fact rather than as an
ordinary fact about the past.
Why is the opening of a retail store in a foreign country a
historical fact while the selection by the same company of a foreign
country as the domicile for its parent is not ? The distinction inheres
in the strategic substance of the two events. Within a year of the the
formation of Kodak Ltd., its host country became embroiled in the Second
South African War (1899 - 1902). To finance the required military
expenditures, the British Parliament increased the rate of direct taxation
from 8 Pence per Pound to 1 Shilling and 3 Pence per Pound over the three
year period.6 Although the 6.2 percent rate of taxation seems, by the
standards of a later day, to have been quite modest, the base to which the
rate was applied under wartime pressure to increase government revenue had
ominous implications for Eastman Kodak. This base was the company's
world-wide earnings of which the largest part by far was generated in the
U.S., the company's original home country. In 1900, Eastman wrote to his
New York legal counsel :
Altogether we shall be sub3ected to an excessive taxation of
about $100,000 which we ought to avoid. The only way to do it
as far as I can see at present would be to reorganize under the
laws of some friendly state and transfer the whole business,
foreign and domestic, to a new company, keeping such local
foreign companies as may be necessary to carry on the business
advantageously... 7
The result was the 1901 formation of the present Eastman Kodak Company (of
New Jersey), a corporation that acts both as an operating entity
conducting the company's business in the U.S. and as the parent of its
foreign subsidiaries. 8
Following the formation of the New Jersey company,
Kodak Ltd. assumed a more modest, though hardly negligible, role in
Eastman Kodak's international operations, and this role is described in
the chapter devoted to the company's internationalization. The present
point is that the formation of Kodak Ltd. as the world-wide parent had no
impact whatever on the long-term business fortunes of Eastman Kodak." By
contrast, the opening of the Brussels store was one step in the
implementation of a global market development strategy. It was a step
* In fact, the company protested the imposition of British income
tax on earnings generated outside the U.K., and a British court
eventually ruled in the company's favor.9
that Eastman Kodak was to repeat more than 200 times in as many cities
around the world during its founder's lifetime. More important than the
consistency of the company's behavior in this respect is that this
behavior was guided by an articulated policy the purpose of which was to
overcome the limitations of a primitive, and in some places non-existent,
distribution system for a novel consumer product.
The formation of Kodak Ltd. can thus be categorized as an
interesting but ordinary fact while the opening of the Brussels store is
nominated, as Carr would put it, for membership in the club of historical
facts. Whether this nomination will be seconded and accepted depends on
the extent to which readers of these essays accept the interpretation
herein offered as being valid and/or significant. As the title assigned
to these essays suggests and the foregoing discussion adumbrates, the
interpretation serving as their organizing principle rests on two pillars,
the concepts of business strategy and of internationalization.
Business Strategy
The literature of management offers many definitions of strategy
and little agreement as to what the word really means. Despite the
widespread disagreements, some examples of which are cited below, the
definitions can be classified along two dimensions. The first of these
involves statements of what a thing is, while the second involves
descriptions of the distinguishing characteristics of the thing being
defined. These are obviously related but can usefully be separated for
expository purposes.
Along the first of these dimensions, the definitions fall into
two fundamentally different and perhaps incompatible taxonomic categories.
These categories can be conceptualized by means of an analogy drawn from
the field of photography itself. A photograph captures a scene at a
moment in time. When a series of photographs of such scenes is strung
together and shown at well defined intervals, the human eye is fooled into
the perception that it is seeing motion. The individual photographs
constituting what is called a motion picture are not seen simultaneously
but in sequence. Projection of the sequence necessarily occurs over time.
The story told by a movie thus unfolds over time. An individual
photograph, on the other hand, can reveal something only about the
particular instant at which it was taken.
Many, if not indeed most, strategy definitions are movie
analogues. Some representative examples of the genre follow. In a
classic contribution to the literature of management, Chandler defines
strategy as "the determination of the basic long-term goals and objectives
of an enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and the allocation
of resources necessary for carrying out those goals." 10 The key nouns
here - determination, adoption and allocation - all connote action of some
sort. Somebody is doing something, even if it is something as intangible
as making a decision.
What is implicit in Chandler's definition is made explicit by
Andrews when he states that "corporate strategy is an organization
process, in many ways inseparable from the structure, behavior and culture
of the company in which it takes place." 11 The key word here is
process, something that usually occurs over time.
These movie analogues can be contrasted with snapshot analogues.
Tregoe and Zimmerman, for example, define strategy as "the framework which
guides those choices that determine the nature and direction of an
organization." 12 The image used is revealing. A framework does not
move; there is at least a strong presumption that it will stand up long
enough to withstand scrutiny.
Quinn's definition falls into the same snapshot category when he
states that "a strategy is a pattern or plan that integrates an
organization's maior goals, policies, and action sequences into a
cohesive whole." 13 (Emphases by Quinn.) A plan can have meaning only
with reference to a point in time. There may be many such points, and
they may be separated by relatively long intervals. The same plan may
exist at each of the points in a long interval; the individual points are
nevertheless discrete. On the other hand, a plan may change at some
point. To the extent it does, it represents a different strategy.
The following definition by Andrews is recited at some length
for two reasons. It contains elements that will subsequently be drawn
upon as useful, and it throws into sharpest relief the essential
difference between the two principal views of strategy.
Corporate strategy is the pattern of decisions in a company that
determines and reveals its objectives and purposes or goals,
produces the principal policies and plans for achieving those
goals and defines the range of businesses the company is to
pursue, the kind of economic and human organization it intends
to be, and the nature of the economic and noneconomic
contribution it intends to make to its shareholders, employees,
customers and communities. In an organization of any size or
diversity, "corporate strategy" usually applies to the whole
enterprise, while "business strategy," less comprehensive,
defines the choice of product or service and market of
individual businesses within the firm. Business strategy, that
is, is the determination of how a company will compete in a
given business and position itself among its competitors.
Corporate strategy defines the businesses in which a company
will compete, preferably in a way that focuses resources to
convert distinctive competence into competitive advantage. Both
are outcomes of a continuous process of strategic
management... 1 4
Now, we can choose to attend the cinema or to stay home and look
at old photographs. The attempt to do both simultaneously is likely to
produce unnecessary confusion. To avoid it, a choice should be made
between strategy as process and strategy as the outcome of a process.
The point of view adopted in the following essays is that the
conduct of management follows a sequence that begins with a process best
described as the formulation of strategy. The outcome of this process is
an intent to pursue one course of action rather than another. The
carrying out of this intent, beat described as strategy execution, is
another process. The nature of what is intended constitutes strategy, and
the concept is meaningful only at a point separating the two processes.
As strategy is one kind of intent, all intents do not
necessarily constitute strategies. To differentiate strategic intents
from other kinds, it may be useful to consider the second of the above
mentioned definitional dimensions and identify the distinguishing
characteristics of strategy. Some of these have already been given;
others will be added. The aim here is to synthesize from all of them a
definition that will be useful in the present context.
All the definitions cited thus far share, though with varying
degrees of clarity, the idea that strategy is directed toward important
ends. Tregoe and Zimmerman perhaps do it most succinctly in summoning the
ability to guide those choices that will determine where an organization
goes. The use of qualifying adjectives, such as "major" by Quinn and
"principal" by Andrews, points to the same concern with importance.
Broad objects call for general predicates; narrower objects
require more restricted ones. To Tregoe and Zimmerman, a distinguishing
characteristic of strategy is that it guides choices; for Andrews, it
defines choices. The choices that guide do so to determine the nature and
direction of an enterprise. The choices that define do so with respect to
the range of businesses to be pursued and to products, services and
markets. The distinction between guiding and defining will be ignored
since the object of one can easily be subsumed within that of the other.
Both are acceptable if the aim is to identify those characteristics that
distinguish intents constituting strategy from those that do not.
The distinction made by Andrews between corporate and business
strategy, while useful in the study of large contemporary corporations,
can also be largely ignored for the present purpose. Given a sufficiently
broad conception of involvement with photography, the corporate interests
and business interests of the photochemical enterprises were essentially
the same during the periods covered in this study. Exceptions, of which
the early Agfa is the most prominent example, are noted where appropriate
in individual chapters. In general, however, the notions of how these
companies competed and allocated resources to convert distinctive
competence into competitive advantage during their early decades apply
equally well to given companies and the businesses they pursued.
The intents constituting strategy have other distinguishing
characteristics. Henderson suggests one of these in the following terms
"Strategy cannot be changed very often. It is, by definition, the
essentially irretrievable commitment of resources." 15 If the
conceptualization of strategy being developed here has merit, it may be
more accurate to state that the intent embodied in a strategy will, when
carried out, require the irretrievable commitment of resources. This
subtle difference will not be labored further here lest we lose the main
point which is that strategy is concerned with the long run.
Robinson addresses substantially the same point, though more
incisively, when he defines a strategy as "a policy choice that, once
having been made, tends to be institutionalized and thereby resists change
in the short run." 16 The change resistant institutionalization that
follows from the making of strategic choices will be assigned a key role
in the following model of what drove photochemical enterprises to
internationalize their operations.
Although the next definition appears on the surface to say much
the same thing as the previous one, it includes one idea that makes an
essential addition to the list of distinguishing characteristics. In a
later work, Robinson modifies his earlier statement by defining strategy
as "an element in a consciously devised overall plan of corporate
development that, that once made and implemented, is difficult (ie.,
costly) to change in the short run." 17 The crucial additional idea
here is that strategy is consciously devised. Much the same idea is
apparent in Henderson's thinking when he states :
A business should be regarded as a system in equilibrium. An
effective strategy is a predetermined sequence for the
allocation of resources in such fashion that the equilibrium
will be shifted to a more favorable relationship. 18
The important idea here is that of a predetermined sequence. This is
characteristic of strategy whether or not it turns out to be effective.
It may be noted as an aside that while strategy is consciously
devised, the strategist formulating it may thereby be acting out
psychological drives that never rise to the surface of consciousness. A
given strategy may also be one manifestation of sweeping social and
economic changes or a response thereto. The strategist may not be
completely aware that such changes are occurring. Neither of these
considerations invalidates the idea that strategy is consciously devised.
There is one more distinguishing characteristic to be brought
into this developing definition of strategy. This is hinted at by
Henderson in his idea of shifting to a more favorable relationship. It is
insinuated by use of the phrase "defendable position" in Porter's
description of competitive strategy as "taking offensive or defensive
actions to create a defendable position in an industry..." 19 It is
implicit in several of the above cited definitions. To make it explicit,
it may prove useful to draw on the work of an earlier student of
management. In his exposition of "The Theory of Opportunism," Barnard
wrote :
If we take any system, or set of conditions, or conglomeration
of circumstances existing at any given time, we recognize that
it consists of elements, or parts, or factors, which together
make up the whole system, set of conditions, or circumstances.
Now, if we approach this system or set of circumstances, with a
view to the accomplishment of a purpose (and only when we so
approach it), the elements or parts become distinguished into
two classes : those which if absent or changed would accomplish
the desired purpose, provided the others remain unchanged; and
these others. The first kind are often called limiting factors,
the second, complementary factors. Moreover, when we
concentrate our attention upon a restricted or subsidiary
system or set of circumstances, we often find, on the basis of
previous experience or knowledge, that the circumstances fail to
satisfy the requirements of purpose because they lack an
additional element or elements, that is elements which are known
to exist in the larger environment. These are likewise
limiting factors.
The limiting (strategic) factor is the one whose control, in the
right form, at the right place and time, will establish a new
system or set of conditions...
Where the crucial element or part present or absent is a thing
or physical element or compound or ingredient it is convenient
to call it a "limiting" factor; but when personal or
organizational action is the crucial element,
as it ultimately is in all Purposive effort, the word
"strategic is preferable.2 0
The idea to be drawn out of this line of thought and adapted to the
present purpose is the pivotal nature of that which is strategic. An
intent is strategic when its successful execution is indispensable to the
long run prosperity, perhaps even the survival, of the organization.
To summarize, strategy is an intent or collection of intents to
pursue certain courses of action and to avoid others. Among the important
distinguishing characteristics of of these intents are that :
1. Their purpose is to make more certain the long run fortunes
and survival of an enterprise in an environment that may be
and often is competitive.
2. They guide the choice of businesses to enter or exit, of
products znd services offered, of markets to be sought, of
ways of competing or avoiding competition.
3. The choices tend to become institutionalized.
The institutionalization of strategic choices warrants further
comment. This may illuminate why strategy as intent and strategy as
process are sometimes confused. The view has been adopted above that
strategy formulation precedes the carrying out of strategy in a sequence.
So far, such a sequence may be viewed as linear. It may occur, however,
that the successful execution of one or more institutionalized elements of
a given strategy creates conditions in the firm's environment that
stimulate the need to formulate other, additional strategic intents. The
sequence of formulation and execution is therefore repeated, and the
pattern of repetitions may appear to become circular. It becomes easy for
the observer to confound the circular repetition of processes with the
essence of strategy and thereby to conclude that strategy is a process.
Internationalization and its Linkage to Strategy
The concept of internationalization is far less elusive. It is
the extension of business activities across national frontiers. In the
photochemical industry, those activities are largely confined to trade in
tangible goods. Such trade is primarily in consumable products and to a
lesser extent in raw or intermediate materials. Other business functions
and relationships have been extended across national borders by the
companies in this industry, and these will be noted where appropriate.
However, for reasons to be discussed, the international involvement of the
members of this industry fundamentally takes the form of exporting.
As photosensitive materials are consumed rather quickly and
repeatedly, internationalization in this instance implies recurring export
and related marketing activities.
In view of these circumstances, strategy and
internationalization can be linked by the following proposition which
serves as the unifying theme for these essays. All the usual
qualifications apply with respect to models as highly idealized
representations which, because they are idealized, must discard a great
deal of detail.
As suggested above, it is in the very nature of certain
strategic intents that to carry them out requires the institutionalization
of business functions. The performance of such institutionalized
functions involves the incurrence of costs that are quite independent of
the physical volume of what is produced and sold. These volume
independent costs are conventionally labeled as fixed in the literature of
economics and accounting, although this is something of a misnomer.
These costs have in common another characteristic related to but
different from their volume independent behavior. This is that once the
strategic intent to incur then has been formed, they are virtually certain
to be incurred. By contrast, the variable margin required to absorb these
costs is far from certain. The dispersion around an expected value is far
greater for revenues than for these costs. This disparity in degrees of
uncertainty has little appeal to those responsible for the welfare of the
enterprise. It is the source of powerful motivational drives to do
whatever can be done to reduce the uncertainty of revenue generation.
These drives express themselves in one or the other or both of two forms.
One is to restrain or eliminate competition by every means available. The
other is to seek and develop markets wherever they can be found. This
search for markets sooner or later spills across national frontiers.
Internationalization is thus seen as a market seeking response to the need
for recovery of certain fixed costs that arose from strategic commitments.
When market search extends to other countries, the searcher
encounters numerous difficulties, inconveniences and complexities, all of
which lead to the perception of a new set of uncertainties. Until this
perception becomes modified by experience, the risk that is thought to
arise out of conducting business in a foreign environment is typically
shifted to someone to whom that environment is not foreign. This is
achieved by selling the product to an independent foreign distributor.
Later, as the foreign environment comes to seen less strange and signals
that it has the potential for significant market development, a new round
of institutional commitments is made in the form of permanent sales and
distribution establishments owned and operated by the manufacturer. The
original image of repeated strategy formulation and execution takes on
another dimension by being extended from circular to spiral form.
The foregoing discussion attempts to identify a chain of causes
and effects. This is not to suggest that the sequence of events is
inevitable. The view adopted here differs from that of Porter who, for
example, begins his booklength treatise on strategy with the assertion
that every firm competing in an industry has a competitive strategy.2 1
The contrasting position taken here is that all firms exhibit patterns of
behavior. Such patterns may be followed more or less consistently by a
given firm, and the particular combination of elements making up that
pattern may characterize the behavior of that firm so as to differentiate
it from others. When such behavior is the result of having been thought
out and deliberately decided, it can be described as the carrying out of
strategy. This distinguishes such behavior from mere habit. It is easy
to confound habit with the execution of atrategy because both involve
repetition. The distinction is made here to emphasize the point that the
prosperity of the firm depends less on its habitual behavior than on a
deliberated way of dealing with its business environment.
Once the train of causes and effects is set in motion, it does
not necessarily move in only one direction. The perception that
significant market potential exists abroad can lead to further
institutionalized commitments at home. Nevertheless, the present attempt
is to identify how the spiral got started.
Strategic Commitments of Photochemical Producers
Various attempts have been made by students of the subject to
describe the substance of strategy in a generalized way. Porter, for
example, discusses three generic business strategies under the headings of
leadership in cost minimization, product differentiation and concentration
on market segments.2 2 Andrews gives a brief taxonomy of low-growth and
forced-growth strategies.2 3 Both would agree that it is exceedingly
difficult to generalize strategy. Any given company strategy is in most
respects a unique combination of intents that develop in a unique business
environment and represent a unique response to the challenges posed by
that environment. This uniqueness strongly influenced the presentation of
the substance of this thesis in historical essay form.
Such difficulties notwithstanding, there are several
characteristics that distinguish the most successful photochemical
enterprises. These characteristics are the result of carrying out of
strategic intents and are noted here for that reason.
The production of photosensitive materials has over time become
highly capital intensive. Vast complexes of factories, production
machinery and ancillary equipment are used to make photographic film and
paper. Fewer than a dozen such complexes operating around the clock are
capable of satisfying the entire world's demand for their output. Master
rolls of paper or plastic are run in widths of several meters under
coating heads at speeds exceeding 100 meters per minute. A modern color
film receives ten or more coats of chemical compounds including the silver
halides which make it sensitive to light. Each of the layers is
exceedingly thin, its thickness being measured in microns, and tolerance
for deviation from standard width is quite low. Ambient temperature,
humidity and air purity are stringently controlled. Once the light
sensitive compounds enter the process, it must be conducted in virtually
total darkness.
The input of human labor to such a production function is of
necessity limited, and its cost is a miniscule portion of the total
product cost. The small amount of human labor incorporated in the final
product is nevertheless absolutely crucial and represents a perfect
example of the institutionalization of business functions. The design,
improvement and maintenance of such complex production facilities requires
the work of highly trained and skilled technicians and engineers. Such
people are relatively scarce, and the service they perform is not hired by
the production lot. Their presence at the scene is more or less
permanent, and the cost of the service they perform will be incurred
irrespective of the volume of production within rather broad limits.
The output, which is measurable in millions of square meters per
year, is cut up and packaged into relatively tiny units. A 24 exposure
roll of 35mm film covers a little more than 200 square centimeters; the
disk format film introduced by Eastman Kodak in the early 1980s includes
about 11 square centimeters of negative per packaged unit. As it is the
intent to bring such products within the means of the great mass of
consumers, prices are quite low. The cost of the vast manufacturing
complexes in which such products are made can be recovered only from the
production of many years. The decision to construct such facilities takes
on a strategic character.
In narrow economic terms, the objective of these capital
intensive production functions is to minimize both total costs and unit
output costs. When the production process is characterized by large
quantities of materials being transformed at high speed, the detection of
defects becomes very costly if it is delayed until the process is
complete. The detection of conditions causing defects and the adjustment
of these conditions therefore also became automated at every step in the
process. The decision to manufacture at high speeds thus led to an even
greater intensification of capital use.
Minimization of unit costs is achieved by spreading the
relatively large component of fixed costs, in the main depreciation, over
as many output units as possible. The declining unit costs characteristic
of scale economies in manufacturing eventually became a distinguishing
feature of the photochemical industry.
In a somewhat broader sense, the use of capital intensive
manufacturing processes in this industry has other strategic objectives.
Among these is uniformity in physical makeup of the output. This makes
possible a predictable consistency of performance in actual use. The user
takes this consistency on faith when the product is purchased.
Successful producers develop this faith over time and by several
means. Perception of the need to develop it sets in motion a train of
other institutionalized strategic commitments among which is scientific
research and development. It is virtually certain that a photochemical
enterprise that fails to undertake the effort to reduce its understanding
of the relevant physical and chemical phenomena to scientific law will
sooner or later fall by the wayside. There has always been a sufficient
number of competitors forging technical progress in this industry to
assure this result. But the mere undertaking of the effort by no means
assures success. There are few activities the outcome of which is less
predictable. The development of a new photosensitive product can easily
consume a decade. Once the decision is made to institutionalize research
and development, the costs to be incurred in conducting it are quite
certain, and the independence of such cost incurrence from sales revenue
is constrained only by short-term profit considerations.
Photosensitive materials are used in a variety of applications.
They can serve as intermediate or ancillary products in some other
product, process or service. These can be broadly categorized as
commercial applications. All other uses for which the photographic
picture serves as the end product are categorized as consumer uses.
Where the materials are intended for consumer use, the business
behavior of producers is characterized by high marketing intensity. The
most visible manifestation of this intensity is pervasive advertising.
The strategic significance of advertising requires a little elaboration.
On its face, a given advertising campaign would appear to be the
quintessential example of a tactical maneuver. It is short in duration,
and the decision to refrain from repeating it can be made at any time.
The photochemical industry nevertheless advertises with predictable
regularity. In a word, the function becomes institutionalized. As it
does, the managerial discretion to refrain from advertising becomes
increasingly hypothetical. Firms become committed to continued
advertising and are willing to stake their long term prosperity on its
effectiveness. The strategic objective of continued advertising by the
members of this industry is to build long term brand loyalty. The basis
for this loyalty is the predictable performance of the product in actual
use, something that, as mentioned above, the purchaser necessarily takes
on faith.
The same function is performed by the ubiquitous display of
company trademarks wherever photographic products are advertised and sold.
Although the cost of trademark registration and protection is relatively
minor, photographic companies go to great lengths to protect their
trademarks from improper or unauthorized use. The ostensible purpose of
trademarks is to differentiate the products offered by a given producer
from those put out by competitors. But the underlying motive is always to
reduce to whatever extent possible consumer perceptions of the product's
performance risk.
It is notable that the above characteristics correspond closely
to those identified in a number of empirical studies that sought to
identify the distinguishing characteristics of industries showing large
propensities for internationalizing their operations. These studies have
been summarized by Vernon24 and Caves2 5 among others.
Qualifications and Research Issues
The foregoing description of strategic commitments characterizes
the photochemical industry as it has come to be in the twentieth century.
The central proposition offered above is that internationalization is a
market seeking consequence of the carrying out of these commitments. The
following essays will show that in several instances the search for
markets abroad began during the late nineteenth century, before such
strategic commitments came to characterize the industry. These early
foreign market explorations were, however, for the most part quite modest
and can be attributed to the entrepreneurial initiative of the industry's
pioneers. It can even be argued that the early search for foreign markets
and the early adoption of characteristic strategies had a common source in
the entrepreneurial makeup of some of the industry's founders. This
argument will not be pursued since few facts supporting it came to light
in the research.
The following chapters recount a number of events the
significance of which is open to question in light of the offered
interpretation. Some of these are presented simply to minimize
disjointedness in presentation. The inclusion of others is prompted by
considerations of completeness. What is offered here is an
interpretation of the internationalization of an industry. Other
interpretations are certainly conceivable, and history does not, in any
event, unfold according to formula. If readers are to form their own
judgments about the general validity of this interpretation, they are
entitled to as complete a recital of the facts as the availability of raw
data makes feasible. This is notwithstanding that the researcher has used
his own judgment in excluding some events on the ground that they had no
role in the recurring international activities of given firms.
The use of judgment was critical throughout the research
conducted in preparing this thesis. Before the judgmental discrimination
between historical fact and ordinary fact can be made, it is necessary to
ascertain that a given set of data constitute a fact at all. In many
instances, this was not self-evident and required qualitative use of the
quantitative concept of probability. The search for facts was conducted,
wherever possible, by inspection and evaluation of primary source
documents. Such documents are rare, incomplete and sometimes
inaccessible. Enterprises do not conduct their affairs or leave behind
records of their doings for the convenience of later historians. Any
given document cannot be accepted at face value when other documents give
incompatible or contradictory indications. This situation, which was
encountered on a number of occasions, prompted a search for independent
corroborating evidence. If and as such coroboration was found, the
subjective probability that the researcher had a factual basis for the
reconstruction of events was perceived to have increased. These
probabilities can never be quantified in a meaningful way, but at some
point they will have grown to an extent that warrants the reconstruction
of data as facts.
A danger in this approach is that the researcher will fail to
identify a potentially significant fact because the evidence no longer
exists. This is a risk that must be assumed if anything is to be reported
at all. It can never be eliminated, but it may be reduced by placing
limited reliance on secondary sources. This had to be done to some extent
in the present work, and its merit is diminished in direct proportion
thereto. The first end-note following each chapter of Part II. identifies
the major sources used in the research for that chapter.
The problem of data search and evaluation was particularly acute
with respect to reconstruction of business strategies. With the exception
of George Eastman, who nearly always indicated throughout his voluminous
business correspondence what he was about to do and why, the leaders of
photochemical enterprises rarely articulated their strategies as such.
The analytical task in writing these company histories thus was to tease
the strategic substance out of such data as were unearthed. Often this
can only be surmised from the observed behavior of companies, and the
rigor of the distinction between behavior as habit and as carrying out of
strategic intent must sometimes be relaxed.
Structure
Part II. comprises the histories of the individual enterprises
named earlier in this introduction. It is appropriate to note at this
point that several other participants in this industry have been excluded.
This omission is due mainly to lack of researchable data. Among those
excluded are :
3M Company, (formerly Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.), a
diversified multinational enterprise that, in a sharp departure
from its own traditions, bought its way into the photographic
industry by the acquisition during the early 1960s of several
minor manufacturers; it operates as a private label film
supplier to chains of photographic specialty and general
merchandise retailers.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., a large multinational chemical
enterprise that has been involved in photosensitive materials
for at least six decades but only in certain medical and
industrial application niches.
Polaroid Corporation, an enterprise that since 1948 has occupied
a special niche in the industry by offering instantly developing
photographs; the photosensitive materials used in this product
were for more than two decades manufactured by other firms which
included Eastman Kodak, DuPont, and Agfa-Gevaert. The
internationalization of Polaroid began in the early 1960s and
had essentially taken its present form by the time the company
internalized the manufacture of photosensitive materials in the
mid-1970s. 2 6
It is considered unlikely that omission of these companies would
materially affect the conclusions to be drawn from this study. Those
conclusions are discussed in Part III. which relates the findings, the
above described model and several strands of relevant theoretical work.
Much of that theoretical work draws on concepts that have been developed
by the discipline of economics. Several of these concepts have already
been mentioned or used without being named as such, e.g., economies of
scale, oligopolistic industry structure, product differentiation, etc. It
is thought best, however, to postpone a detailed discussion of how these
concepts relate to the subject at hand until the evidence has been
examined.
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Chapter II
Agfa I
Introduction and background
If a major theme of this thesis is the internationalization of
the photochemical industry, we might well transpose sub3ect and object in
contemplating the early history of Agfa. This company was a mature,
internationalized dye manufacturer before it became a significant
participant in the photographic industry. Its two founders shared a
cosmomolitan outlook which had been acquired by virtue of social
background, education and early work experience. The company was formed
by Carl Alexander von Martius and Paul Mendelssohn-Bartholdy. Von Martius
was the son of a well known scientist who had been a travel companion of
Alexander von Humboldt. Trained as a chemist, the son had worked for a
time in the English dye industry after studying in London.
Hendelssohn-Bartholdy belonged to a family whose reputation had extended
beyond Germany for several generations. He was a great-grandson of the
philosopher Moses Mendelssohn, grandson of the international banker
Abraham, son of the musical composer Felix. He too was a chemist and had
apprenticed in the Leipzig branch of a company based in Manchester.2
The two men met and in 1867 formed an enterprise dedicated to
the then young field of synthesizing aniline dyes. Starting with the
production of intermediate chemical products, they soon saw better
business opportunity in forward integration to the actual making of dyes.
This required physical expansion. In 1873, the company was incorporated
as Actiengesellachaft fur Anilinfabrikation, and it purchased the Berlin
factory and business of a Dr. Jordan. This plant, established in 1850,
had been chartered in 1863 to make aniline dyes for which even then there
were good markets as far away as East Asia.3
The business prospered. By 1877, it was possible to pay a six
percent dividend on a capital base of 1.02 million marks. The growth of
the firm is revealed by periodic increases in its outstanding share
capital. An indication of this is provided by the following data : 4
Year Marks
1877 1,020,000
1882 1,800,000
1884 2,600,000
1890 3,000,000
1895 5,000,000
By the turn of the century, the company was operating branch
factories in Moscow, St.Fons (France) and Libau (Austria). The motivation
for the erection of such foreign branch plants is familiar to the student
of early international business. This was the need to get behind high
tariff barriers and other impediments to trade. In France, for example,
one of these obstructions was that the protection given to the holder of a
locally registered patent would remain in force only if the product
covered by the patent were made locally. Commercial exploitation in
France of a patented product was thus dependent on local manufacture.5
A report to the company's supervisory board for the year 1901
indicates that Agfa was then exporting prodigious quantities of dyes and
intermediate products to Shanghai, Tientain, Canton, Hong Kong, Japan, the
Straits Settlements (Singapore), India and the U.S. from its German
factories. Products were shipped to the Far East on consignment and sold
by agents. A branch in New York directed the work of sales offices in
Chicago, Charlotte, Cincinnati, Boston and Philadelphia. A company sales
representative was posted in Bombay to scan the specific needs of the
Indian market. Patent and trademark infringement litigation was conducted
by the company in Italy and the U.S. that year. 6
Agfa was thus a fairly sophisticated international enterprise by
the time of its entry into photography. When one of its chemists
discovered a new photographic developer in 1888, the company took
immediate steps to have the discovery patented in four foreign countries
as well as in Germany.7
While the company prospered, it was not alone. There were
others, and some of them prospered even more. The 1860s had brought forth
most of the subsequently important participants in the German coal tar dye
industry. An indication of Agfa's relative standing among incorporated
companies in its industry is provided by the following 1902 data : 8
Total Long Term Capital Employed
(in marks)
Farbwerke vorm. Meister, Lucius & Brining 51,811,687
Badische Anilin- und Sodafabrik 35,752,875
Farbenfabriken vorm. Fiedr. Bayer & Co. 28,059,884
Aktiengesellschaft fur Anilinfabrikation 17,933,505
Chemische Fabriken vorm. Weiler ter Meer 7,481,000
Farbwerke MUhlheim vorm. A.Leonhardt & Co . 3,591,202
Competition in this industry was fierce during the 1880s and
1890a, sometimes driving prices below production coats. This led the
management of Agfa to pursue two strategic objectives. One was to try to
restrain competition; the other was diversification. Both of these
pursuits evolved in the mind and under the direction of Franz Oppenheim,
the company's chief executive during the years Agfa came to full flower as
a photographic enterprise.
Oppenheim realized that playing in the same league as the giants
of the German dye industry was dangerous and potentially fatal for Agfa.
He therefore kept his mind open to other opportunities. Photography
turned out to be one of these. In a modern industrial sense, it was a new
field in 1888. The discovery of a photographic chemical was completely
incidental to the company's business at the time. Its discoverer was a
dye chemist with an amateur interest in photography. This developer was
commercialized on a modest scale. Organizational lethargy had to be
overcome to get the developer produced at all. Exclusive German
distribution rights were given to a former Agfa chemist who had set
himself up as a photographic dealer in Frankfurt am Main.9 Even with
such a modest beginning, some quantities of the product were exported to
America where a company representative tried to sell it. 10
The product enjoyed small commercial success, partially because
it yellowed certain plates when a given solution was used repeatedly in
the development process. Nevertheless, its discoverer kept up the
pressure for further research and development work on photographic
chemicals. Without making a major commitment, Oppenheim was supportive to
the extent of permitting the establishment of a photographic department in
the company. By 1891, it had synthesized a new developer. This was given
the name Rodinal, and it enjoyed broad and long lived commercial
acceptance. This success emboldened the company to introduce dry plates
in 1894. In the first year of the new century, such plates were being
made with special hardening of the emulsion so as to be usable in the
tropical climates to which they were being exported.1 1
While the company had by 1900 gained a modest foothold in the
German photographic industry, it was one among many. Germany had 44 dry
plate manufacturers at the turn of the century. 12
Toward World Class Status
The seed which eventually blossomed to make Agfa the biggest
producer of photosensitized materials in Europe had nevertheless already
been planted. Starting in 1894, the same year it first made saleable dry
plates, the company started coating emulsions on flat sheets of celluloid.
The next decade and a half was a period marked by many disappointments as
the company's chemists and engineers struggled to master the relationships
among time, temperature, humidity, air purity, celluloid and light
sensitive emulsions. Several times films were put on the market only to
have to be withdrawn. Latent images would disappear, nitrocellulose would
decompose, emulsions would interact chemically with the safety paper in
which films were rolled, and similar childhood diseases, characteristic of
almost any new and ill understood technology, frustrated the photographic
department's progress.
In the meantime, the department made do with what it had to
offer. The report to the supervisory board for the year 1902 mentions that
the photographic department's propaganda in foreign markets must have been
successful since the entire increase in the department's sales was
represented by exports. A 25,000 copy edition of the department's
handbook had been distributed to the German trade the previous year. A
French translation of this book, entitled Agfa-Guide, had come out in
1902; Italian, Swedish, Danish, Russian and English editions were ready
for publication in 1903. The profits generated by sales of existing
photographic products were easily eaten up by the research and development
costs of films. The goal had, however, become clearly defined by 1903.
That year's report to the supervisory board stated
An experimental facility was launched and numerous trials
undertaken for the rational production of the film base.
Production of an endless film band should be achieved by this
facility. Should we succeed in this, we would be able to make
cinematographic films, for which a profitable market should
exist, and above all, we should be able to lower significantly
the production costs of our films; this is because, until now,
we have found coating faults wherever the film support lies
over the small space between two adjoining glass plates on
which the support rests, giving rise to very considerable waste
in production.1 3
The profitable market mentioned in this report did not exist in
Germany. The impetus for Agfa's painful and costly cinefilm product
development efforts came from abroad. A German industry dedicated to the
exposure of negative cinefilm and the development and copying of positive
film destined for theatrical exhibition did not, for all practical
purposes, exist prior to 1910. 14 Such industries had sprung up,
beginning about 1895, in America, France, Italy and Denmark. Virtually
the sole supplier of unexposed film to these cinema industries was the
Eastman Kodak Company.15 There were marginal producers of
photosensitive materials, like the brothers Lumiere in Lyon, who tried to
supply these industries with film. But the quality of their product was
not up to the technical standard set by Kodak.16 And the demand was
insatiable.
Potential customers for unexposed film were not limited to the
cinema studios in Paris, Rome, Turin and Copenhagen. The economic
functions of people and companies during these infant years of the cinema
were not sharply defined and differentiated. People looked for
opportunities wherever they were to be found. One such potential customer
for positive film was the firm of the brothers Pathe in Paris. They had
developed a strong position in the theater exhibition end of the business.
They saw the potential in backward integration to the production of
multiple copies of positive cineffilm. They wanted to build a factory for
this purpose in Paris. Lacking intimate knowledge of the technical
aspects of such a venture, however, they needed outside help. In 1905,
they made contact with Paul Singer, a partner in the firm acting as Agfa's
distributor in France. Singer went to Berlin to propose what would in a
later day become known as a turnkey plus technical knowhow project. Agfa
would construct a film factory for Pathe in France and make available its
process technology for film making. Oppenheimer articulated a key policy
decision in rejecting this proposal. He decided that if Agfa were to
become involved with large scale manufacture of raw film at all, it would
do so only if manufacturing were under Agfa management.17 The
conditional nature of this decision is to be noted; we are not yet at a
point where we can speak of a strategic decision. The latter was,
however, soon to be taken.
The Path6 reaction to Oppenheim's refusal was that they were
prepared to enter into a long term agreement under which Agfa would supply
positive film to them. Similar readiness was expressed by the European
studios, potential customers for negative film. The American studios were
growing at a prodigious rate during the first decade of the century. The
European studios had a well founded fear of a film supply cutoff from the
single source in Rochester. They also resented what George Eastman
subsequently called his Paris manager's "dictatorial and brusque"
treatment of the studios.19 French studios like Eclair and Lux, and
Italian studios like Ambrosio, Itala and Cines worked closely with Agfa
during this period in trying out the experimental product and in
cooperative attempts to solve many technical problems. In 1906, a pilot
plant was successfully started in Berlin, and the foreign studios were
sufficiently satisfied with its output to pressure Agfa into-a fundamental
decision. This was whether or not to go into large scale production. 1 9
A brief parenthetical discussion of the issues involved in this
decision may be useful here. The scale of what was proposed was
unprecedented for Agfa. The planned annual output capacity under
consideration was ten million linear meters of film. 20 In comparable
area of photosensitized materials, this was more than double what the
company had achieved in coating glass plates. The work to be done was,
moreover, quite different from what Agfa had experienced up to that point.
It comprised not only the making of emulsions and coating them on a base;
these are common to plates and film. Rather, it included the making of
the film base itself. Apart from this backward integration, the raw
materials from which the base was made were still changing. This was
because the highly flammable nature of cellulose nitrate had brought the
suitability of this material into question, both in manufacturing and in
use in public theaters. This problem was eventually solved by the use of
cellulose acetate, but this material behaves very differently from the
nitrate in actual use. Coating was to be done by continuous process,
something which was virtually impossible to achieve with glass because of
the very nature of this material. All of the foregoing factors made for
high uncertainty and high cost. The plants to be built were to cost four
million marks.
A management contemplating such an expenditure looks for some
assurance that there will be profitable long term markets for the output..
Such assurance existed, at least for the short term, in the willingness of
foreign customers to enter into supply contracts. Obligations are, of
course, assumed by both parties to a contract. Agfa was neither the first
nor the last photographic manufacturer to learn that what works in a
research laboratory and even in a pilot production plant does not
necessarily work under conditions of large scale production. Seemingly
assured sales can evaporate. Despite the professed willingness of Charles
Pathe to be supplied by Agfa, his firm did build its own factory. As the
events of the next decade were to show, the ultimate chaos in
international relations represented by world war can make a mockery of
assured markets for a producer completely dependent on foreign customers
for sales. Finally, it was required, in the Berlin of 1906, either to
have far sighted vision or to be amenable to the discernment of associates
to appreciate the potential of the cinema as something more than a passing
fad. Oppenheim himself is reported never to have entered a cinema before
1926.
Oppenheim later said that it was the most difficult decision of
his career.2 1 The decision was made to go, and it led to Agfa becoming
the largest manufacturer of photosensitized materials in Europe. The film
manufacturing complex took several years to design and build. It went
into production in 1909. Because of the by then already intolerably high
concentration of industrial air pollution in Berlin, the plants were built
in Wolfen, where Agfa already had a dye works. This choice of location,
about 120 kilometers southwest of Berlin, was four decades later to have
profound implications for the company's very existence, not to mention ita
international history.
The facility was inadequate to meet demand almost from inception.
Continued growth of the foreign cinema industry and the gradual emergence
of German studios after 1910 required almost continuous expansion of the
complex during the next four years. By the end of 1913, the company was
producing cinefilm at an annual rate of 30 million linear meters. 1913
sales of such films exceeded nine million marks, which represented 65
percent of the company's photographic business. To keep the significance
of this business in perspective, sales of all photographic products
represented one fourth of total Agfa sales that year,22
Such success could not, of course, fail to draw the attention of
Eastman Kodak. A series of meetings between Agfa and Eastman Kodak senior
managements took place in Paris and Berlin during the 1912-1913 period.
These meetings produced an agreement dividing world markets for cinefilm
between the two companies. According to Leubner, Agfa agreed to refrain
from entering the U.S. cinefilm market. All other markets were to receive
60 percent of their film from Kodak and 40 percent from Agfa. For all
practical purposes, all other markets meant France, Italy and Denmark.
That Kodak agreed to exclude Agfa from the U.S. is open to question. The
contemporary correspondence of George Eastman indicates he was well aware
that such restraint of trade in the U.S. was illegal. But the division of
European markets is documented in Eastman's own correspondence. 2 3
1914 - 1925
World War I caused a dramatic change in the nationality of
Agfa's photographic markets. Major foreign markets were cut off
overnight. The company became a much more conventional uninational
enterprise than it had been before. The domestic market, and in
particular the German government, picked up the slack. Agfa production
capacity was strained by the demand for entertainment films to maintain
the morale of troops and the civilian population. This demand could be
filled by the rapidly developing German cinema studio industry. By 1916,
the company had gained enough experience in the large scale production of
cinefilm to bring out a negative roll film for use in still cameras. Such
film had largely been imported before the war. With a total supply cutoff
after entry of the U.S. into the war, Germany was desperate for a local
supply source. Such films were used extensively in aerial reconaissance
by the German army.2 4
By 1918, scientific research as the basis for new or improved
products had long been embedded in the company's chemical operations. A
further step toward the institutionalization of research and development
in the photographic section came to be seen as a vital necessity in 1920.
New laboratories were set up in Wolfen; Berlin was seen to be simply too
far removed from actual production.2 5
The research effort bore fruit in a variety of new or better
products introduced by Agfa in the early postwar years. These included
panchromatic dry plates, portrait films, reversal cinefilms, sensitized
printing and reproduction plates, dental x-ray films, and color screen
plates.2 6 The research efforts required to bring out these products
were costly; so was the expansion of production facilities necessitated by
these new products. These products were not just new . Their
introduction reflects a considerable broadening of the product palette
offered by the company. To cover the inevitable escalation of costs which
accompanies such expansion, markets had to be sought, including those
beyond the borders of Germany. This was by no means easy. The war left a
residue of unresolved international economic problems and of ill will
against Germany. This took many forms. Among these were trade barriers.
The British Tariff of 1922 is an example. This tariff explicitly singled
out products of German origin, including photographic materials, and
raised the import tariffs on these to 33.3 percent ad valorem.2 7 Agfa
thus had to go far afield to such regions as the Far East to generate
export sales. The effort to do so effectively led to the establishment of
a number of foreign branches. This in turn required working capital and
was seen by the management as being the immediate cause of bringing the
company to the edge of insolvency during the hyperinflation of 1923. The
minutes of a management board meeting held that year are sufficiently
instructive to warrant translation at this point :
Privy Councillor Oppenheim described the present
unfavorable financial position and ascertained that we are
approaching the borderline of possibility for the continued
maintenance of our activities. A credit of 300,000 Dutch
guilders and 25,000 pounds Sterling has been secured through the
Mendelssohn banking house. This should enable us to meet our
obligations for about two more weeks. An even more thrifty
housekeeping than heretofore is therefore required of all
departments. The main cause undoubtedly lies in the recent
expansion of our exports; moreover, it lies in the circumstance
that in many cases we have tried to stand on our own feet in our
foreign business by establishing our own offices and warehouses.
As our export business has, by such means, achieved a greater
radius of action, significantly larger amounts of money have had
to be tied up in large foreign warehouses (for example, in Japan
with Y. 4 million in insured value, of which, however, Y. 300,000
were destroyed by the earthquake) and in floating goods. For
these, not only production costs but substantial amounts for
freight and customs duties (for example, 33.3 percent in Japan)
have been incurred; but compensating sales proceeds have not in
the meantime as yet flowed into the company.28
The company's fortunes were soon to change.
Division III of IG Farbenindustrie AG
Attempts to restrain competition within the German chemical
industry were nearly as old as the industry itself. A patent dispute over
a dye called Congo Red had led Agfa and Bayer to seek an accommodation
with each other as early as 1876. This took the form of a pooling of
patents covering this and four other dyes; it also included the fixing of
prices on these dyes for the remaining lives of the patents. Agfa and
Bayer joined six other German producers and one English dye manufacturer
in the Alizarin Convention of 1881. This cartel divided markets and
allocated sales quotas to the participants and set price floors for
alizarin dyes. Other efforts, similar in nature, emerged with the passage
of time. In 1905, the German Interior Ministry identified some 46 cartels
in the chemical industry.29
Such cartel arrangements inevitably broke down sooner or later.
Top executives of the leading firms had come to feel early in the new
century that stronger measures were required if the competition among them
were to be kept from becoming ruinous. Except for Bayer's Carl Duisberg,
none were willing to give up their independence of action. A middle
course was taken in 1905. Prodded by a 56 page Duisberg memorandum urging
the complete consolidation of the entire industry, the six largest dye
makers formed two groups.30 Each of these constituted an
Interessengemeinschaft. (Hereafter, this term, which translates roughly
into Community of Interests, will be abbreviated as IG.) One of these,
the Dreibund IG, included Agfa, Bayer and BASF. It operated through a
pooling of profits generated by the invention, manufacture and sale of
dyes. Agfa and Bayer were thus free each to go its own way in
photography. A further step was taken in 1916 when the eight largest
companies formed an IG to be operated along similar lines. 31 Duiaberg
finally had his way in 1925 when IG Farbenindustrie AG was formed.
(Hereafter, this will be abbreviated as IG Farben.) This was a full
merger into one corporate entity of all German chemical companies of any
consequence. This led to a total reorganization of what was now one of
the largest firma in the world. A modern divisionalized structure with
numerous central staff commissions emerged. Agfa became Division III.
Its product responsibilities included, in addition to artificial fibers,
all photographic products. Agfa thereby inherited responsibility for its
own former film, plate and photographic chemical operations, Bayer's
photographic chemical, paper and film business, and the Rietzschel camera
works which had earlier been acquired by Bayer.3 2 Shortly after the
merger, IG Farben acquired the business and assets of Saska GmbH, a Munich
based maker of photofinishing equipment. This acquisition was turned over
to Agfa to integrate into its operations. 3 3
Agfa thus quickly became, for the first time in its history, a
fully integrated photographic manufacturer, capable of offering a complete
product palette. All of its goods were soon sold under the Agfa brand and
trademarks. This began in Germany and soon spread to other countries
excepting the U.S. where other developments were to unfold.
- Agfa's advertising during these years reflects an emerging
business strategy made possible by the new situation. The principal
slogan it used was Alles aus einer Hand (Everything from one
Source).3 4 The slogan is unambiguous in meaning, but it has a twofold
significance to be more fully discussed below.
In 1930, Agfa brought out a simple box camera and sold 44,000
units. The following year, 160,000 units were sold. 3 5 To generate some
extra sales of this model, Agfa ran a special promotion in 1932. The
camera was offered to the public at the virtually unheard of retail price
of four marks.36 The promotion led to sales of more than two million
Agfa box cameras.3 7
It is in the very nature of consumer product promotions that
they be short lived. The Agfa box promotion could have been stopped at
some reasonable point in time. It was continued well beyond its initially
planned term and ran for more than a year. Agfa management had begun to
think in strategic terms. After observing Eastman Kodak behavior over a
generation, Agfa executives had come to appreciate that the profit
potential in amateur photography inhered in repetitive sales of consumable
sensitized materials. They had come to see that an effective way to
realize this potential was to invest in whatever was required to make it
possible for the sensitized materials to be sold. In this instance, the
requirement was fulfilled by putting a camera in the consumer's hands; the
investment took the forms of giving up profit on the sale of the camera
and of massive advertising to support distribution of the cameras to the
ultimate users. The sale of two million cameras resulted in a significant
increase in the sale and use of Agfa films and papers during a period in
which economic activity seemed to be heading toward a nearly complete
standstill.38
The strategic significance of the box camera promotion, and in
connection with this, that of the above mentioned advertising slogan, can
now be discussed. Agfa remained a full line manufacturer of photographic
products. But the box promotion marks a turning point. From this point
on, a much greater emphasis was placed on the popularization of
photography and on making Agfa a supplier of consumer products. In its
appeal to the general public, the slogan conveyed an assurance of quality,
reliability and completeness of service. It drove the public into the
arms of the photographic specialty retailers. This helped strengthen the
company's dominant position in the distribution system of its home
country. The dealers constituting this distribution channel were
cultivated assiduously by Agfa. By appealing to them with this slogan,
Agfa was able to achieve new scale economies in marketing. A sales call
on a dealer had the potential of generating sales of cameras, accessories,
darkroom equipment, chemicals, plates, films and paper.
Although the box camera was exported, the present research has
uncovered no instance of export of the promotion or of foreign adaptation
of the basic promotional idea. The 1932 box camera promotion thus appears
to have been a purely German event. It was, nevertheless, meaningful for
this chronicle of Agfa's international development. The promotion started
an expansion of unit volume of consumable sensitized products. This
helped the company to achieve scale economies that were quite useful in
all of its selling efforts, including those in foreign countries. It is
to be recalled that this occurred during a period of nearly chaotic
international economic relations. The ability to manufacture at low cost
was a critical requirement for any company seriously interested in export
markets.
The international expansion of Agfa's business during the
interwar period fits the conventional pattern and can thus be recited
briefly. The company was, with one notable exception to be discussed
below, a uninational manufacturer with export markets. At first, products
were exported to independent distributors. When and where the perceived
market potential appeared sufficiently large to justify the estabuishment
of a sales branch or a partially or wholly owned sales and distribution
subsidiary, this was done. This latter course had, by 1933, been followed
in the countries shown on the map following this page. 39 These
countries all belonged to the Europe-Near East sales territory, one of two
into which the world outside Germany was organized by the company's sales
management. The other was known as the Overseas territory; this included
the British Isles as well as the more distant countries. At the outbreak
of the next world war, Agfa was exporting to some 70 countries throughout
the world. Among those which were considered important were India, China,
Indochina, Japan, Dutch East Indies, Straits Settlements, South Africa,
and Australia.4 0
In some instances, Agfa took a middle course between working
exclusively through a subsidiary or a distributor in a given country. One
or more Agfa employees worked within the organization of an independent
distributor. Their work, after training and indoctrination in Berlin, was
to bring to the distributor the full range of Agfa's technical and
marketing expertise.4 1'4 2
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The U.S. has thus far been prominent by its absence from this
account of Agfa's postwar international history. This country was the
host for Agfa's only pre-World War I foreign direct manufacturing
investment in the photographic industry. The proximate stimulus for this
investment was the traditional frustration in penetrating a protected
foreign market. The Fordney - McCumber Tariff Act of 1922 imposed an
import duty on film at the rate of .4 cents per linear foot of 35mm
film.4 3
In an effort to preserve its traditional hegemony over its
American market, Eastman Kodak had progressively lowered the price of its
cinefilm from a postwar high of 2.5 cents per linear foot to one cent.
Given the prevailing U.S. import duty, this was a price with which no
foreign film could profitably compete.4 4
The situation was similar for amateur photographic products.
Apart from the high import tariff, Agfa's U.S. activities remained modest
because of a self reference bias in its distribution policy. Such success
as Agfa was enjoying in Europe was based on its growing control over and
reliance on specialized photographic retailers. This policy was not
readily exportable to a market where George Eastman had shown the
prescience to popularize his products by distributing them through drug
stores and other frequently visited retail outlets.
The fundamental resources and skills needed by Agfa to conduct
an effective U.S. business were lacking. As it happened, however, there
was an American company which had at least the nucleus of what Agfa
needed. This was the Ansco company.
The antecedents of Ansco can be traced back to well before the
appearance of photography. The J.M.L. & W.H. Scovill Co. had been
involved in the manufacture of small hardware items since its 1802
founding.4 5 It had gone into production of the silvered plates used by
daguerreotypists within months of Daguerre's 1839 demonstration of his
process in Paris. Edward Anthony had in 1842 opened a New York store to
supply daguerreotypists. Both firms became importers of European
photographic materials; both became significant participants in American
photographic industry and commerce during the nineteenth century. Both
had run out of energy and leadership by the end of the century. They
merged in 1901 to form the Anthony and Scovill Company. Six years later,
the company name and trademarks were changed to Ansco.4 6 This appears
to have been the limit of the company's strategic thinking. In 1914, the
courts ruled for Ansco in a patent infringement suit it had brought
against Eastman Kodak. As the case involved the patent for the process
and use of the celluloid film base which constituted the core of the
radical change in photography that had started in 1889, the court's
3udgment might well have changed the subsequent history of the
industry.47 But Ansco accepted a $5 million out of court settlement
from Eastman and proceeded to dissipate over 40 percent of this to pay a
dividend to its common stockholders and to retire two preferred stock and
bond issues.4 8 In 1922, Anaco directors brought in Horace Webber Davis,
a professional revitalizer of sick companies, to do what could be done
with the company. He did what he could, but he saw clearly what was
lacking.
Davis approached IG Farben in terms that were later paraphrased
by the editors of Fortune as : "We need money and technicians. You need
sales in the U.S. market. You have the money and technicians. We have a
factory within the U.S. borders. Let us pool our possessions and meet our
necessities." 49 The approach was hardly subtle. To make sure,
however, that his German negotiating partners did not miss the point,
Davis had Ansco file a dumping complaint against Agfa with the U.S.
government just before the negotiations began.5 0
The Agfa Anaco Photo Products Company was organized as a new
corporation in late 1927, capitalized at $7,350,000 of which 60 percent
was subscribed by IG Farben. (This was subsequently raised to 93
percent.)5 1 The products were marketed under the Ansco brand, and in
acknowledgement of the political sensitivities of the era, every effort
was made to maintain an American face toward the public. The marketing
functions and general administration were headed by American executives.
The board of directors remained prominently American. Production, all
technical support functions and finance were headed by Germans. A new
film factory was built, and the paper and camera plants in Binghamton, New
York were extensively modernized, all according to engineering plans drawn
up in Wolfen. A veritable flood of German engineers and technicians
streamed into Binghamton. This did not always result in perfectly
harmonious relations with their American colleagues. The quality of Ansco
products nevertheless soon began to show remarkable improvement. Academy
Awards were earned in 1936 and 1937 for new infra-red and high speed
films. By 1935, the company had begun to generate reasonable profits.5 2
The Ansco acquisition became involved with some of the other
corporate purposes of IG Farben. A gasoline synthesization project had
drained IG Farben's financial resources. One of the means used to
replenish the corporate treasury was an agreement with Standard Oil
Company (New Jersey). Under this 1928 agreement, a new American company,
Standard - I.G.Company was formed; ownership was split, Standard Oil
holding 80 percent and IG Farben the rest. Farben turned over to this new
company world patent rights, excepting Germany itself, to the
Bergius-Bosch hydrogenation process. The consideration paid to Farben was
two percent of Standard Oil's common stock, then valued at $35
million.53 This amount was subject to German income tax, an expense
which Hermann Schmitz, the company's chief financial executive, was
desperate to avoid. He therefore caused a number of IG Farben
subsidiaries to be formed. These were to act as holding companies. Among
these were the American I.G. Chemical Company which came to hold the IG
Farben equity in Agfa Ansco Company and in the General Aniline Works. The
parent holding the stock of American I.G. Chemical Company was organized
in Switzerland in 1929 as the Internationale Gesellschaft fUr Chemische
Unternehmungen, subsequently called I.G. Chemie. Several IG Farben
controlled Dutch companies also became involved in the share control of
American I.G. Chemical Company by way of the latter's 1929 issuance of
convertible debenturea.5 4 As the second World War approached, other
efforts were made to camouflage the real German ownership of American I.G.
Chemical Company. In 1939, its name was changed to General Aniline and
Film Corporation (hereafter GAF).55
In the end, none of these moves were effective. Within days of
American entry into the second World War, the U.S. Department of Justice
initiated a congressional amendment to the 1917 Trading With The Enemy
Act. This amendment, the main aim of which was to legalize government
seizure of GAF, empowered the U.S. to cut through the corporate veil of
nominal ownership of enemy assets by entities in Switzerland and other
neutral countries. GAF was seized early in 1942 by U.S. Treasury
Department agents and put under the control of the Alien Property
Custodian.5 6 Following more than two decades of litigation and
political maneuvering, GAF shares were eventually sold to the public in
1965 for 0329 million.
1945 - 1963
In the perspective of subsequent events, the loss of Anaco was
trivial. Agfa lost virtually the entire basis for its business with the
collapse of the Third Reich. The European economy lay in ruins, as did
that of much of Asia and other parts of the world in 1945. The company's
paper facilities in Leverkusen were slightly damaged. Its Munich camera
works were one third completely destroyed and two thirds severely damaged.
Many of the company's key chemists were either dead or scattered over the
rest of the world.5 7 Agfa's chief executive was soon to be indicted as
a war criminal at Nurnberg.
The American army briefly occupied Wolfen. During its
occupation, visitors representing competitor firma based in Allied
countries came to get and received Agfa's emulsion formulas. These firma
included Dupont (U.S.), Ilford (U.K.), Kodak Ltd. (U.K.), Guilleminot
(France) and, for a final ironic touch, Anaco (U.S.); Russians, Czechs,
and even Chinese visitors arrived to get what they could.5 9 The Allied
powers appropriated all Agfa patents and freed them for common use. As a
result, details of the Agfacolor process became known to Tellko
(Switzerland; later acquired by Ciba), Ferrania ( Italy; later acquired by
3M), and Gevaert (Belgium; later to merge with Agfa).6 0 In monochrome
photography, the Koslowsky effect became public knowledge. This had been
the 1935 discovery by an Agfa chemist that film sensitivity could be
significantly increased by the addition of minute amounts of gold to the
emulsions.6 1
The American occupation lasted two months. Troops of the Soviet
Union took its place in June 1945. Under the subsequent regime of the
Sowietische Militgradministration in Deutschland (Soviet Military
Administration in Germany), the Wolfen works were expropriated in 1947 and
nationalized as Soviet property in Germany. Although the German
Democratic Republic effectively came into existence as a separate nation
in 1949, the Soviet Union waited until the end of 1953 to turn formal
ownership of the Wolfen works over to the new state.6 2
There was, in short, little reason to believe in the mid-1940s
that Agfa would ever again be a significant name in the photographic
industry. Agfa had, however, not quite lost everything. Among its
remaining assets, intangible though they may have been, were its
reputation and the determination of a handful of executives not to yield
to the disaster which had befallen their enterprise and their country.
There were others who saw potential for Agfa in a reconstructed
Europe. Approaches were made by Gevaert, Tellko, and by the Union Bank of
Switzerland. The bank's client is not identified, but it is not wildly
implausible that the bank was speaking for CIBA, the Basel based chemical
giant. (CIBA later acquired Tellko, Lumiere and Ilford to establish itself
in the photographic business.) Nothing came of these approaches. Agfa
began to reconstruct itself in the western occupation zone of Germany.
Two Agfa companies were formed, each a subsidiary of Bayer AG; Bayer was
reconstituted as one of three major companies to emerge from the breakup
of IG Farben. The two Agfa subsidiaries were subsequently combined into
one. The Munich-based Agfa subsidiary made cameras. The other Agfa
subsidiary was established in Leverkusen to make photochemical products.
The choice of Leverkusen, a city north of Cologne, was influenced by two
major considerations. One was that Leverkusen was the principal site of
Bayer's chemical manufacturing operations. Secondly, Agfa photographic
paper coating operations had been centered in Leverkusen before the war.
The decade starting in 1945 constitutes a hiatus in the
international history of Agfa. The Munich works did make Ansco branded
cameras as a contract manufacturer for GAF, the company's former U.S.
affiliate, during this period.6 4 But similar activity on the
photochemical aide was out of the question. The first attempts to coat
film in Leverkusen were made on machinery designed to coat paper. That
did not work very well. The tension to be maintained for coating paper
and film base varies significantly with the material. 65 It took until
1950 to construct and install new film machinery in Leverkusen.6 6 By
then, the 1948 currency reform, which had the effect, among others, of
institutionalizing East and West Germany as separate aconomic zones and
eventually as separate political entities, had made its contribution in
stimulating what came to be called the Wirtschaftswunder, the
extraordinary post-war recovery of the West German economy. 67 The
Leverkusen management had its hands full keeping up with rapidly growing
domestic demand during this decade. Therein lies a chapter in the history
of international business relations which may be unique in its details but
which throws some light on the importance of intangible assets in the
conduct of international commerce in photographic goods.
The name Actiengesellachaft fur Anilinfabrikation does not fall
trippingly from the tongue even in its native language. The letters
A-G-F-A thus began to appear in the company's trademarks with the
introduction of its first gelatin dry plates in 1894. The photographic
historian, Stenger, ventures that this may have been the first use of an
acronym for such purposes in Germany. The Agfa trademark was first
registered in 1897, and by the turn of the century it had become prominent
in the identification of the company and its products.68
Despite a certain amount of dismantlement during the American
and Russian occupations, the Wolfen film factory was able to resume
production soon after the cessation of hostilities.69  It was able,
though operating as expropriated Soviet property under Soviet direction,
to supply substantial quantities of Agfa branded films to customers of
Agfa Leverkusen. When ownership of the factory was transferred from the
Soviet Union to the German Democratic Republic, it took the name VEB
Filmfabrik Agfa Wolfen. 70
As Leverkusen gradually built up its film production capacity
and became able to satisfy its domestic market during the 1950s, an
increasing share of Wolfen production sought outlets in third country
markets. This led to a vigorous dispute over which of the two entities
had the right to use the Agfa name in trademarks and product branding in
international markets. In the preamble to an agreement executed in 1956,
both sides declared themselves to be the rightful owners of all Agfa
trademarks. A key clause in this agreement specified that as from 1957
the products of both factories would be exported to one exclusive
distributor in each third country market. Such distributors were to be
appointed, in principle, based on continuation of prior representation
arrangements in each country in which either of the two contracting
parties had registered the trademarks.7 1
This clause gave a decided advantage to Leverkusen. Both of the
German republics had been formed at about the same time starting in 1949.
But the Federal Republic had been somewhat quicker in establishing
diplomatic, consular and commercial relationships with other countries.
Agfa Leverkusen had thus been able to reregister its trademarks in many
more countries and, from a market perspective, in more important countries
than had Wolfen. Among potentially major export markets, Italy, Japan and
Sweden, for example, had simply ignored trademark registration
applications from enterprises in the German Democatic Republic.7 2 Agfa
Leverkusen was by this time becoming quite active in reestablishing its
sales subsidiaries in those European countries that represented major
market potential. The 1956 agreement thus effectively empowered it to
call the tune as to which factory was to supply which markets with what
products.
The 1956 agreement was amended two years later. In this
amendment, Leverkusen effectively relinquished its trademark rights in
most countries of Eastern Europe. Wolfen relinquished its rights in other
nations adhering to the Madrid Agreement. Several long lists specifying
countries in which Registered User, Permitted User and Co-User agreements
were to be executed were included in this amendment.7a
The basic reconstruction of the West German Agfa was essentially
complete by 1958. Given that its production capacity was sufficient to
supply both domestic and export markets, the disadvantages to Wolfen of
the arrangements became more evident with each passing year. By 1965, 40
percent of Wolfen's production was being exported; this represented 14
percent of the entire East German chemical industry's exporta.74 The
prospect of gradual diminishment of the foreign exchange earned by such an
important export was seen to be a serious matter for the East German
economy. A reconstructed West German Agfa, capable of filling export
demand with superior products and enjoying better access to export markets
by virtue of its international trademark control, made such a prospect
quite real to the East German authorities.
The postwar Agfa trademark episode finally ended in the 1960s.
The East German enterprise assumed the new name of Volkseigener Betrieb
Filmfabrik Wolfen and became the headquarters of the Fotochemisches
Kombinat DDR.7 5 Its products were branded and sold under the ORWO
trademark.7 6 In a final agreement, executed in 1967, Agfa-Gevaert AG
paid a substantial sum to Wolfen in consideration for exclusive use of the
Agfa trademark in all countries except the German Democratic Republic
where registration of the mark "Agfa Wolfen" was to be cancelled. 77
In summary, the early postwar activity of Agfa outside its home
country was largely confined to reestablishing its trademark rights, its
good name and, gradually, its international sales network.78 As the
redevelopment of the company's export business proceeded to gather steam,
it began to run into trade barriers which, though traditional in form and
mechanism, reflected the new political realities of the period. Despite
the greatest initial reluctance expressed by its senior management, Agfa
began, where necessary and justified by perceived future market potential,
to invest in small foreign manufacturing facilities.7 9
The New India Industries Ltd. began production of simple roll
film cameras in Baroda (India) under Agfa technical direction in 1960.
Agfa took a one fourth share in the capital of the company, the rest
remaining in the hands of the Ghia family, local industrialists who had
hitherto been active in textile manufacture. Construction of a
photographic paper plant in Mulund (India) was begun in 1961 by this
company, and production commenced in 1963, again with technical knowhow
provided by Agfa. 890fl
The firm Domingos Bove e Irmao had been founded as a trading
company in Sao Paulo (Brazil) in 1936. In 1958, it was incorporated as
Industria Fotoquimica Bove S.A. and began manufacture of photographic
papers. Agfa took a majority interest in the new corporation and provided
the necessary technical knowhow. 82 (The Bove factory ceased operations
in 1974. By then, it was believed that the Brazilian market could be
supplied more efficiently from Argentina by a subsidiary described
elsewhere in this thesis.)
Societe Nouvelle As de Trefle S.A.r.l. had begun operations near
Avignon (France) in 1936. An Agfa investment in a portion of the share
capital of this company was made in 1953. The purpose was to begin
coating of Agfa document copy papers in France. This investment was
increased to a controlling interest six years later. (This operation was
closed down in 1964 because a separate French production facility could no
longer be justified for this product in light of the gradual abolition of
trade barriers among European Economic Community member countries.)8 3
There is a consistent pattern in these foreign direct
investments in manufacturing facilities made by Agfa up to 1964. All were
market seeking in their motivation. Very likely none of them would have
been made had it not been for a variety of trade impediments.8 4 All
meant involvement with a more or less established local enterprise. All
involved continued equity participation by host country investors. The
basis for control that Agfa was able to exercise in these situations
rested in the first instance not on equity but on its mastery of the
required manufacturing technology.
Epilogue
Throughout its first century, Agfa had, as a German enterprise,
enjoyed the fortunes and suffered the misfortunes of the nation which is
its domicile. After 1945, the company came to flower again, mainly in
domestic soil. This was largely a function of an international relations
drama played out on a such broader stage during the quarter century
beginning in 1939. Agfa's resurrection from the ashes of 1945 to world
class status must remain a remarkable achievement. Its ability to regain
that status within two decades was conditioned by several factors. Among
these were the financial, administrative and research support of Bayer AG.
In the aftermath of the breakup of IG Farben, Agfa had become a wholly
owned subsidiary of Bayer; the latter had quickly regained a place among
the giant chemical enterprises of the world. Bayer's own store of
knowledge of dye chemistry, which had accumulated over a century, was by
no means the least significant of assets at Agfa's disposal. Perhaps the
key strategic element in Agfa's revival was that it was able to rebuild a
distinctive competence in color photography during the 1950s. This was a
period in which this new technological wave was building up to a crest.
The chemistry underlying color photography is subtle and the coating
technology complex. The shift to color photography constituted a change
as profound in its way as the change from dry plates to roll film had been
half a century earlier. As a result, the barriers to entry into the
photochemical industry had become intellectual far more than financial.
The field in which Agfa chose to apply its technical competence
was amateur photography. This represented a continuation of policies that
had developed two decades earlier. It formed, for the time, an effective
basis for its business. Amateurs gradually shifted to color photography
as increases in their incomes made this more feasible. Contemporaneous
with the shift to color photography, momentous changes were occurring in
consumer marketing. Among these were the distribution of photographic
goods through mass retailing outlets, a proliferation of retailers' house
brands, growing sophistication on the part of Eastman Kodak in product
differentiation, and the awesome intrusion of television as an advertising
medium. Agfa management, fully occupied with the reconstruction of its
production capacity, was slow to appreciate the implications and
significance of these changes. When the appreciation came, it was late
enough to carry with it the realization that the failure to adapt to these
changes earlier constituted a genuine source of long term weakness. This
was especially significant for an enterprise that was ready once again, at
least in a technical sense, to play a larger role in the international
arena. The weakness was considered serious enough to call for a more
dramatic solution than was possible by evolutionary means alone. This
solution involved the fusion with Gevaert and is described in a later
chapter of this thesis.
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Chapter III
Gevaert I
Introduction and Background to Founding of Company
Perhaps no single photochemical enterprise more clearly supports
the market seeking internationalization thesis than that founded by Lieven
Gevaert. Three quarters of a century elapsed between the company's spare
origins in an Antwerp photographer's studio and the juncture of its
destiny with that of Agfa. During this interval, Gevaert grew into one of
the half dozen largest enterprises in what had become a highly
concentrated world industry. To its 1964 fusion with Agfa, Gevaert
brought a sales and service network extending to 122 countries and three
minor manufacturing subsidiaries in countries outside its Belgian home
base. Nearly twenty years later, the phrase "our traditional export
mentality" remained firmly embedded in the company's internal culture.
The roots of this tradition run deep and can be traced back to the very
origins of the company.
Lieven Gevaert was apprenticed to several Belgian photographers
during his adolescence. His mother, who had been widowed when he was
three years old, established a photographic studio in 1883. How long this
venture lasted is not known. In 1889, when Gevaert was twenty-one, he
felt ready to establish himself as an independent portrait photographer in
his home city of Antwerp. His shop prospered sufficiently to survive, but
the pace was slow and left time to experiment with a variety of
photographic printing materials and techniques. For a time, he made a
commercial specialty out of printing photographs on ceramics and
porcelain. He also experimented with various papers and chemical
preparations. These experiments led to a product he called Calciumpapier.
The name originates from the layer of calcium chloride which was spread on
the paper before the coat of silver chloride was applied. This gave a
reddish brown tint to the eventual print and was considered an attractive
feature.2 The quality of the prints made possible by this paper was
perceived to be quite superior to that achieved by his professional
colleagues in Antwerp. These were soon satisfied to buy their papers from
Gevaert.3 The basis for a larger enterprise had begun to emerge.
In 1894, Gevaert gathered six local investors to form the
Commanditaire Vennootschap op Aandelen L.Gevaert & Cie. The immediate
purpose of this company was the production of photographic papers on a
commercial scale.
Foreign Raw Material Supply
Gevaert's initial market was confined to the 36 professional
photographers who by 1892 had established themselves in Antwerp.4 But
his business was grounded in international trade from the beginning. The
raw materials for the product that eventually becomes a photographic print
are paper and chemicals. The latter are suspended in a binding agent of
some sort. One of the binding agents which came into general use in the
nineteenth century was egg white; hence the name albumen papers for those
in which this medium was used. The employment of albumen, however,
created an economic problem for those who used it on an industrial scale.
This is what to do with the yolks. Physical disposal was wasteful and
costly. German albumen users had solved this problem by selling the
unwanted by-product to local tanneries. 5 As this outlet was not
practical for Gevaert, he used collodion as his binding agent. Collodion,
a solution of cotton in ether, had been well known as a binding agent used
in the sensitization of glass plates since the middle of the century.
This and other chemicals were bought from Schering, a producer of
pharmaceuticals and fine chemicals in berlin.6
The chemical makeup of the raw paper which eventually becomes a
photographic print is critical to the appearance of the picture. It must
be free of any metalic traces which react chemically with the silver salts
in the emulsion. As paper making depended on flowing water during the
nineteenth century, the metalic content of the streams where paper mills
were established greatly influenced whether the output was suitable for
photographic use. It was thus in part the accidents of geology which
largely determined that such continental European mills would be located
in France and Germany. Among the first paper suppliers to Gevaert were
the Buntpapierfabrik Gustaf & Heinrich Beneke in Lcbau (Saxony) and J.B.
Weber in Offenbach a.M. (Hesse) These were soon followed by the mills
with the greatest renown for the purity of their papers, namely Steinbach
& Cie. in Malmedy (Rhenish Prussia before 1919) and Blanchet Freres &
Kl6ber in Rives (near Grenoble, France).7 These two firmas formed a
cartel in 1898 by organizing the General Paper Company and appointing it
to be their exclusive selling agent.8 When prices for the output of
these mills effectively doubled overnight, Gevaert lost little time in
seeking alternate sources of supply. This search led him to the then
recently founded firm of Felix Schoeller Jr. which was operating a mill in
Burg Gretch (near Osnabruck, Westphalia). Schoeller began to deliver
paper to Gevaert within a year.9 Other German paper suppliers during
the early period included Trapp & MUnch and the Vereinigte Fabriken
Photographiacher Papiere, a consortium of firms headquartered in
Dresden.1 0
The Gevaert business was thus rooted, at least on the raw
material supply side, in international business relationships from its
beginnings. The conduct of these relationships by Lieven Gevaert, whose
mother tongue was Dutch, was facilitated by his having taught himself
German, French and English during his apprenticeship years.1 1 This
linguistic knowledge was acquired to enable him to supplement his
practical understanding of photographic processes by study of the
professional publications which were flourishing in the 1880s.
Toward Continuous Process Production
From a production point of view, several conditions had to be
satisfied if Gevaert were to have an economic basis for an industrial
enterprise in photographic papers. First, the paper had to be sensitized
by means somewhat more efficient than was possible by each photographer
doing his own. In addition, the emulsion had to be spread over its base
completely and with uniformity in thickness. These conditions led to a
search for mechanical aids. By 1891, he was coating paper with the help
of a mechanism of his own design and construction. This mechanism - it
can scarcely be called a machine - was primitive indeed compared even to
the succeeding machinery which quickly made it obsolete. But it
adumbrates much that is to be found in subsequent coating technology. It
is reproduced here from a company publication.12
The first emulsifying
ni a c h i n e
invented by L. Gevaert.
The machine consists of a wooden
framework (A) on which rests a
glass frame (B) covered with a
sheet of baryta paper. The paper
is fastened to the frame by two
hinged clips worked by the in.
terlocking shaft of a crank (D).
Above the machine a flask (E)
discharges the emulsion through
a rubber tube into a tank (F)
from which a strip of chamois leather emerges. This strip is in contact with the paper which
it covers with a film of emulsion. A second frame is slid against the first so that the
emulsifying can be carried on without interruption from one sheet to another.
This mechanical aid made possible the coating of 2.5 square
meters of paper per hour. 1 3  By 1894, a somewhat larger mechanism had
increased the output to 17.5 square meters per hour. Within a year, a
semi-automatic machine brought this to 54 square meters per hour. A gas
driven, 2 horsepower macnine, imported from Germany in 1898, made possible
the continuous coating of 66cm wide stock rolled in lengths of up to 100
meters. By the time the company had moved to its present facilities in
Mortsel on the outskirts of Antwerp in 1905, a 150 horsepower steam engine
was drawing paper under the coating head at up to 4 meters per minute,
realizing a production output of 158 square meters per hour. 1 4
Explosive growth in productivity accompanied the absolute
increase in output. A few key figures survive from the period. Gevaert
production of sensitized papers grew as follows : 15
Year Square Meters (approx.)
1895 10,000
1900 50,000
1905 1,200,000
1910 2,000,000
1913 3,200,000
Roosens has researched the 1910 paper sales data of several
prominent manufacturers. 1 6 These are here translated to a common
numeraire in which Gevaert sales are indexed at 100
Eastman Kodak 431
Gevaert 100
Ansco 71
Bayer 14
Foreign Sales
The fast growth of the Gevaert company into a force to be
reckoned with in world photographic circles would have been inconceivable
had its marketing efforts remained confined to its home country. Lieven
Gevaert took to the road during the first year of his company's existence,
and he was soon followed by some of his closest associates. The radius of
the circle they covered lengthened quickly and soon extended beyond the
borders of Belgium. In a year spanning the period 1895-1896, expenses
incurred in travel to The Netherlands, Germany, France and Switzerland
amounted to Fr. 4,787. In relation to the company's initial issued capital
of Fr. 20,000, this was a considerable sum. Soon after the reimbursement
of each travel expense, the books began to show sales to and accounts
receivable from customers in the places visited. At the end of 1895,
there were customers in the following foreign places :
France
Germany
Netherlands
Switzerland
Others
: Bienne, Lyon, Dijon, Lille, Calais, Boulogne, Reims,
Colombes, Paris, Bordeaux, Nancy, and Besancon.
: Frankfurt a.M., Schweinfurt, Aachen, Roermond, Wuirzburg,
Cologne, Strassburg (then under German control),
Coblenz, Nurnberg, Wiesbaden, Berlin, Karlsruhe,
Muhlheim, Mannheim, and Munich.
: Groningen, Eindhoven, Amsterdam, the Hague, Leiden,
Leeuwarden, Nijmegen, Utrecht, Dordrecht, Arnhem,
Rotterdam, Dordrecht, Haarlem, and Delft.
: Zurich, Basel, Luzern, Lausanne, and Geneva.
: Milan, Luxembourg, Lisbon, Porto.
The mere listing of these cities does not reveal a key fact which requires
emphasis. The number of customers, and the value of product sold to them,
in the business capitals of the foreign countries were minimal. Paris,
Berlin, Amsterdam, Milan - cities in which competition from other
manufacturers might have been expected to be fiercest - were largely
avoided. Gevaert sales policy was directed to the provincial cities.
By the end of 1895, the bookkeeper had begun to find it useful
to classify the receivables by country. The Fr. 43,000 owed were
classified as follows :17
Belgium
Netherlands
France
Switzerland
Germany
Others
Total
47%
3
100%
Payment and collection of foreign drafts were handled for the
firm by the Antwerp banking house of Jos. Waterkeyn & John Aulit who were
also among the financial backers of the young venture.
Early Foreign Sales Establishments
The logistics of physical distribution of products across
national frontiers on what was essentially a retail basis of operation
must soon have become a burden. A branch distribution depot in Paris
began to be organized in 1895 and was in operation the following year. To
express its commercial hopes and intentions, the company temporarily gave
itself a new trade name to accompany this move : Franco-Belgische
Xaatschappil voor het vervaardigen van fotografische papieren,
L.Gevaert & Cie. (Franco-Belgian Company for the Production of
Photographic Papers L.Gevaert & Co.) 18 How long this name was used is
not known, but the Paris branch depot survived and was the antecedent of a
wholly owned French sales subsidiary that was incorporated in 1913. 19
The pattern of market penetration that had worked in France was
followed in several other countries with large populations. This pattern
consisted in local market prospecting and establishment of contacts with
photographers, the beginning of sales, the setting up of branch
warehouses, and when the volume of sales had grown sufficiently to support
them, the incorporation of wholly owned sales subsidiaries. Depots were
started in Vienna and Berlin in 1901; the latter was incorporated as a
G.m.b.H. in 1908. The year 1906 saw the establishment of depots in Milan
(incorporated in 1913) and Moscow. A depot was started in London in 1908,
and this was incorporated shortly thereafter.2 0
The choice of country in this early pattern of penetration
appears to have been dictated largely by assessment of market potential as
measured by population size. After one year of Gevaert selling effort,
The Netherlands represented by far the largest single foreign market for
the company. This is hardly surprising in view of its geographic and
cultural propinquity. But the Dutch neighbor was a small country.
Establishment of a Netherlands Gevaert sales depot did not take place
until 1914, and it was not incorporated until nine years later.2 1
The company's sales were not for long confined to European
markets; nor did they in all instances result from its own direct selling
efforts. Shortly after the turn of the century, the Defender Photo Supply
Co. of Rochester, New York requested and got exclusive U.S.A. distribution
rights for Gevaert products.22 A Defender Vice-President who had
negotiated the agreement was prominent among the dignitaries who sat for
portraits with Lieven Gevaert in 1905. The occasion was a celebration of
the opening of the new Gevaert factory and company headquarters in
Xortsel. The initial contract between Gevaert and Defender ran until the
end of 1907. 23 Whether or not it was renewed is not known; but it is
likely that a few years later the World War I transatlantic shipping
disruptions and German occupation of Belgium would have closed the
American market to Gevaert for some time in any event. Gevaert formed its
own North American sales subsidiary in 1920. 24
Other parts of the western hemisphere did not escape the
company's attention. Sales agency-depots were organized in Buenos Aires
in 1913 and in Rio de Janeiro one year later. Although the dates remain
uncertain, depots were also set up in Montevideo (Uruguay) and Valparaiso
(Chile) about this time.2 5
On the eve of the First World War, then, the Gevaert company was
already trading on a broad international scale. The company's 1913 sales
were close to Fr. 10 million, of which some 96 percent was exported.2 6
Strategic Issues During First Quarter Century
Although the company kept operating throughout the German
occupation of Belgium, the 1914-1918 period represents a hiatus in its
development. It may, therefore, well serve at this point to supplement
what has already been reported so as to provide a basis for a critical
interpretation of what, seen in strategic terms, took place during the
company's early years. Much that occurred during those years set the tone
and pattern for what was to come in the succeeding five decades.
A fact of the greatest strategic significance is that the
Gevaert enterprise concentrated its entire industrial activity on paper
coating for nearly two decades. This occurred during a period in which
opportunities for profitable sensitizing of other photographic base
materials were abundant, obvious, and quite probably within Gevaert
technical competence to exploit.27 A review of the company's actions
and policies during this period may provide some clues to an understanding
of its product strategy.
The start in paper is understandable in view of the modest
financial resources initially available to Gevaert. Paper is simply a
much less costly material than glass to tie up in working capital.
Furthermore, the virtually unsolicited arrival of initial orders signified
a great deal more than aesthetic satisfaction with Gevaert's paper. It
was a sign of the times. During the 1890s, demand for the photographic
image was growing to an extent that required multifaceted change. This
included change in the way photography was practiced and commerce in its
goods conducted; it included change in the technology underlying the
production which fed this commerce.
Egg whites represented a technological blind alley from which
photography had to be diverted. The separation of whites from yolks had
obvious physical efficiency limitations. What is less obvious is that the
photographer had to do his own sensitizing shortly before printing when he
used albumenized paper. The product had a very short shelf life. The move
to collodion and other binding agents was thus a change as profound in
paper coating as the move from wet collodion to gelatin dry plates had
been in negative materials a decade earlier. In this, and in other
technical aspects, Gevaert was by no means a first mover. The substitution
of collodion for albumen has been traced back to J.8. Obernetter in Munich
in 1867.28 George Eastman had first used machinery to coat paper in
1884. 29 The search for mechanical aida for this purpose in Germany
during the 1880s had been sufficiently extensive to support the 1890
foundation of the Radebeuler Nachinenfabrik August Koebig G.m.b.H. to
supply such equipment. 3 0
That which sets Lieven Gevaert apart from most of his
contemporaries was his ability to combine these elements of change into a
coherent strategic bundle that responded to the unarticulated imperatives
of an international market.
Once started in paper, the enterprise soon had enough to do to
absorb all the energies of its handful of employees. Gevaert did not rest
on the laurels won by his Calciumpapier. After 1893, hardly a year went
by that did not see the introduction of some new Gevaert product. These
papers, emulsified with a variety of silver halogens and in a variety of
binding agents, were developed to meet some market need, whether
anticipated or actual, and whether aesthetic or technical. At the
aesthetic level, papers came out with a variety of surfaces ranging from
mat to high gloss, from fine grain to raw. While colorprint photography
awaited a future technology, Gevaert put out papers capable of being
printed in monochrome tints of blue, sepia, green, violet and rose.
Gevaert kept close enough to his market to sense that a growing segment of
it consisted of amateurs who preferred to do their own developing and
printing. For them, papers were made which obviated the need for the
expensive gold and platinum baths which yielded such superb results for
professionals. Papers were brought out which were more sensitive, thereby
freeing the photographer from restricted lighting conditions. As is
almost inevitable when a field requiring some technical background becomes
more popular and the process falls into less expert hands, the resulting
photographs sometimes became less than completely satisfactory. Gevaert
invented papers on which acceptable prints could be made even when the
negatives had poor contrast.
To take nothing away from Lieven Gevaert's ingenuity and
inventiveness, it is to be noted here that he worked near the technical
frontiers of photography of his the time but rarely crossed those
frbntiers to break really new ground. Precedents for early Gevaert
product and process developments can be found elsewhere in Europe and
America. Gevaert's contribution to the development of the photographic
industry was entrepreneurial more than it was technical. In judging when
the time was right to adapt innovations and bring them to market, his
intuitions were generally sound.
There are several key patterns running through the early Gevaert
history of product development and commercialization. First is that
products were developed to satisfy a market need. (Lest this statement be
taken as a superfluous platitude, it may be appropriate to point out that
the history of photography is replete with inventors whose first priority
and purpose lay in the sheer overcoming of some technical obstacle,
without regard to marketability.) Secondly, no paper which was superior
to an earlier product in some respect was introduced before the commercial
potential of the predecessor had been fully exploited. Finally, product
development was sequential rather than proliferative although many
varieties of paper were introduced. No paper was introduced without
thorough testing of the variety of conditions under which it might be
used. The sequence of steps required to invent, develop and test a new
product is necessarily time consuming when limited resources are devoted
to it. Gevaert hired his first university trained chemist in 1898; while
others joined him in subsequent years, a decade elapsed before a central
Gevaert research laboratory was formally instituted.3 1
The testing of new products before commercialization was of a
piece with the entire Gevaert product policy. While he moved rapidly to
put his production on an industrial basis, he maintained an essentially
craftsman's attitude toward his product. An absolutely uncompromising
policy with respect to selling only the highest quality product possible
characterized the Gevaert business from the start. Long before modern
statistics had integrated the insights of probability theory to put
statistical quality control on a scientific basis, Gevaert sampled from
production batches and rejected a batch if the sample were found
wanting.3 2 A policy of quality leadership became one of Gevaert's
sources of competitive advantage. Such sources were a condition for
survival and growth since Gevaert was hardly the sole participant in the
field. Industrial scale preparation of photographic papers had been going
on for decades when Gevaert entered the business. Paul Eduard Liesegang
had begun to succeed with albumen papers in Germany in 1860. 33 Trapp &
Eunch, whose main business was the milling of paper, began albumenizing in
1862. 34 A dozen photographic paper manufacturers were operating in
Germany alone by 1890, and this number had grown to 28 at the turn of the
century. 35
Gevaert did little advertising in its early years. In 1900,
Fr. 8,000 was spent for advertising.3 6 Gevaert did not, however, rely
entirely on word of mouth by satisfied customers to spread the word that
its papers were a premium product. Gevaert papers were submitted to the
judgment of experts at a number of international expositions. First
prizes were carried off at Liege in 1905, Milan in 1906, and Turin in
1911. At the Brussels Fair in 1910, Gevaert papers were classified as
"without competition." 37 These symbols of recognition and achievement,
while a legitimate source of pride to members of the company in
contemplating its history and traditions, are less than completely
persuasive. We do not know against whose products the company was
competing at these exhibitions. A more convincing, though also more grim,
indicator of the esteem in which the quality of Gevaert papers was held is
provided by Wentzel. He relates in his memoirs that Gevaert was able to
keep operating under German occupation from 1914 to 1918 because the hard
gradation of its Ridax paper could not be matched by any German
manufacturer. Hard gradation was needed to print details from the fuzzy
negatives obtained in aerial photography. The German military forces were
a large customer during this period. 38
The other aspects of the company's operations during this period
show a conservatism which tolerated no nonsense. Few expenses were
incurred which did not promise a quick return in higher sales, lower costs
or improved products. The sales policy was one of maintaining direct,
close and frequent contact with customers and treating them as always
being right even when they were not. The early books of the company show
many entries for reclamatory allowances and adjustments.39 As the
sensitivity of papers increased with the introduction of new materials,
Gevaert sales activity took on a stronger educational and service
orientation. Customers had to be taught to adjust their exposure times to
the new products.
The development of products intended to satisfy the needs of
amateurs required no change in distribution channels. As this branch of
photography began to grow in continental Europe, people who had been
professional photographers gradually became retailers of photographic
products. Recognition of the amateur market's significance was
nevertheless expressed by an action the strategic importance of which
increases whenever sales to ultimate users are not direct but through
intermediary distribution channels. The company registered its first
Belgian trademark in 1909; international trademark registration began the
next year.40
The conservatism of the company's operations was matched by its
financing. Debt was avoided entirely for the first ten years. When the
first bonded debt obligation was issued for Fr. 300,000 in 1907, the
shareholders' equity had grown to Fr. 840,676, and the net earnings
exceeded Fr. 250,000. A second bond issue came out in 1912; this one
amounted to Fr. 700,000, and by this time the shareholders' equity was
close to Fr. 2.9 million, and net earnings exceeded Fr. 800,000. 41
The foregoing portrait is that of a cautious, conservative
management. But the story is somewhat more complex. The real nature of
Lieven Geveert's attitude toward dealing with uncertainty is revealed by
the contrast between the company's industrialization and its international
expansion. The slow, steady, deliberate, methodical, patterened entry
into foreign markets reflects caution in facing the unknown and in
learning to deal with it over time. No such caution is apparent in the
company's rapid movement from one coating technology to the next. Every
new machine certainly represented some risk of either not working at all
or of compromising the product quality on which the company had staked its
existence. Yet, Gevaert and his associates had gained enough experience
to be able to assess the probability of success in this domain with far
more confidence than they could with respect to making good in foreign
markets. Lieven Gevaert was thus not simply a risk averse conservative,
but there were severe limits to his willingness to expose himself to risks
involving multiple unknowns at any given time. He rarely took a step into
the unknown without having a solid base on which he could fall back should
anything go wrong.
Photography was going through a very gradual technological
transition from plates to film during the three decades starting in 1890.
Despite great technical strides by Eastman Kodak, the eventual outcome was
not yet by any means obvious to everyone. The field had become fairly
crowded with plate makers in England and Germany. The contemporaneous,
and largely unsuccessful, initial struggles of Agfa and Bayer in Germany
and Lumiere in France to produce marketable film were surely known to
Gevaert. It was not for a man who had based his company's survival on a
reputation for quality leadership to place that reputation at risk until
the new technology was more completely understood if not mastered.
But Gevaert's ambition to expand into other photosensitive
materials had burned from the beginning. As early as 1896, Gevaert had
informed his investors of his intent to manufacture photographic plates.
With his characteristic caution, he had arranged for an unidentified
producer to make the plates to order under Gevaert supervision. The
plates were to be branded as Gevaert products. This arrangement, he said,
will "permit me to appreciate the investment yield of this new branch
before impairing our own production." 42 Nothing came of this plan.
The subject was not mentioned again until 1910 when construction of the
first facilities dedicated to the manufacture of dry plates and cinefilm
was begun after two years of experimentation.4 3 The first Gevaert
plates were marketed in 1912. 44 Volume production of cinefilm was
achieved in 1913 when 11 million linear meters of 35mm film were
produced.45
World War I put a stop to film expansion. This was a matter of
raw material supply availability. Belgium, along with England, had
developed a plate glass industry during the nineteenth century. The
purity of its output had made it a premier supplier in photographic
commerce. The nitrocellulose base used in film coating, by contrast, was
bought by Gevaert from the Deutsche Celluloid Fabrik, Eilenburg, and the
Celluloid Company of Newark, New Jersey, sources which became unreliable
or impossible under wartime conditions.46
The war made several major national markets temporarily or
permanently inaccessible to Gevaert. The company tried to compensate for
this loss by turning its selling efforts to neutral countries. Among
these were The Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries and
Switzerland.47
The Interwar Period
The cessation of hostilities enabled the company to resume
building on the foundation which had been set in place by 1914. Cinefilm
production was resumed. Roll film and flat sheet film were introduced in
1923. The company participated fully in the explosive growth of
photography during the 1920s. The use of advertising and budgets became
visible during this period. Research and development became
institutionalized as an indispensable element in the company's strategic
mix. Wherever photography went in its technical development, Gevaert
followed, rarely far behind. X-ray films were brought out in 1929, sound
cinefilm a year later, and cinefilms for amateur use within two years
after that event. By 1928, the company built a cellulose plant to lessen
its dependence on foreign suppliers for this critical base material. 4 8
A certain financial sophistication to be found in firms
operating on an international scale became more evident during this
period. A letter from the company to a Basel intermediary, written in
1926 to support an application to the Swiss federal bank for the opening
of a commercial credit, lists accounts receivable denominated in a variety
of national currencies. Among these were Dutch florins, Argentine pesos,
Brazilian milreis, Danish, Norwegian and Swedish crowns, German and
Finnish marks, English pounds, Italian lires, Spanish pesetas, French and
Swiss francs, and Uruguyan piastres; customers in the Baltic States,
Austria and Portugal had been billed in U.S. dollars, as had the company's
U.S. affiliate.4 9 Just when multi-currency invoicing began is not
known. The possibility exists that this practice went back to the first
export sales made by the company. Memorandum entries showing translations
of amounts invoiced to foreign customers show up in the earliest
accounting journals of the company. 50 This would have been consistent
with the policy of making life as convenient as possible for customers. A
provision for foreign exchange losses showed up for the first time in the
balance sheet at the end of 1914, the first war year.5 1
Gevaert continued the expansion of its international sales and
distribution network throughout the interwar period. Some of the prewar
affiliates had, for unknown reasons, fallen by the wayside since 1914, but
other relationships were substituted. By 1927, the American subsidiary
had branches in Canada and Mexico; the Vienna subsidiary was responsible
for branches in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania. Agents
and independent distributors represented the company in 26 countries.
That year, the company dispatched an experienced traveler to study on site
the feasibility of appointing new representatives or of establishing
direct trade relations in "China, the Japanese Empire including Korea and
Formosa, Kwantung, Sakhalin, the Mariana, Caroline and Marshall Islands,
the Kingdom of Siam and its dependencies, the Straits Settlements, Hong
Kong, Oceania, Macao, Indo-China, Cochin, Tonkin, Amman, Cambodia, Laos,
and Eastern Siberia." 52 Three years later, exclusive distributors had
been appointed in Palestine, Ceylon, South China, North China, Japan,
Indo-China, Manchuria, Cuba, Dutch Guyana, Venezuela, Colombia,
Mozambique, Lowanda, and Albania. 5 3 In its booklet describing the
company, published for distribution at the 1939 New York World's Fair,
Gevaert listed representations in 74 countries and dependencies; nine of
these were Gevaert subsidiaries.5 4 Two were tied to the Gevaert family
through marriage of Lieven Gevaert's daughter. Several of the wholly
owned affiliates were held through an intermediary holding company
registered in Luxembourg.
An undated manuscript, the content of which suggests that it was
written late in 1939, describes the Gevaert sales organization of the
time. It is translated here in its entirety, not only for the light it
throws on the Gevaert company but because it reflects what, with minor
variations in detail, can be described as the standard practice of the
entire international photographic industry during the twentieth century.
(This is confirmed by Buerle 55, by Xobayashi 56 and by the present
author's work experience during the 1960s and 1970s.)
Brief Overview of the Sales Organization of the Gevaert Firm
The Gevaert firm makes 'articles which, provided with
their own brands and trademarks, are offered for sale to the
public in all countries of the world and should be held in stock
everywhere';
This applies to the principal products of its manufacture,
that is to say, photosensitive products in current use. (Special
products made by the Gevaert firm are not treated in the present
overview.)
It is then to the sales of these articles that the sales
organization is necessarily adapted. This organization is thus
different from that of an industry which, for example, :
supplies unfinished products to other industrial enterprises,
makes articles which are delivered in neutral form, that is to
say, without trademarks, and sold for the most part in large
quantities in public commodity exchanges,
produces articles which are not sold to the public but solely
to a restricted number of buyers, transmitting large orders at
a time, orders which absorb over the months the production of
the factory (army, navy, railroads, etc.),
etc.
Factory Sales Organization
At the head of this (organization) we find the Sales
Manager. He is assisted by the Sales Services, direct and
auxilliary. The direct sales services comprise geographically
divided departments :
1) Belgium and Belgian Congo
2) Central and Western Europe
3) Southern Europe and North Africa
4) Eastern Europe and Asia Minor
5) Great Britain and North America
6) Central and South America
7) Asia and Africa (other than North Africa and the Congo)
Each of these departments is headed by a Department Chief, who is
backed up by an assistant and an adequate team of employees.
The following auxilliary services are functioning :
1) A 'Pricing' and 'Conditions of Sale' Department, which is
headed by a Section Chief and which has as its mission the
setting of sales prices and conditions of sale in the different
countries, the control of these two matters, and the relations
among producers under international conventions.
2) A Stenographic Department charged with the stenographic work
of all the other services.
3) An Advertising Department which occupies itself with all the
problems of advertising in Belgium and abroad.
4) An Editorial Department which occupies itself with the
publication of publicity articles, usage guides, manuals, etc.
5) A Budget Department which lends help in the establishment of
annual budgets, fixed year by year for each country separately,
and which, in the course of the year exercises a severe control
over budget performance.
6) A Finance Department and an Insurance Department, directed by
a Section Chief. The function of each of these departments is
indicated sufficiently by its name.
Sales Organization Outside the Factory
a) Belgium
In Belgium, sales are made in great part via wholesalers, and
sometimes also, directly to a limited number of large retailers.
The wholesalers directly supply professional photographers and
retailers of lesser importance. The retailers sell to the
public. Sales in Belgium are directed by a general
representative, assisted by 7 traveling salesmen, who regularly
visit the entire clientele, divided into geographic sectors.
They also, and even particularly, visit the professional
photographers, despite the fact that these receive their supplies
from wholesalers.
b) Abroad
Abroad, the firm has founded its own affiliates in the principal
countries. To these it has entrusted a sales monopoly for its
products. This type of affiliate exists in Holland, Italy,
France, Spain, Great Britain, Canada, the United States of
America, Brazil and Argentina.
In other countries which are important from the point of view of
consumption of photosensitive products, the Gevaert firm has
appointed distributors, that is to say, agents who are
exclusively at the service of the firm and who sell Gevaert
products, be it, due to 3uridicial or fiscal motives, in their
own name and for their own account, or be it, at the same time in
the name and for the account of the company. The remuneration of
this type of agent consists of a commission based on the realized
sales turnover. Some of these agents cannot afford the expenses
of selling, which fall to the charge of the firm; their
responsibility is limited to that of the commission agent, to
efficient distribution within the availability of stocks, and to
the minute execution of fixed expense budgets. Others among
these agents can absorb either the total or a portion of the
selling expenses (personnel, rent, etc.), and for this category
of agents, as is well understood, the commisasion percentage is
proportionally higher, Agents of this type have been appointed
by the firm in Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Switzerland, Bulgaria, Greece, etc.
In the countries of lesser importance, or there where fiscal
legislation renders it preferable, the Gevaert firm has entrusted
the sale of its products to independent monopolists. The
monopolists of this type are independent commercial firms, which
buy and sell Gevaert products in their own name and for their own
account. Exclusive distributors of this type exist in Norway,
Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Turkey, and in all other overseas
countries not mentioned above.
In the countries with protective customs tariffs, the Gevaert
firm has erected its own factories or concluded agreements for
the production of Gevaert products with existing enterprises
already in place; this is the case for France, Spain, and the
United States of North America.
All the sales organizations in the different foreign countries
are visited regularly by inspectors; it is thus that one
inspector has been appointed for each of the following
territories :
Central and Western Europe
Southern Europe
Eastern Europe
Asia Minor and North Africa
Asia and (the south of) Africa
Central America and South America
England and North America are visited by special delegates
or by members of management. 57
Manufacturing Abroad
Gevaert's first venture into foreign manufacturing was the
result of a mixture of personal relations, marketing strategy and
macroeconomic phenomena. The mixture was complex and perhaps somewhat
idiosyncratic. Spain had during the 1920s increased its customs tariff to
a level considered among the highest in Europe. By 1928, the tariff on
sensitized film imported from Belgium, which enjoyed Most Favored Nation
status, was imposed at the rate of 5.8375 pesetas per kilogram; for
sensitized paper, it was 11.675 pesetas per kilogram.58 It is difficult
to describe this duty rate as protectionist; there was little to protect.
A modest local paper sensitizing industry had sprung up after 1914 as a
result of supply difficulties precipitated by the war. All the
participants in this local industry, under pressure of the rapid postwar
technical development in other countries, had consolidated into one firm,
Industria Fotoquimica A. y R. Garriga, S. en C. Among the principals of
this company were Rafael Garriga Roca and Higinio Negra Vive; the first
had responsibility for general direction of the business and technical
direction of the factory in Barcelona; the latter served as Commercial
Director. The plant had technical difficulties in the proper drying of
its papers after sensitization.
Garriga decided to seek help from abroad. In 1926, he met
Hendrik Kui~pers at a convention of European photographic manufacturers in
Germany. Kui3pers was Lieven Gevaert's first employee and closest
business associate throughout their careers. At the time of the meeting,
Kui3pers was serving as General Technical Director of the Gevaert firm.
Gevaert was at the time represented in Spain by an independent
distributor, D. Eduardo Tey, who had expressed the intention of retiring.
As the Garriga and Gevaert firms explored their mutual business interests
over the next two years, a very close relationship developed between
Rafael Garriga Roca and Charlotte Xuijpers, the daughter of Hendrik
Xuijpers. This culminated in an engagement to marry. The wedding was
first scheduled to take place in 1928 and to coincide with the merger of
the two firms.
The marriage had to be postponed because of an accident
sustained by Garriga, incapacitating him for two years. During his
convalescence, Higinio Negra Vive ran the Barcelona plant and assumed
responsibility for general direction of the business. Despite the
marriage postponement, the fusion of the two firms went on as planned in
1928. The Garriga enterprise was incorporated as Industria Fotoquimica
Nacional S.A. (Infonal), and the Gevaert company took a 75 percent equity
participation, paying in over Fr. 2 million.
The state of the world economy which Gevaert faced after Rafael
Garriga Roca resumed his duties as General Manager of Infonal in 1930 was
clearly quite different from that which had prevailed earlier. The long
sought technical assistance from Mortsel was too slow in coming in to suit
Higinio Negra Vive: substantial policy disagreements between Garriga and
Negra arose during the next two years. In the latter's view, the weight
of Gevaert emphasis had shifted away from development of the Barcelona
plant and toward use of the Infonal organization to distribute Belgian
manufactured materials in Spain. Negra resigned in 1932 and began to lay
plans for the foundation of his own company. In 1936, he sold his shares
in Infonal and founded the forerunner of the present Negra Industrial S.A.
As a final and perhaps ironic touch, the new Negra operation, slow in
getting started owing to the Spanish Civil War, sought out and received
technical and commercial assistance from the local Agfa subsidiary in
distributing its products in Spain.5 9
The Gevaert company sustained a severe setback during the global
economic crisis of the early 1930s. Sales began to drop off after a 1930
peak estimated at Fr. 264 million and decreased by nearly one fourth over
the next four years. A new sales record was not achieved until 1936. 60
As an indication of the essentially fixed cost structure of this industry,
Gevaert profits during the five years starting in 1930 fell by 79
percent.6 1
It is hardly possible to read a Gevaert annual report covering
this era without being exposed to a lengthy recital of the full panoply of
trade hindrances characteristic of the time : protectionist import
tariffs, import quotas and other restrictions, suspensions of
international payments and currency inconvertibilities, competitive
devaluations, League of Nations sanctions against Italy, civil war in
Spain, German autarky; this was the fate of an enterprise dependent
almost entirely on exports from a domestic manufacturing base during a
decade in which the conduct of international economic relations often
appeared to be heading toward anarchy.
Under these circumstances, and given the by now excessive
production capacity of his company, it is perhaps understandable that
Lieven Gevaert was in no mood to initiate further foreign adventures
during these yeara.6 2
In addition, his world outlook and sense of social
responsibility undoubtedly influenced his entire business strategy. He
was born and raised in a poor and barely industrialized Flanders in 1868.
63 The region had not escaped the ravages of an economic depression
which lasted for the better part of three decades at the end of the
nineteenth century.64 Throughout his career, Lieven Gevaert expressed a
concern for the physical and spiritual degradation that accompanies
poverty. He believed that one of the necessary conditions for the social
uplift of his provincial countrymen lay in industrial development. As
soon as he felt that his business was on a solid enough footing, he began
to give concrete expression to these concerns. At his initiative, a
mutual aid society was formed in 1905; this society was a vehicle for
funding pensions, life insurance and health insurance for Gevaert
employees. in 1910, the company started evening courses for its
employees. Gevaert started an employee Works Council in 1913,. many
decades before this became a statutory requirement throughout western
Europe. A relief fund for inadequately protected widows and orphans of
Gevaert workers was set up in 1920. An informal profit participation
scheme was set up in 1900; it was institutionalized on a company wide
basis in 1921. 65 Lieven Gevaert would not have denied the charge that
some of his schemes were somewhat paternalistic. Among the objectives of
his employee relations program was the bonding of his workers into a sense
of belonging to an extended family. His humanistic impulses were genuine,
and a major factor motivating his expansion of the firm was concern for
the social welfare of his Nortsel workers.
We can submit that a chief executive motivated by such
considerations will not lightly entertain the idea of a direct foreign
manufacturing investment or the licensing of unrelated foreign
manufacturers. In this light, the investment in Infonal must be
considered as a tactical exception within a larger strategic pattern.
It was thus not until after the death of Lieven Gevaert in 1935 that the
company moved to establish production behind trade barriers that had been
erected by the governments in two of its potentially most important
markets, France and Germany.
France had dealt with the economic crisis of the early 1930s in
the nationalistic fashion characteristic of the time. The import tariff
had been raised to levels at which the duty represented one third of the
retail price for sensitized papers and ten percent for film. In addition,
quantitative limits on importation of sensitized goods had been
imposed.66
A new Gevaert subsidiary, L'Industrie Photographique S.A., was
formed in France, and a paper and film factory was built at Pont-h-Marcq
near Lille.6 7 (That factory has continued in operation to the present
day and is now an integrated unit of the Agfa-Gevaert global production
system, producing two types of specialty papers for the entire world.)
In Germany, an accommodation to the political realities of the
day was made. The company entered into a joint venture itself with
Voigtl~nder, the oldest name in the commerce of photography. Voigtl~nder
activity in the making of precision instruments antedates photography
itself by nearly a century. Since 1840, when it had introduced the world's
first photographic lens designed on the basis of mathematical
calculations, Voigtl~nder had developed a reputation as one of the premier
makers of high quality lenses and cameras.6 8 Its shares had come under
the control of Schering in 1923.69 This German manufacturer of
pharmaceuticals and fine chemicals, with which Gevaert had had a business
relationship since its own beginnings, had wanted to keep at least a
toehold in photography, pending this industry's development.
The 1935 joint venture, called Voigtlgnder-Gevaert G.m.b.H.,
involved a 51-49 percent split of the share ownership. Although Gevaert
had the smaller of these shares, it was given the responsibility for
management of the factory. This was an abandoned textile mill that was
converted to production of paper, plates, and films in the Spindlersfeld
section of Berlin. 7 0 The German marketing organization of Gevaert was
absorbed by that of Voigtlnder which took over distribution within
Germany of the Spindlersfeld factory's output and retained distribution of
Voigt18nder's own cameras and other optical goods. (The venture had a
short life. The Spindlerafeld factory was expropriated and dismantled by
Soviet occupation forces in 1945. A business relationship between the two
partners was, however, kept alive until 1964. Until then, the global
Gevaert sales network was used to distribute Voigtlnder cameras outside
Germany. Gevaert products were distributed in Germany by Voigtlfnder
until 1957; for the next seven years, German distribution of certain
Gevaert products was handled by a joint venture described below.)71
Gevaert's American sales subsidiary had been organized in 1920.
By 1939, the Gevaert Company of America Inc. was operating sales offices
in New York, Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia and Los Angeles. Its former
branch in Canada had become incorporated, and Gevaert (Canada) Ltd. had
offices in Montreal, Toronto and Winnipeg. 72 As the approach of a major
war became evident in 1939, Gevaert anticipated the cutoff of its Western
Hemisphere markets from their normal supply source. It bought an
abandoned textile mill in Williamatown, Massachusetts and converted it to
a paper and film coating plant. Production began in 1941 but never
achieved scale economies or Gevaert quality standards. (The plant was
closed in 1948 and was eventually sold to Remington Rand Corporation which
had earlier been licensed by Gevaert to coat a special paper for document
copying applications.)7 3
1939 - 1963
Although a 1943 Allied air bombardment seriously damaged parts
of the Mortsel factories and killed some 50 employees, the Second World
War did not nearly affect the company 'a operations as seriously as it did
those of major European competitors such as Agfa. The German occupation
officer under whose supervision the Nortsel factories were placed had been
an executive of the Voigtlsnder company in civilian life. Given the
relationship of the two companies, it can be presumed that he exercised
his control in the Gevaert company's best interests to the extent this was
possible under wartime conditions. German demands for aero-filmas were
defied; existing stocks were destroyed, and new production was not
undertaken. 7 4 In view of the German occupation of Belgium, Gevaert Ltd.
in London was seized as enemy property by the British government. The
subsidiary was, however, permitted to operate more or less normally under
its own management and became a kind of wartime headquarters in exile for
Gevaert subsidiaries in allied and neutral countries. When its Belgian
supplies of sensitized materials were exhausted, some replacements were
furnished by Ilford Ltd.7 5
The international economic dislocations caused by the war did
not stop with the cessation of hostilities. The inconvertibility of
Sterling, in particular, stimulated negotiation between Gevaert and
Courtaulds Ltd. to form a joint venture for the manufacture of film base
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at Norwich.7 6 The British government did not allow this venture to get
started, however, and as the postwar economic recovery went into high
gear, the Gevaert company began a major expansion of its Belgian
production facilities.
During the first postwar decade, a new emphasis in Gevaert
product development became more manifest. This was an increasing
concentration on the development and commercialization of photosensitive
materials for use by other than amateurs. Among these were office
document copying, industrial x-ray photography, professional
cinematography, reprography and other graphic arts applications, and a
variety of materials used in scientific and technical work.7 7 This
emphasis has implications which are wider than can be subsumed under the
heading of product strategy. These products are characterized by high
volume usage, making possible the rapid achievement of production scale
economies. They further enable the producer to maintain direct sales and
service contact with relatively few customers. And they obviate the need
for much of the costly selling activities necessary for the development
and maintenance of market position for a mass consumer product.
The foregoing summary of Gevaert postwar direction should serve
as background to understanding of the company's further international
development. In that development, much Gevaert management time and
attention was devoted to Germany. Belgium's large industrial neighbor to
the east had represented a problem and an opportunity for a generation.
Prior to 1914, Germany had become Gevaert's biggest foreign market. As an
aftermath of World War I, the German border had effectively been closed to
Gevaert products until a German-Belgian trade accord was signed in
1925.76 The company did not for long enjoy the benefits of this
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agreement. The economic crisis of 1930, soon followed by the autarkic
policies of the Nazi government, again brought Gevaert exports to Germany
to a virtual standstill. The joint venture with Voigtl~nder did not
survive the Second World War. As the reconstruction of the German economy
brought unprecedented prosperity to that country, opportunity again
beckoned. The next Gevaert move, though short lived, is significant for
our story. This is because it reflects management thinking of the time
and, seen in retrospect, it represents an adumbration of the dramatic
developments that were to come.
In 1956, Gevaert executed two agreements with Zeiss Ikon AG in
what had become the Federal Republic of Germany. Zeiss was an old and
highly respected name in photography. Following the loss of the principal
Zeiss factories in what had become the German Democratic Republic, Zeiss
had acquired a number of West German photographic producers and had merged
them into Zeiss Ikon AG. Among these was Voigtl8nder which had been
bought from Schering AG. 7 9
The first of the two Gevaert-Zeiss agreements called for the
creation of a new, jointly owned German company, Gevaert Technik
Vertriebagesellachaft m.b.H., the function of which was to be the sale and
distribution of all Gevaert professional and industrial user products in
the Federal Republic. Under the second agreement, Gevaert was to supply
its range of amateur use materials to be marketed in Germany under Zeiss
brand names.80
The commercial myopia of the second agreement was not long in
making itself obvious. Zeiss enjoyed a reputation for technical
excellence in optical precision instruments. This reputation was the
primary cause for the failure of the Gevaert-Zeiss arrangement to bear
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fruit. Distribution of Zeiss products was limited to several hundred
German prestigious photo retailers. No large scale commercial success was
possible for Gevaert's amateur products in Germany under such
circumstances. By 1958, discussions between Gevaert and Agfa were under
way to explore other possibilities.8 1 These discussions eventually
culminated in the fusion of Agfa and Gevaert described in the next
chapter.
Following the formation of the Latin American Free Trade
Association in 1960, Gevaert acquired a newly reincorporated Argentine
firm, Fabricacion Industrial Fotografica Argentina S.A., successor to an
S.A.R.L. of the same name (hereafter FIFA). FIFA had a factory near
Buenos Aires, and its initial mission under Gevaert direction was the
production of monochrome films and papers. FIFA eventually became the
center of gravity of the company's manufacturing operations in Latin
America.82
Epiloque
During the seven decades following the founding of the Gevaert
company, technological and economic developments in the world
photochemical industry did not permit the survival of many manufacturers.
Gevaert's rise to eminence during this period constitutes prima facie
evidence of sound management. The quintessential characteristic of that
management was conservatism. Although the company was among its
industry's pioneers in the internationalization of markets, its
international development was essentially arrested at the export stage.
In the development of new products and processes, the company rarely led
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the way, thereby sparing itself much of the pain and cost to which first
movera are subject. In retrospect, the timing of its entry into product
markets and production technologies seems nothing less than exquisite.
Except for its rather late entry into an already mature dry plate market,
it usually began to ride a new wave of product and process technology and
market readiness before that wave created. It knew, moreover, when to
exit or abandon a field.8 3 The company's history is a persuasive
demonstration that an intelligent follower strategy can pay handsome long
term dividends. Gevaert conservatism may thus be said to have served the
company well. It was under no duress to give up its corporate
independence in 1964. Sales and earnings had reached record levels;
during the three years preceding the merger, the return on stockholders'
equity had averaged 15.7 percent.84
The conservatism which served Gevaert so well for so long
eventually became a source of weakness for the long run. It had, during
its founder's lifetime, enabled the company to assemble an effective mix
of business strategies. Because it had worked, it became implanted in the
company's culture. Under such circumstances, a management's propensity to
confound form and substance, attitude and strategy, becomes nearly
irresistible. It becomes prisoner of a mindset that gradually becomes
less appropriate as new technologies and new ways of conducting business
emerge on the world scene.
The historian's task of reconstructing the past so that it has
coherence for the present is difficult enough without assuming the added
burden of speculating on what might have been. But several cases in point
insinuate.
1.) During the early 1930s, a Japanese company approached
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Gevaert for technical assistance. The request was turned down by Gevaert.
Within a generation, Fu3 i Photo Film Co. Ltd. developed into the second
largest enterprise in the photochemical industry.85
2.) Gevaert was one of the companies approached by Cheater
Carlson to support development of his electrostatic copying invention.
That idea was rejected by Gevaert. It was eventually taken up by what is
now the Xerox Corporation. 8 6
These two cases have more in common than Gevaert rejection.
Fuji and Xerox subsequently formed one of the most successful
international joint ventures of modern times to exploit the process. The
experience suggests that the issue goes well beyond adaptation of new
technology. A marketing policy that does not develop beyond seeing
outlets for domestic production in export markets will eventually blind
management to new business opportunities and challenges that emerge in
other countries. This proposition is supported by another case in point.
3.) In America, Polaroid Corporation developed a new branch of
the photographic industry during the 1950s. The technical foundation of
this branch was a process that had first been discovered by a Gevaert
engineer.8 7 The adaptation of this process to a consumer product, the
original basis of Polaroid success, was perhaps a phenomenon that would
have succeeded commercially only in the U.S. at the time. The instant
gratification provided by the Polaroid system came at a high cost to the
consumer. The retail price of the first Polaroid camera alone came to
nearly 0100. This was a sum not likely to be spent by many consumers for
such a novelty in the war-torn economies outside the U.S.
Sectors of Gevaert's domain were clearly being invaded by
products and processes in the hands of competitors more nimble, more
105
aggressive and less inhibited by their own traditions than the Gevaert of
the late 1950s. During this period, conventional photography was moving
toward greater use of color. This was particularly evident in the amateur
sector. Despite the company's obvious success in the professional and
industrial user fields, Gevaert management saw that its weakness, compared
to Kodak and Agfa, in color technology and the amateur sector represented
a danger for the long term. This had much to do with leading Gevaert to
seek a common solution with Agfa.
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Notes and References
1 Much of the history of the Gevaert company traced in this chapter is
based on documents and source materials in two separate archives.
These are :
A) Agfa - Gevaert Historisch Archief. Provinciaal Museum voor
Fotografie. Antwerp, Belgium. (Subsequent to the research for
this thesis, the author was informed that it was foreseen that
this collection might be returned to Agfa - Gevaert in Mortsel,
Belgium.) Citations of materials in this collection are
hereafter identified by the abbreviation AGHA : D...;
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Chapter IV
Agfa-Gevaert 1
Historical Background
Discussions by top executives of Agfa and Gevaert, seeking a
closer modus vivendi between the two enterprises, began in 1958. 2
It was not the first time the paths of the two companies had crossed in
such efforts. A meeting had taken place as early as 1913. This
conference, which involved representatives of Agfa, Gevaert, Kodak and
Pathe, attempted to reach an understanding on cinefilm prices and on ways
to prevent the film studios from playing off one manufacturer against
another. This meeting had failed to produce an agreement. Gevaert had
refused to go along with whatever had been proposed.3
A similar effort did result in an agreement in 1924. A
convention involving Gevaert and the leading German producers, soon
thereafter joined by French and English interests, agreed on a system of
price regulation and production restraints. The leading national producer
in each country established the price level for its domestic market.
Foreign competitors had to accommodate to this level. 4 This arrangement
lasted until World War 11.
At the conclusion of that war, a Gevaert executive had
approached Agfa with the suggestion that the two companies merge. The
purpose was to reconstruct a European photographic industry capable of
competing against Kodak. The merged enterprise was to be known by the
Gevaert name. Agfa refused to consider this proposal. 5
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During the war, Gevaert had for a time made Agfapan film to
Agfa's order. After a fire in Agfa's reconstructed Leverkusen plant had
temporarily disrupted production there in the 1950s, Gevaert supplied
celluloid base and 35mm film to the German company. Trade in intermediate
and final products went on between the two companies during the postwar
reconstruction whenever the production facilities of one had been
inadequate to meet the then rapidly growing demand.6
Shortly before the outbreak of World War II, researchers at both
companies had, independently and within the same year, discovered and
patented the principles of diffusion transfer reversal. This process
involves the migration of silver salts from negative to positive image
layers when both are immersed in a developer and brought into contact with
each other. The rapid formation of the positive image by this process
considerably shortens the traditional sequence of developing, fixing,
washing and drying needed to make a photographic print.7 This process
eventually served as one of the bases for a system of instant photography
introduced by Polaroid Corporation.8 Both of the European companies,
however, chose document copying as the field of application to exploit the
discovery commercially during the early postwar period. Executives of
both companies met periodically during the 1950s to discuss ways and means
of exploiting the process to mutual advantage. In the marketplace,
however, lower level employees of both companies competed vigorously and
as if no such discussions were taking place. 9 The formation of the
European Economic Community in 1957 would, in any event, have inhibited
continuation of such top management discussions. The Rome Treaty
establishing this Community prohibits such anti-competitive collusion by
companies within member countries.
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In 1956, Gevaert acquired exclusive European distribution rights
for the products of Pako, a Minneapolis-based manufacturer of photographic
development and printing equipment.1 0 Gevaert sales of this equipment
to German photofinishing laboratories was perceived by Agfa as an indirect
but potentially serious competitive move. It threatened the traditional
hegemony of the specialty retailers over the service of developing,
enlarging and printing of photographs for consumers. The performance of
this service had long been a source of profitable revenue both for the
retailers and for Agfa. The specialty retailers had for a generation been
the foundation stone of Agfa marketing policy for consumer products. They
constituted the major outlet for Agfa photographic papers and chemicals.
The scale economies made possible by a Pako machine could only be achieved
by a unit volume greater than that enjoyed by many dealers. This
stimulated the development of a number of independent photofinishing
laboratories operating on a wholesale basis. Agfa retaliated by
introducing smaller equipment of its own design and manufacture after
having mounted an unsuccessful public relations campaign cautioning
against loss of the creative element in photofinishing.1i
Merger Decision
- These and other skirmishes involving two companies that knew
each other well were the immediate stimuli prompting the search for a more
comprehensive basis for cooperatioon. There also were larger
considerations. These included the visible integration movement in the
photographic and other industries, the fear of diminishing competitive
power resulting from falling behind in technical development, the ever
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growing technical strength and market presence of Eastman Kodak and the
relative weaknesses of Agfa in professional markets and of Gevaert in
amateur markets. A committee of senior executives representing both
companies was appointed to study the matter in 1958. 12 Over the next
three years, the members of this committee persuaded themselves and their
principals that
1) Production and research costs in both companies were rising more
rapidly than sales revenues.
2) Global competition in the industry was becoming more intense.
3) Product rationalization and production cost economies could be
achieved through joint effort.
4) Marketing costs were unnecessarily high due to the competition
between the two firms, and these costs could be reduced.
The restraint of trade provisions of the aforementioned Rome
Treaty influenced these deliberations. These provisions prohibit
practices that inhibit competition among companies, but they do not
prohibit mergers as such. By 1961, Agfa and Gevaert managements had
concluded that the best solution lay in a complete fusion of the two
enterprises. 13
Commentary on Decision and Additional Background
These retrospective rationales, though not implausible, call for
somewhat closer scrutiny. The two firms had long histories, traditions
and individual company cultures. The respective managements had their own
ambitions and fears. There was no duress impelling them to join their
fates. The propensity to perpetuate their individual activities did not
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die with the decision to merge. It may therefore be appropriate to
reexamine what the two stood to gain in the long run by Joining forces.
It has been estimated that 70 percent of Agfa's production
during the early 1960s was devoted to amateur or mass market pleasure
consumption. The same approximate percentage of Gevaert's output went
into a variety of technical, professional and business use markets.14
This was not fortuitous but the result of strategic choice. As related in
an earler chapter, photography was at this time undergoing a fundamental
technological change. This was the move to color. This made itself
especially evident in the amateur sector. It had already become clear by
1960 that no participant with ambitions to maintain a significant position
in the industry had a chance of surviving for the long run without mastery
of photographic color technology. Gevaert had introduced a Gevacolor film
in 1949, using the prewar Agfa patents which had been appropriated by the
Allied powers at the end of the war. The dyes were not stable, however,
and the product never reached a level of technical development that made
it competitive or that was up to the level on which the Gevaert reputation
for quality had rested throughout its history. Gevaert had not been
willing to undertake the substantial risks of the research and development
efforts needed to keep pace with Agfa and Eastman Kodak in color
photography; nor had Gevaert been willing to engage these two companies in
the bruising and costly, albeit oligopolistic, competition in the consumer
marketplace.
An alliance with Agfa thus promised to give the Gevaert
organization access to a technology which it could have acquired on its
own only at very high cost. It created an improved chance of more solid
penetration of the German market with products in which Gevaert's
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competence was distinctive. This was an opportunity that had eluded
Gevaert for fifty years. It is not clear in retrospect that Gevaert could
not eventually have done this on its own, given the development of the
European Communities. But the use of the Agfa sales organization in its
domestic market must, on balance, be considered to have been an advantage.
Sales of Agfa professional products had been largely confined to
its domestic market during the postwar period. Access to the palette of
Gevaert technical and professional products gave Agfa an improved basis
for reentry into the markets of the larger industrially developed
countries. Such reentry with only its amateur products into the U.S. and
Japan, for example, would have been suicidal, given the presence of
Eastman Kodak and Fuji on their respective home grounds.
An analysis of available 1963 sales data suggests that not more
than 40 percent of the combined sales of $300 million was subject to
direct competition between the two companies. Some portion of this would
soon have fallen away in any event. Haloid Xerox had put its Model 914
electrostatic copying machine on the market in 1960. Within two years, it
had formed joint ventures with the Rank Organization in the U.K. and Fuji
Photo Film Ltd. in Japan to exploit the electrostatic copying process in
Europe and the Far East.15 1964 imports by Germany of Rank-Xerox
copiers amounted to DM 47 million.1 6 The days of diffusion transfer
based document copying, the process which had been the immediate source of
contention bringing Agfa and Gevaert together, were clearly numbered,
although the process subsequently found other commercial and industrial
applications.
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The complementarity of the two companies' product lines was
mirrored in their foreign operations. Manufacturing operations abroad
during the early 1960s were as follows
Agfa 17
France Societe Nouvelle As de Trefle, S.A.r.l.; 52 percent Bayer
owned; document copy papers and photographic
chemicals.
Fabrique d'Horlogerie La Vedette, S.A.; 50.2 percent Agfa
owned; camera shutters and cameras.
Brazil Industria Fotoquimica Bove, S.A.; 79.9 percent Agfa owned;
papers.
India The New India Industries Ltd.; 25.7 percent Agfa owned;
cameras and papers.
Gevaert 16
Argentina : Fabricacion Industrial Fotografica Argentina, S.A. (FIFA);
99 percent Gevaert owned; monochrome films and papers,
document copy papers.
France : Gevaert France, S.A.; 100 percent Gevaert owned; monochrome
films and papers.
Spain : Industria Fotoquimica Nacional, S.A. (Infonal); 100 percent
Gevaert owned; document copy and other monochrome
papers.
Perutz 19
(The affair becomes somewhat more complex. This is due to the presence
of Perutz interests which, as related below, had been acquired by
Bayer. For the point to be made here, this interest is merely listed.)
Spain Manufacturas Fotograficas Espanolas, S.A. (MAFE);
28.4 percent Perutz owned; x-ray, cine and amateur
films.
Each of the above listed foreign direct investments had been
market seeking in motivation. Most of them had been made to cicumvent
some national barrier to international trade. This fact and the nature of
the products made in the various locations suggest that the opportunities
120
for achieving greater production scale economies abroad through
rationalization were minimal at the time and for the foreseeable future.
The combined international sales and distribution network of the
two companies extended to 144 countries. 2 0 The Gevaert network was,
reflecting the company's traditional export policy, perhaps somewhat more
highly developed; it extended over 122 countries including wholly owned
subsidiaries in sixteen.2 1 In at least ten countries, mainly in Latin
America, Agfa was represented by departments of its Bayer parent's sales
organization. Sales subsidiaries under direct Agfa management were
operating in- seventeen countries. The number of countries in which both
Agfa and Gevaert were operating sales subsidiaries amounted to seven; some
distribution functions may also have been performed by wholly owned
photofinishing laboratories that had been established by Agfa in several
countries where Gevaert had its own selling subsidiaries.2 2
The above facts strongly suggest that it was possible and quite
likely to have overestimated the potential for a more secure future
prosperity simply through elimination of duplicate costs. There appears
to have been more overlapping of activity in the international marketing
function than in manufacturing and research before the merger. Such
economies of scale as could be achieved through joint effort would in the
long run benefit the merged enterprise only if the products manufactured
under these conditions could find outlets. It can thus be said in
retrospect that the potential for expansion of international scope may
have had a significance that has previously been underestimated.
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Small and Large Mergers
The decision to merge having been reached in 1961, it took three
more years to develop a suitable form. In the eyes of the two senior
managements, substantial barriers stood in the way of using traditional
means to achieve this end. Such traditional means might, for example,
have involved the takeover of one company by the other. This was rejected
because it would have adversely affected management and employee morale in
whichever company had been taken over. Harmonization of legal systems
within the European Communities had made no progress toward permitting the
formation of one European corporate entity the validity and rights of
which would be recognized by all member nations. A classical merger
would, under these circumstances, have required the formation of one new
corporate entity in one particular nation. Apart from the national
sensitivities of stockholders of the two merging companies, such a move
might have had unfortunate fiscal consequences for one or the other or
both groups of shareholders.2 3
The legal forms adopted and the rationales given for their
adoption have been reported at length elsewhere and are summarized here
only for the sake of completeness.2 4  The participating entities, Agfa
AG and Gevaert Photo-Produkten N.V., turned themselves into holding
companies. Two operating companies were formed, Agfa-Gevaert AG in
Germany and Gevaert-Agfa N.V. in Belgium. (The name chosen for the Belgian
operating company undoubtedly represented an appeasement of Gevaert
stockholders and employees at the time. In 1970, six years after the
merger, the Belgian operating company's name was changed, for the sake of
commercial uniformity, to Agfa-Gevaert N.V.) The two holding companies
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each held 50 percent of the shares of each of the two operating companies.
These came under joint general management direction through boards of
directors with common members except for the labor representatives on the
supervisory board of Agfa-Gevaert AG required by the German
co-determination law.2 5 Fixed assets originally owned by the holding
companies were leased to the operating companies. Patents, trademarks,
other assets and employees were simply transferred to the operating
companies. Future investments in various assets were intended to be made
by the operating companies for their own account. Net profits of the
operating companies were, when distributed, to be shared equally by the
holding companies.
As two new entities emerged rather than one, and as the
identities of the merging firms were not lost so much as combined, the
arrangement might more accurately be described as a de facto merger.
It is, however, referred to herein simply as a merger. This is both for
the sake of brevity and in recognition that Agfa-Gevaert in fact became a
single operating enterprise irrespective of the legal mechanisms chosen.
The selection of these mechanisms was guided by the most punctilious
regard for national sensitivities and company traditions on both sides.
The result was a legal fusion of two national companies with international
orientations and embryonic multinational characteristics into a
trananational enterprise.2 6  It should be pointed out here that
execution of the marriage certificate is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for a functioning marriage. After the legal formalities were
completed, the work of integrating the operations of the two companies
remained to be done.
These integrating efforts were complicated by factors that were
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part of the entire package design. In what might be called the folk
terminology used within the German company, the fusion of Agfa and Gevaert
became known as "the large merger" and "the big solution." It was
immediately preceded by "the small merger" or "the little solution." The
latter meant the absorption by Agfa of seven smaller German photographic
manufacturers. These firms were :
Perutz-Photowerke G.m.b.H. and its wholly owned subsidiary,
CAWO Photochemische Fabrik G.m.b.H.
Mimosa G.m.b.H. *
Leonar-werke AG.
Chemiache Fabrik Vaihingen/Enz G.m.b.H. *
Gelatine-Fabrik Koepff & Suhne G.m.b.H.
Otto Schlund G.m.b.H. *
* Makers of branded photographic products, to be viewed
as Agfa competitors within their limited spheres and the
acquisition of which represented horizontal integration.
* Manufacturers the acquisition of which represented
vertical integration.
Agfa's parent company, Bayer, had prior to 1964 acquired partial
or complete equity interests in these seven firms, but they had been
treated as portfolio investments. As part the so-called little solution,
these companies were completely absorbed into the Agfa organization.
Although each of these seven firms was, with the exception of Perutz, of
moderate significance, the small merger had the effect of considerably
enlarging Agfa and putting it on a more equal footing with Gevaert.27 In
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an operational sense, the timing of the small merger could have been more
propitious. Rationalization of product mix, production, marketing and
distribution had to be achieved simultaneously with the integration of
these functions with Gevaert.
The small merger had international repercussions of its own,
thus adding to the complexities of the large merger. The Perutz firm had
existed since before 1880 and had begun making dry plates in 1882. 28
Although Perutz had survived mainly as a uninational business, it had
achieved modest export distribution by the 1930s. 29 By the time of the
small merger, Perutz had its own sales subsidiaries operating in Austria
and Italy.3 0 In 1949, Perutz had also gained a foothold in Spain by
organizing, with local equity participation, a joint venture for the
production of monochrome amateur, cine and x-ray films. This venture took
the name NAFE. (See above.)3 1 The marketing and general management
functions of NAFE had to be integrated with those of Gevaert's Infonal
subsidiary and with the Spanish marketing operations of Agfa and Gevaert.
The integration and coordination of operations in Belgium and
Germany proceeded without abnormal difficulties. The Belgian operating
company took on responsibility for technical and professional products.
The German operating company did the same for amateur products. This
eliminated competition in the market place between the two former
companies. But this concentration of effort merely reinforced the major
emphases which the two companies had given their product lines before the
merger. There thus was not too much duplicate production and management to
eliminate.
Integration of overlapping foreign operations was, by contrast,
somewhat more difficult. Perhaps the most complex situation, that in
125
Spain described above, was successfully resolved within two years. In
some other countries, where there had been what were now overlapping
subsidiaries and/or independent distributors, the effort took much longer.
The elimination of competing products was easier to achieve than the
appointment of managers in subsidiaries abroad. Where there had been two
subsidiaries in a foreign country, there would now be one. In such
countries, a number of functional and general management positions had to
be eliminated. Less difficult, but not entirely free of problems, was the
elimination of duplicate distributorships in many countries.
The one country in which legal obstruction to the combining of
several subsidiaries into one might have been expected did not raise any
barriers. There is no record of the U.S. Department of Justice
intervening to stop the merger. Any attempt to explain this lack of
action on the part of U.S. anti-trust law enforcers is pure speculation.
But it is not wildly implausible that they might have welcomed the merger.
This is because of the overwhelmingly dominant market position that
Eastman Kodak enjoyed in the U.S. market for photographic products at the
time. Any additional strength accruing to Agfa-Gevaert as a result of its
merger might well have been interpreted as a factor creating the
possibility for more effective competition in the U.S. market rather than
less.
The work of integrating Agfa-Gevaert into a unified world-wide
enterprise was done during a period in which the company participated in
an explosive growth in the global business opportunities offered by
photography and related imaging technologies.3 2 This eventually led to
a new company structure in 1979. This structure comprised four operating
divisions, each with its own research, production and sales functions and
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global profit responsibilitiy. The four product families for which
operating divisions were established comprised Amateur Photo, Technical
Photographic Products, Office Systems, and Magnetic Tape. A centralized
Regional Sales Coordination staff function was established as part of this
structure. The group was by this time operating around the world through
22 national sales subsidiaries and 145 independent foreign distributors.
Exports represented 70 percent of the Agfa-Gevaert group's sales at the
end of the 1970s. 33
Post-Merger Strategic Issues
Despite enormous revenue growth, the post-merger profit
performance of Agfa-Gevaert has been lackluster. During the fifteen years
following the merger, net earnings reported by the operating companies
averaged less than one percent of worldwide sales and never rose above 2.4
percent after 1965. 34 These can hardly be the results envisioned by
the merger's architects. Some examination of what occurred during the
post-merger period is in order.
Let it be stated at the outset that the problems underlying
Agfa-Gevaert's poor profit performance do not appear to be related in any
way to the trananational nature of the merged enterprise. There was not a
trace of national bias among the many of senior and middle management
executives who were interviewed, both formally and informally, in the
course of the present research. To the extent that the disagreements
which are inevitable in any large organization may arise, they reflect the
viewpoints of executives as individuals, not as representatives of a given
national culture.
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Any conflicts that could have arisen because of the binational
ownership of Agfa-Gevaert were removed at the source. By 1979, the
operating companies needed a large infusion of additional share capital.
This was subscribed in its entirety by Bayer AG, thereby giving Bayer a 60
percent equity interest in both operating companies. Two years later, in
connection with a further increase in the share capital of the operating
companies, all of which was again paid in by Bayer, the latter acquired
the minority interest still held by Gevaert Photo-Produkten N.V., the
Belgian holding company. As a result, Bayer is now the sole owner of
Agfa-Gevaert. Bayer is a German company, though some of its shares may
well be held by people and institutions outside Germany. The senior
management of Agfa-Gevaert remains binational. The chief executive at
this writing is a Belgian. This is a fact that no one would expect if the
German parent were under the influence of any national bias.
There is, furthermore, no evidence that the labor participation
in the highest councils of management required by German law is causing
any unusual problems. It can be presumed that the labor representatives
on the supervisory board of the German operating company were not elated
by the decision to close the company's Munich camera works permanently.
(See below.) But they accepted the decision, though it led to the
dismissal of several thousand workers.
Certain macroeconomic forces did affect the profits reported by
Agfa-Gevaert. These forces included the general turmoil in the world
economy beginning in the late 1960s, an inflation in raw material costs
far exceeding the increase in the general price level, and the relative
strength of the Belgian franc and the Deutschmark during the 1970s. As
Belgium and Germany are the main manufacturing and administrative bases of
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the company, a heavy preponderance of costs incurred is necessarily
denominated in these currencies. This was a source of competitive
disadvantage the results of which are reflected in the reported earnings.
Macroeconomic forces do not, however, provide a complete
explanation. There were other forces at work. A critical review of what
Agfa-Gevaert chose to disclose and emphasize in public, and what it chose
not to reveal or to deemphasize, leads to some tentative conclusions.
This review suggests that the company pursued a highly successful strategy
in its professional and technical product markets. A key element in this
strategy is what might be called a systems approach. This involves
selling a mechanism engineered to provide a certain type of photographic
image. The mechanism is designed, in its optical, electronic and
mechanical aspects, so as to make it necessary to use the same
manufacturer's photosensitive materials. Once the customer decides to use
a given system, he must consume certain photosensitive materials for some
time to come. Even when the consumable materials of a competing
manufacturer can be substituted, the customer often buys those made and
supplied by the equipment manufacturer. The after-sale service provided
by the manufacturer generates a certain customer loyalty. This approach
more or less assures the manufacturer of a steady stream of sales revenue
as materials are consumed and have to be replaced by the customer.
Variations of this approach had been exploited brilliantly for years by
Eastman Kodak and Polaroid in the amateur photographic sector.
Agfa-Gevaert prospered in adapting this strategy to its industrial user
marKets.
The same review suggests that the handsome profits generated by
its industrial user business were being drained away by Agfa-Gevaert's
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participation in the amateur photographic sector. In this sector, the
company had become the prisoner of its own historic business strategy and,
in a larger sense, of Agfa's locational history. Compared to its
competitors, the company moved slowly and with some difficulty to
extricate itself from its nearly exclusive reliance on photographic
specialty retailers for the distribution of its products to the consuming
public. Had it not unfolded as gradually as it did over a twenty year
period, the development of a variety of mass retailing outlets as
significant distribution channels for photographic products in continental
Europe, particularly in the German Federal Republic, might well be termed
a revolution. Agfa-Gevaert gradually came to grips with this revolution
by such means as using the Perutz brand name to move its films at
substantially lower prices through German mass merchandise outlets. Such
moves came late in Germany and had little hope of succeeding in
international markets, where the Perutz name had little meaning.
The area within which the company had room for strategic
maneuver was severely circumscribed by the location of its amateur product
manufacturing base in Germany. Despite whatever success it achieved in
product cost reduction, the company and its pricing policy had become
captive to its own cost structure. In the heady expansionary atmosphere
of the postwar reconstruction, Agfa's administrative bureaucracy had
become not only very large but too deeply entrenched to be uprooted save
by the most dramatic means. Such means, for example, were resorted to in
1982, when a management decision to terminate production of amateur
cameras was made. This meant the permanent closure of camera
manufacturing facilities in Munich and an eight year old satellite camera
factory in Portugal. This was was described as "imperative to safeguard
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the existence of the company".35
A similar decision with respect to amateur use photosensitive
material, which is produced in Leverkusen, is most unlikely. Leverkusen,
a town north of Cologne in North Rhine-Westphalia, is the site of
1. Corporate headquarters for Bayer AG, Agfa-Gevaert's
parent company.
2. The principal chemical manufacturing works of Bayer AG.
3. Administrative headquarters for all Agfa-Gevaert operations
within the Federal Republic of Germany.
4. The principal Agfa-Gevaert research, development and
manufacturing works for amateur use photosensitive
materials.
Except for retail and service businesses serving the Leverkusen
community, Bayer and Agfa-Gevaert are the sole employers of consequence.
There is a highly developed top management sense of social responsibility
for the maintenance of employment where there are no alternative
opportunities. German institutional employment arrangements do not, in
any event, encourage employee mobility. Bayer is a highly profitable
enterprise; it has a deeply embedded corporate bureaucracy of its own; it
also has an established policy of employee benefits the lavishness of
which goes well beyond world standards. The range of benefits offered is
necessarily common to Bayer and Agfa-Gevaert employees in Leverkusen.
Bayer may be able to afford them; Agfa-Gevaert cannot. Given all the
foregoing factors, it is difficult to foresee management decisions either
to terminate the company's activities in amateur photosensitive materials
completely or to scale down its excessive administrative overhead costs.
Were such decisions to be taken, the impact on the Leverkusen economy and
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on Bayer employee morale would be severe. As long as the excessive costs
continue to be incurred at their recent levels, prices charged by the
company for amateur films and papers will remain high compared to the
prices of Japanese competitors whose overheads are more commensurate with
their sales volumes. The present pattern of Agfa-Gevaert operations in
amateur photographic materials is thus a holding action, maintained while
normal employee attrition and retirements take their effect.
Contemporaneous with this holding action in the amateur
photographic sector, Agfa-Gevaert has gradually been developing a
strategic reorientation to its business. Like every other major
participant in the photographic industry, it has been searching for
sensible ways to combine its distinctive competence in photochemistry with
the emerging electronic technologies to satisfy the world's appetite for
image information. A major step in this search was taken in 1981 with the
$78 million acquisition of a 69 percent interest in Compugraphic
Corporation.36 At the time of acquisition, Massachusetts-based
Compugraphic held a dominant position in the market for computerized
phototypesetting equipment used by smaller circulation newspapers and
in-house corporate publications. Consolidation of Compugraphic sales
represented the lion's share of the 1982 sales increase reported by
Agfa-Gevaert that year and raised the share of the group's global sales
represented by foreign countries to 78 percent.3 7 How this and related
developments will eventually affect the company remains to be told by
future historians. But it is clear that Agfa-Gevaert's continued
development as a participant in world business had taken a new direction.
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Chapter V
Ilford i
Introduction and Early History
In 1976, a British bi-monthly, The Photographic Journal,
published a short historical essay entitled "Plates, Ilford, England."
Its author, George Jones, a retired Managing Director and historian of the
Ilford company, states in this article that the words in its title were a
cable address known throughout the world from 1900 until the arrival of
telex.2
As of the writing of this thesis, Ilford is among the most minor
of minor league players in its industry. Its continued existence is
tolerated by its Swiss based parent for only one reason. This is that
Ciba-Geigy A.G., with an eye on such larger corporate interests, wants to
avoid, to whatever extent possible, being cast in the role of the nasty
multinational which takes over local enterprises, exploits them and then
shuts them down when they have outlived their usefulness. 3 The small
toehold in color photography which the Ilford Group manages to maintain
with the products branded as Ilford Cibachrome depends on technical
assistance provided by Konishiroku.4
Analysis of such fragmentary evidence as still exists suggests
that the title of the Jones article has a significance that goes well
beyond what its author intended to convey. The Ilford case is a classic
example of the business-technological mind-set identified by Jenkins.
This mind-set is characterized by a commitment to a given technology and
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way of conducting business. It becomes oblivious to the possibilities and
later to the imperatives of new ways.5 The company was started in 1879
by Alfred H. Herman as a cottage industry dedicated to the manufacture of
gelatin dry plates in the village of Ilford, east of London. 6 Harman
took up the sensitizing of papers in 1884, but the reputation of his firm
rested on the excellence of its plates.7 A small indicator of public
acceptance of this product is given by an 1887 survey of member usage
undertaken by the Camera Club Journal. Its report showed the following
data 8
Ilford 312
Eastman 223
Cadett 187
Wratten & Wainwright 79
Once firmly established in the coating of glass plates, Harman
became committed to this photographic medium. A film was brought to his
attention in 1892. B.J. Edwards, a local plate maker later acquired by
Ilford, had made a film coating machine. Harman inspected the machine and
decided against going into films.9 Three years later, the company did
purchase the business and goodwill of Austin Edwards, a son of B.J.
Edwards and, perhaps somewhat more significantly, a maker of both plates
and films. These films were, however, coated on flat sheets of celluloid.
They were sold as plates at prices which were 50 to 100 percent higher
than glass plates.lO These flat films appear to have been coated
manually, a process that was not destined to be competitive with
Kodak.1 1 The film did not sell well and was phased out in 1896. 12
The company was approached by owners of several small roll film
manufacturers looking for buyers in 1899, 1900, 1902 and 1903. These
offers were all rejected.1 3 When the company finally decided to enter
the field in 1912, it engaged two Germans to undertake the necessary
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engineering work. They were asked to leave the country as undesirable
aliens after August 1914. It was 1922 before Ilford was able to introduce
a roll film in commercial quantities. 14 Its commitment to plates
remained undiminished, however. A peak daily production rate of 45,000
plates was achieved in 1933, a year not otherwise noted for the brilliance
of its economic activity.1 5 Ilford coated its last plates in 1975. 16
Foreign Marketing
The above sketch of Ilford product commitment is illustrative of
a broad set of management attitudes. These attitudes accepted the status
quo not merely as given but as nearly immutable. Distribution of product
was effected through agents and wholesalers. The company did not have its
own traveling salesmen before 1923. The idea of having them was brought
in by T.M. Illingworth whose company had been acquired.1 7 An
advertisement run by Ilford in an 1889 professional yearbook carried the
following laconic footnote :
Special Export Agent for the manufactures of this company,
Mr. J. Spencer, 125 West Regent Street Glasgow.16
In the following year's edition of the same annual, Spencer described his
functions more explicitly in a notice of his own
John Spencer
125 West Regent Street Glasgow
(Export Only)
John Spencer acts as Home Agent for many Colonial and Foreign
Photographic Dealers and Wholesale Druggists, and being
constantly in the market is able to offer them all the
advantages of a Home Office of their own.1 9
it is likely tnat Spencer haa an exclusive agency for 1Ifora
exports during its first decade. The practice of appointing foreign
distributors appears to have started after tne 1889 appointment of John
Howson as the firm's business manager. He was active in a number oi
functions that would in a later aay be subsumed under the word
marketing.2 0 The first advertisement run by Ilford in a foreign country
that has been uncovered in -the course of the present research appeared in
a German language 1902 yearbook. The names of Ilford distributors began
to appear in this publication a few years later.2 1 -
in one sense, the product carried its own advertisement to
exotic places. Ilford had adoptea as its trace name that of the village
where it was founced in 1886. Harman naa started selling his plates under
the name Britannia. A trademark incorporating that name had previously
been registered by Marion & Co., Harman's first domestic wholesaler. The
two firms had a falling out in 1886, and Harman was forced to change his
trade style. To proclaim the ilford name, ne introduced the paadlewneel
steamer trademark shown oelow.2 2
I LFORD-
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In the Far East, where little English was known, the Ilford
product became known as the Little Ship plates.2 3 Although there are no
existing supporting data, it is believed that India, China and Japan were
important markets for Ilford products.2 4 Some supporting evidence that
Japan was important is given by the history of Konishiroku, one of
Ilford's importers starting in the early 1890s. 25 A reform of the
Japanese import tariff in 1906 raised the duty on negative materials from
30 to 40 percent ad valorem.2 6 This appears to have been a
significant enough increase to prompt Edward Xnobel, then Ilford's
Managing Director, to sail to Japan for the purpose of negotiating a joint
manufacturing venture there. The suggested arrangement involved three
local photographic importers and trading houses. These were Kuwata
(Osaka), Asanuma and Konishi (both Tokyo). These would supply 40 percent
of the capital needed to establish a dry plate factory. Ilford would
provide the remaining required capital and its technical know-how.
Profits were to be split by each of the Japanese partners taking 17.5
percent and Ilford 47.5 percent.2 7
The Japanese venture was doomed before it could begin. The
intense commercial rivalry among the three potential Japanese participants
made any future cooperation in such a venture unlikely. In addition,
Knobel's temperament may not have made him the best person to undertake a
delicate negotiation with three Japanese companies. The detailed reports
in the London financial press of Ilford shareholder meetings of the time
suggest that Knobel was rather dictatorial in his approach to everything
related to the conduct of the company's affairs. As early as 1903, his
aggressively assertive personality was described as considerably
diminishing the value of his technical ability to Ilford. Among the
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suggestions made was that "his wings will have to be clipped before the
direction of the Ilford Company can be considered healthy and
satisfactory." 28 He could also be abrasive. An indication of this
bent is given by his reported remarks at one such meeting :
On the other hand, the Board itself knew nothing about the
business. He ventured to ask, Had they ever seen even the
outside of the factory more than twice during the last five
years ? (Laughter.) Had they ever seen the price list, or did
they know what articles the company manufactured ? (Laughter.)
He maintained that the opinion of the directors, so far as
regarded the actual trade, was not worthy of very serious
consideration.29
At the meeting following the Ilford Booard's request for
Knobel's resignation in 1907, one director was reported as stating
When(ever) the Board met, Mr. Knobel seemed to expect them all
to be puppets and dance to his tune, and the directors had
never had a proper share in the management of the concern. 3 0
Precisely what Knobel told his Japanese negotiating partners and
how he said it have not been recorded. But it is plausible to believe
that Knobel was used to having his own way and that he was not likely to
have it in a Japanese manufacturing venture involving local partners.
This was as close as Ilford ever came to manufacturing abroad until modern
times.
Some semblance of an export organization began to develop during
the 1920s. Before then, no foreign customers had ever been visited. A
somewhat more aggressive approach to selling abroad was initiated by T.M.
Illingworth. The typical Ilford foreign distribution contract ran for two
to three years. Distributors began to be visited on a regular basis by
Ilford sales personnel at four to six month intervals. A roving area
salesman for the Far East was based in Tokyo.3 1
The first Ilford foreign sales subsidiaries came into being
during the early 1930s. 32 They were the product of a crisis into which
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the company had stumbled with little strategic forethought. In 1903,
George Eastman had made an unsuccessful attempt to acquire Ilford. A
committee of Ilford stockholders had made several recommendations to the
management after this attempted takeover had been rebuffed. Among its
suggestions was that there be a combination of British photographic
manufacturers and distributors. 3 3 That recommendation was duly adopted
and then forgotten for a decade and a half.
Between 1917 and 1930, however, the company gradually acquired
nearly every remaining British photographic manufacturer of consequence, a
dozen in all. Their early account books show that several of these had a
more or less lively export trade, conducted through agents and
distributors in foreign countries.3 4 Here and there a foreign sales
branch could be found. The companies having been acquired, not much
further was done with them. This practice of competitor acquisition
without managerial integration may have been characteristic of British
industries at the time.3 5
By the end of the 1920s, Ilford was a kind of photographic
mini-conglomerate. Some sporadic efforts were made to bring these
companies under common direction and control. But in the main, each went
its own way. Some twenty pages of advertising were spread among five of
the companies in the 1932 edition of the industry yearbook. No one would
have known that these were all Ilford companies. The contrast in impact
with the nineteen pages of Kodak advertising in the same publication is
striking.3 6
It was the economic crisis of the 1930s which finally stimulated
Ilford management to bring some order to this imbroglio. The overlapping
efforts of competing foreign agencies, distributors, and sales branches
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had to be rationalized. It was thus that sales subsidiaries came into
being in Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and India. 37
Single distributors were appointed in other countries, mainly in Europe.
Foreign sales territories were organized into three geographic groups.
Two of these covered Europe and the third the rest of the world.38
' After the second World War, several subsidiaries in small
markets were not revived. Others were formed in the U.S. and in
Australia. In the latter, a high tariff and import restrictions led to
shipment of films and papers in bulk master rolls from England. Slitting
and packaging for local consumption were done in Australia. 3 9 A
government report issued in 1966 shows the company to have been operating
sales subsidiaries in Australia, Denmark, France, India and the U.S., in
addition to having a world wide distribution network during the early
1960s. 40
Accelerating Weakness Amid Growth
Alfred Harman preferred to work in secrecy when it came to
preparation and coating of emulsions. He engaged his first chemist in
1888, but his function appears to have been that of ensuring product
quality rather than research, product or process development. Harman had,
on an empirical basis , developed a superior product which he meant to
exploit as fully as possible. The first Ilford research chemist was hired
in 1898 as Harman was beginning to phase out from active management of the
company. Ilford research laboratories eventually developed a number of
products that gave the company a first rank reputation as a producer of
highly sensitive fine grained monochrome negative materials. There is,
however, little evidence that the research effort had a well defined sense
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of direction.
Throughout the 1930s, the company worked on a number of additive
color processes. None of these were destined to be competitive in the
postwar world. The U.K. government prohibited the use of scarce resources
for research into color photography during the war. Ilford was thus faced
with some difficult decisions as the reconstruction began. The company
knew that it had to develop an effective basis for entry into the color
market. Its first decision was not to use the Agfa process though this
had become freely available after the Allied powers had appropriated
Agfa's patents. The reason given for this decision was that Ilford felt
it lacked the technical knowledge needed to make the organic chemicals
required by the process.4 1 To avoid infringing the web of Kodak color
patents, Ilford introduced a number of coatings and solutions that
required processing of the exposed materials in special equipment and
under closely controlled conditions. No one objected to the company's
insistence that this be done in its own facilities when this business was
in its infancy. It did require the sale of the film with processing costs
included.
As this business gradually matured during the 1950s, the way it
had to be conducted became an increasing irritant to those who were
necessarily excluded from participation. For their own reasons, Kodak and
Agfa had internalized the processing of color films. A complaint was
lodged by some members of the Wholesale Photofinishers' Association with
the U.K. Monopolies Commission. The report of that commission was finally
issued in 1966 and recommended a reduction in the price of Kodak color
films and cessation of the practice of selling them with the processing
costs included. 42 The endorsement of the commission's report by the
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Board of Trade the same year gave its recommendations the force of law in
the U.K. Kodak duly lowered its color film prices by 20 percent. This
was a level at which Ilford management felt it could not support the costs
of continued technical and market development. The circumstances seem, in
retrospect, to have been tailor made for the next decision taken by
Ilford.
The company abandoned the field of amateur color photography as
a supplier of its own branded products. Instead, it became a supplier of
private label color film. Its principal customers were Boots, the largest
drug store chain in Great Britain with 1,300 outlets, and Film Corporation
of America (FCA). The latter, a Philadelphia photofinisher, had developed
a way of getting direct access to consumers through mail order and
concession counters in supermarket chains. Ilford sales to FCA swelled
within a few years to a point which enabled the company to win two
Queen's Awards to Industry for Export Achievement.4 3 But these
arrangements did not last. FCA became involved in several ventures into
business activities it did not understand, including an unsuccessful gas
well and general merchandise mail order operations. By 1978, FCA was
insolvent. Ilford wrote off a substantial receivable from FCA and its 11
percent investment in FCA's equity which had sunk below American Stock
Exchange listing standards.4 4
The company put a toe into several other waters outside Great
Britain in modern times.- An equity interest in Valca S.A., a Spanish
manufacturer of sensitized materials, was taken in 1960. That equity was
given in consideration of technical knowledge and assistance. Ilford's
hope in selling this knowledge was to get access to the Spanish market
and, through it, to those of South America. The Valca shares were sold in
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1976 for reasons not revealed by the company's historians.4 5 It is, of
course, plausible that the dominating presence in Spain of Eastman Kodak
and Agfa-Gevaert would have made any other photosensitive product a
marginal one in that market. And, except for common language and cultural
heritage, Spain offered nothing that would ease access to South American
markets for photographic goods.
In 1969, Ilford became the supplier of a turnkey project in
Poland. It involved the provision of designs, paper and film plants and
technical know-how to the Polish government for cash.4 6 Later that
year, Ilford became one of the cooperating participants in a similar
project in the U.S.S.R.4 7
In Germany, the company entered into a joint venture with
Polychrome Corporation, an American company. The purpose of this 1967
venture was the production and sale in Germany of reprographic materials,
sensitized metal plates used in the printing business.48
New Ownership
Although it was plain to the participants in retrospect that
Ilford's postwar effort to establish a position in color photography had
drained the company's financial resources, the antiquated control system
it was still using in the 1950s did not make this transparent at the time.
In the words of Hercock and Jones, a "classical business situation had
arisen; turnover was increasing but profit was not and nobody knew
why." 49
What was clear was that the company's capitalization was
inadequate in light of what is was trying to accomplish. Imperial
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Chemical Industries Ltd. (ICI) provided E6.4 million in 1958. For this, it
took newly issued Ilford shares, giving ICI 32 percent of Ilford's equity
and effective control of the company. ICI had, ever since the freeing of
Agfa's patents, been looking for a forward integration opportunity in
color photography as an outlet for its dye manufacturing operations.5 0
Another multinational chemical manufacturer, one with similar
motivations, came into the picture in 1963. Researchers at Ciba A.G. had
developed a silver dye-bleach process of color photography. This process
was similar to one that had been abandoned by Ilford in 1960 because it
appeared to require a very large and long term research effort to bring up
to competitive standards. Ciba had begun to act on its diversification
program in 1960 - 1961 by acquiring Tellko A.G., a Swiss based
manufacturer of photosensitive materials, and Lumiere S.A., the oldest
French producer in the business.
Ciba had not found a sufficiently high level of technical
expertise in these acquired companies. It therefore approached ICI and
Ilford for an exchange of technical information and help in the
construction of new plants. ICI welcomed to these arrangements because
its investment in Ilford was becoming a disappointment. The fundamental
chemical concepts and techniques on which ICI and Ilford scientists had
been working for years were not compatible. ICI began to look for a
graceful way to extricate itself from its embarrassing involvement with
Ilford. It made a tender offer for the remaining Ilford shares
outstanding. It was understood that 40 percent of Ilford's equity would
be sold immediately to Ciba. ICI sold the remainder of its investment to
Ciba two years later. 5 1
In 1970, Ciba merged with Geigy A.G., another Swiss based
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multinational chemical producer.5 2 Ilford and Geigy had known each
other for nearly two decades. A British subsidiary of Geigy had been a
supplier of chemicals to Ilford, and the two companies had formed Gyl
Chemicals in 1952 as a joint venture to make and supply Ilford with
hydroquinone, a photographic developer agent.
As a result of the foregoing events, a series of discussions
about organization ensued in Basel and London. Ciba-Geigy was ready to
form a group which would bring under its umbrella all of the company's
worldwide photographic operations. The critical issue was who was to
manage this group. The company's technical strength in color technology
was by now centered in Fribourg, Switzerland. The company's senior
management was headquartered in Basel. Such knowledge as Ilford possessed
of the business aspects of the world photographic industry was embodied in
executives in the U.K. In the end, it was decided that the group would be
called the Ilford Group and responsibility for its operations would be
given to Ilford management headquartered in London. This was a first for
Ciba-Geigy, none of its other operating divisions or groups ever having
been headquartered outside Switzerland previously.5 3
It was a decision that the senior management of Ciba-Geigy has
had ample time to ponder in the interim. The decline of Ilford as a
significant factor in the world's photochemical industry continued. In
1980, the company stopped production of x-ray, microfilm and graphic arts
products, selling off its inventories, receivables and customer lists to
Agfa-Gevaert. These segments represented about half of Ilford's sales.
The group had been running up losses for several years.54
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Epilogue
We consider that our board as a whole exhibits a want
of general business acumen and a lack of those essential
qualifications so necessary for the ..... conduct of so large an
undertaking. Many facts have come up in evidence indicating
that the board has not moved with the times, and that more
modern ideas and methods, coupled with greater businesslike push
and vigour, particularly in connection with the commercial side
of the undertaking, are essential for the maintenance and
development of our business. Your committee consider that your
board does not contain those elements of strength necessary to
cope with the exceptional competition to which our trade is
specially subject, our want of progress being due to this fact
This quotation is taken from the report of the stockholders' committee
which had been appointed to look into Ilford's affairs at a somewhat
stormy meeting of shareholders called to consider the 1903 Eastman Kodak
proposal to take over the company. The committee issued its report in
August of that year. The indictment handed down then could well have been
made any time during the next eight decades. The international history of
Ilford is spare. This is less a cause of Ilford's decline than a symptom
of the consistent failure of its management to define the company's
central purpose and business objectives, its products, processes and
markets, or to formulate d coherent set of policies consistent with these
definitions.
149
Notes and References
I The research on which this chapter is based was done by interviewing
several retired directors of the company, examination of contemporary
newspaper accounts and public documents, and perusal of such other
secondary sources as have been published.
2 George A. Jones, "Plates, Ilford, England",
The Photographic Journal, Vol. 116, November - December 1976,
p. 292. Hereafter cited as Jones, "Plates..."
3 Interview with George A. Jones, retired Ilford Managing Director,
London, 19 April 1983. Hereafter cited as Jones interview.
4 Interview with Philip Jenkins, retired Ilford research executive,
London, 18 April 1983. Hereafter cited as Jenkins interview.
5 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1975, passim.
6 Robert J. Hercock and George A. Jones, Silver by the Ton, London:
McGraw-Hill Book Company (UK) Limited, 1979, pp. 16 - 17.
Hereafter cited as Hercock & Jones, Silver by the Ton.
7 Ibid., p. 159.
8 Jones, "Plates...," p. 293.
It may be noted here that the firms putting out Cadett and Wratten &
Wainwright plates were subsequently acquired by Eastman Kodak.
9 Hercock & Jones, Silver by the Ton, p. 33.
10 Ibid., pp. 37 - 39.
11 Jones, "Plates...," p. 295.
12 Hercock & Jones, Silver by the Ton, p. 39.
13 Ibid., pp. 51, 115.
14 Ibid., p. 158.
15 Jones, "Plates...," p. 296.
16 Id.
17 Hercock & Jones, Silver by the Ton, p. 117.
18 The British Journal Photographic Almanac and Photographer's
Daily Companion for 1889, p. 352.
150
19 The British Journal Photographic Almanac and Photographer's
Daily Companion for 1890, p. 299.
20 Hercock & Jones, Silver by the Ton, pp. 19, 27, 28.
21 Eder's Jahrbuch. 1902
Although Eder worked and published in Vienna, his various publications
were aimed at Germany as much as at Austria. An Ilford advertisement
in the 1908 edition of his yearbook identifies R. Wollner & Cie. as the
company's general distributor for Austria-Hungary and the Balkans and
Romain Talbot for Germany. (Talbot, a Belgian trader in photographic
goods who had established himself in Berlin, had served as Eastman
Kodak distributor before that company had established its own German
sales subsidiary.)
22 Hercock & Jones, Silver by the Ton, pp. 17, 122, 123.
23 Jones, "Plates...," p. 294.
24 Ibid., p. 295;
Hercock & Jones, Silver by the Ton, p. 115;
Interview with Sydney Ferris, retired Ilford Export Director, London,
22 April 1983. Hereafter cited as Ferris interview.
25 Tokio Kikushi and Takishi Kamei, eds. Shashin to tomo ni 100 nen,
Tokyo: private printing by Konishiroku Photo Industry Co. Ltd., 1973,
pp. 70, 71, 74, 77, 78, 90, 136.
Hereafter cited as Kikushi & Xamei, Shashin to tomo....
26 Japanese Import Tariff, 1906.
27 Kikushi & Xamei, Shashin to tomo..., p. 161;
Hercock & Jones, Siiver by the Ton, p. 50.
28 Investors' Guardian (London), 3 October and 28 November 1903.
29 Financial Times (London), 26 June 1903.
30 Financial Times (London), 4 December 1907.
31 Hercock & Jones, Silver by the Ton, p. 117.
32 Carl W. Ackerman (George Eastman, Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1930,
pp. 249 - 250) lists an Ilford Company as one of many competitors
active in the U.S. before World War 1. All Ilford executives
interviewed in the course of the present research denied that the
company had any establishment in the U.S. this early. The name may
have been a tradestyle adopted by an American distributor of the
company's products.
151
Statist (London), 22 August 1903;
Investors' Guardian (London), 22 August 1903.
34 General Journals and Sales Journals, Ilford subsidiaries, Library of
Imperial College of Technology, London.
35 See Leslie Hannah, "Visible and Invisible Hands in Great Britain," in
Managerial Hierarchies, edited by Alfred D. Chandler Jr. and Herman
Daems, Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1960, pp. 52-60.
36 British Journal Photographic Almanac 1932.
37 Ferris interview;
Hercock & Jones, Silver by the Ton, p. 117.
38 Ibid., pp. 61 - 62.
39 Ferris interview;
Hercock & Jones, Silver by the Ton, p. 81.
40 The (U.K.) Monopolies Commission, "A Report on the Supply and
Processing of Color Film", Parliamentary Papers (House of Commons and
Command), Session 18 April 1966 - 27 October 1967, Vol. XLI, London:
H.M.'s Stationery Office, 1966. Hereafter cited as "U.K. Monopolies
Commission Report."
41 Hercock & Jones, Silver by the Ton, p. 79;
Jenkins interview.
It may be noted in this context that none of the companies that
introduced postwar color films based on original Agfa paptents were
particularly successful, either technically or commercially, with these
products.
42 U.K. Monopolies Commission Report.
It may be of interest to the student of international business that the
U.K. commission's report cites as one of the precedents for its
conclusions a consent decree accepted by Eastman Kodak Company in 1954
to settle a complaint brought under the provisions of the Sherman Act.
43 Financial Times (London), 25 October 1968;
Hercock & Jones, Silver by the Ton, pp. 88 - 90.
152
44 Jones interview;
Moody's Industrial Manual 1970 - 1978, New York: Moody's Investors
Service;
Wall Street Journal, 21 February 1978.
45 Hercock & Jones, Silver by the Ton, pp. 85, 90, 91.
46 Ibid., p. 90.
47 Id.
"Daten zur Entwicklung der Fotoindustrie", unpublished chronolgy,
Volkswirtachaftliche Abteilung, Agfa-Gevaert A.G., ca. 1975, pp. 64-65.
48 Ibid., p. 62.
49 Hercock & Jones, Silver by the Ton, pp. 80 - 82;
Jones interview.
50 Hercock & Jones, Silver by the Ton, passim;
Jones interview;
Economist, 7 January 1967;
Financial Times (London), 3 January 1967.
51 Hercock & Jones, Silver by the Ton, passim;
Financial Times (London), 8 February 1968 and 10 July 1970;
New York Times, 3 January 1967.
52 Hercock & Jones, Silver by the Ton, p. 90;
Financial Times (London), 10 July 1970.
53 Hercock & Jones, Silver by the Ton, p. 90;
Jones interview.
54 Agfa-Gevaert Annual Report, 1980;
Ilford Ltd. Annual Reports, 1974 - 1980.
55 Statist (London), 22 August 1903.
153
Chapter VI
Konishiroku I
Introduction
Konishiroku Photo Industry Co. Ltd. is an old Japanese
enterprise. The involvement of its antecedents with international
commerce in photographic goods can be traced to 1873. It is a large
enterprise. For its 1982 fiscal year, it reported sales of nearly V. 285
billion. (In equivalent terms, this was well over one billion U.S.
dollars.) Nearly half of its revenue comes from the sale of
photosensitive materials. An undisclosed, but presumed to be very large,
percentage of the company's production of sensitized materials is exported
to countries in the industrially developed West.
Yet, the company is hardly known as a photographic industry
participant to the general public outside Japan and a handful of
neighboring East Asian countries. To the extent the company is known at
all to the public in the West, it is as the producer of Konica cameras.
This apparent paradox is resolved by one key fact of strategic
importance. This is that Konishiroku has chosen to be a private label
exporter of sensitized goods. In Japan and nearby markets, the company
sells film and paper under its own Sakura brand name. In Western export
markets, these products are sold by others under a variety of names.
These include brands owned by other manufacturers as well as by certain
retailers. The latter, in effect, perform the entire marketing function
for the company's films and papers in their localities.
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This method of conducting business abroad is the result of a
long, albeit slowly evolving, company history. The company gradually
developed from a merchant trading in imported photographic goods to a
manufacturer of such goods. The pace of this evolution was slow. Mastery
of the required technologies did not come easily and may possibly have
absorbed all of the management's energies. There is little evidence that
the company ever learned the skills necessary for successful marketing of
photographic products, either in its home market or abroad. For more than
six decades after the company started manufacturing in 1902, management
attention was concentrated on camera production. The company did not
become a reliable producer of sensitized goods until the 1930as. During
the 1950s and 1960s, a number of quality lapses resulted in a serious
erosion in the company's share of its domestic film market. To keep its
film factories running at reasonable unit cost, Konishiroku had to turn to
exports in the late 1960s.
The turn to film exports during this period coincided with
several other developments inside and outside the company. Each of these
developments influenced the company's policy in coming to rely on private
label exports. Inside the company, a serious financial crisis in 1967 led
to the replacement of the entire top management, which had been in the
hands of one family for nearly a century. The new management had been
involved in research and development of the company's film products for
several decades and was therefore perhaps inclined to see better business
prospects for these products than its predecessors.
Meanwhile, Japan had begun to liberalize film import
restrictions. This liberalization bred a fear of a massive invasion of
film imports from the West. This invasion never took place, but the
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prospect of Kodak films taking a dominant share of the Japanese film
market stimulated the search for other markets in which to sell Japanese
made film. Finally, the very success of Western producers in building a
truly mass market for color photography opened opportunity for the
emergence of a number of private retailer brands. Lacking knowledge of
how to market films in the West, Konishiroku made a virtue of necessity.
It turned the marketing function over to retailers and manufactured the
product for them. This chapter traces these developments.
Early Photographic Imports
The origins of photography in Japan are shrouded in the mists of
time. There is little hard evidence supporting the legends which are
commonly believed with respect to particular early milestones. It is,
however, safe to state that photography gradually emerged as an import
from the West during the twilight years of the Tokugawa Shogunate.
The social diffusion of this imported art throughout Japan began
simultaneously from the bottom up and from the top down. An example of
the first is provided by foreign sailors who wanted souvenir photographs
of themselves and local women. These sailors came in increasing numbers
as Japanese ports were opened up to European and American traders. By
1862, the demand for such souvenir photographs had become large enough to
support the establishment of the first Japanese studio shop in Yokohama.
The owner of this shop, Renjo Shimooka, had learned the craft from, among
others, the secretary of Townsend Harris, the American Consul. 2
Photography also came to the attention of people at the very top of
Japanese society. Among these was the last Tokugawa Shogun. His
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enthusiasm for photography helped to spread awareness of this new art
among the Japanese aristocracy. This awareness and subsequent interest
continued after the Restoration. The Meiji Emperor had his portrait taken
in 1873. This was a signal to government officials and wealthy people
that photography had become respectable. The demand for portraits began
to grow.3
Among the merchants who supplied medicinal drugs to the last
Shogunate and the Restoration government was a drug dealer named Rokuemon
Sugiura.4 The Sugiura family interest in trade of medicinal drugs can
be traced to 1859 when a store called Konishiya had been acquired. Six
years later, this business was turned over to a younger brother of
Rokuemon Sugiura. The latter opened a new store in what was to become the
city of Tokyo. The new store was named Konishi Honten. It was quite
probably through his business contacts with high government officials that
Sugiura became interested in photography. By 1873, the business of
Konishi Honten turned its main emphasis to dealing in photographic and
lithographic supplies. The diversification from drugs was a natural one.
Photography at this time was still in its wet plate stage. In wet plate
photography, the negative plate is made sensitive to light by the
photographer immediately before the exposure is made. The plate is
literally wet with chemicals at this point; thus the name. The chemical
compounds have to be supplied by someone to the photographer. In early
Meiji Japan, the supplier turned out more often than not to be a drug
dealer. The diversification from medicinal to photographic chemicals had
many parallels in Europe at the time.5
The initial Konishi Honten foray into trade in photographic
supplies ceased temporarily soon after its start. Two years earlier, in
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1871, another drug dealer, Tokichi Asanuma, had begun to trade in
photographic supplies in Tokyo. Demand for such supplies may have been
growing in the early 1870s, but it was not yet large enough to support two
Tokyo dealers. Competition between Asanuma and Konishi Honten was fierce
and threatened to become ruinous for both. At a bathhouse meeting, where
matters of business importance were discussed in those days, it was
decided that Asanuma would concentrate on photographic supplies and
Konishi would specialize in lithographic materials. This arrangement
lasted for three years.6 It is an early example of attempts to restrain
competition in the commerce of photography. The house of Asanuma remained
in the business and, as of this writing, is by far the largest
photographic wholesaler in Japan. Konishi Honten returned to trade in
photographic supplies in 1876, and its successors have been involved
continuously in it since then.7
In the Japan of the early Meiji Era, there was one major
difference between trade in medicine and trade in photochemicals in that
the medicines were of domestic origin while photographic supplies had to
be imported. The main source for the latter was England. The first
importers of photographic goods in Japan were Europeans who had
established themselves near the bluff overlooking Yokohama harbor. They
took care of unloading the goods from European ships, clearing whatever
customs formalities were required, and storing the products. They bought
and sold for their own account. It can be presumed that they enjoyed a
sellers' market for many years starting in the 1860s. It was to these
people that dealers such as Asanuma and Sugiura came to buy their
supplies.8
This manner of trade went on for several decades. As Japan's
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relations with the West developed during the Meiji reign, knowledge of
whatever importing skills were required spread among the Japanese.
Asanuma was the first to break the trading pattern in photography by
becoming a direct importer. Konishi Honten followed. The latter was
aided by two people in making the transition to direct imports. One of
these was a European trader from whom Sugiura had bought products for many
years and with whom he had developed a friendly business relationship over
that time. This trader decided to retire in 1893, at which time he sold
his entire photographic inventory to Sugiura and helped him make contact
with his European supply sources.9
Another person who was instrumental in establishing such
contacts was William Kinnimond Burton. In its efforts to modernize Japan,
the government had invited Burton, a Scotsman, to teach civil engineering
in Tokyo. He received a professorial appointment at the Imperial
University in 1887 and remained in Tokyo until his death twelve years
later. 1 0 Burton had an avid amateur interest in photography and became
well known to the small circle of photographic merchants in Tokyo. Burton
wrote letters of introduction on behalf of Sugiura to such English
manufacturers of photosensitive materials as Ilford and Marion. Once
contacts and trade relations with these companies had been established,
other European manufacturers soon fell into line. It was but a small step
from direct import to exclusive distributorship. By the end of the
nineteenth century, Konishi Honten had become the sole Japanese
distributor for a number of European and American manufacturers. These
included camera and lens producers as well as makers of sensitized
materials. Konishi Honten gradually transformed itself from a retailer
into an importing wholesaler as photography became more diffused
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throughout Japan.11
Koniahi Honten imported its first Kodak films in 1894. They did
not perform well, which fact was attributed to the very high humidity
prevailing in Tokyo at certain times of the year.1 2 Be that as it may,
the film may simply have been defective. It is known that Eastman Kodak
films made in 1892-1893 performed poorly wherever they were sold. 1 3 The
result was that Konishi Honten imports of Kodak film were not resumed
until 1901.
In summary, much of Konishi's role during the first two decades
of its involvement with photography was confined to that of retailer or
wholesaler. Its international involvement was limited to direct import.
The Importer as Re-exporter
Among the customers who sought out Sugiura in the 1890s was
Tamotsu Kashimura, a Japanese military ship chandler. Kashimura had high
ambitions to extend his product lines and the geographic scope of his
operations. Following the absorption of Formosa by Japan in 1895,
Rashimura established a trading business on the island. Among his lines
were photographic goods. These had been imported by Konishi Honten from
Europe and were then reshipped to Formosa. By the turn of the century,
Kashimura had extended his operations to several cities on the Chinese
mainland and had established branches in Peiping and Dairen. In Tientsin,
he arranged for drop-shipments of European products to his customers. 1 4
The business first stimulated by Kashimura began to expand after
the Russo-Japanese War. One of the results of that war was an expansion
of Japanese economic activity in Asia. Among many Japanese who moved to
other countries in the region were photographers. They fanned out in a
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long East Asian arc that ranged from Manchuria to the Dutch East Indies.
At home, they had bought supplies from Koniahi Honten. Abroad, they found
Kashimura's warehouses and agents. The growing volume of Kashimura's
orders impressed itself on Sugiura. Several of his sons-in-law were sent
to various Chinese coastal cities for market prospecting. These
investigatory visits led to the appointment of authorized Konishi
wholesalers and agents in these cities. This expansion into re-export
markets continued for at least two decades. During the 1920s, the goods
destined for re-export were kept in bonded warehouses in Kobe and
Yokohama, the paperwork being handled by a branch office in Osaka. As the
decade ended, some 85 percent of Konishiroku'a exports comprised
re-exports of goods that had been imported from Europe. One of the major
suppliers was Ilford. 15 It is doubtful that Ilford's management ever
knew the ultimate destination of its exports to Japan.
Early Manufacturing
In 1901, Sugiura was able to buy, at bargain prices, the parts
inventory of a Japanese company that had tried and failed to manufacture
cameras. Sugiura established a manufacturing arm for his company. He
gave the name Rokuosha to this department of Konishi Honten. The first
commercial product made by Rokuosha, introduced in 1903, was a camera
called the Cherry Portable.1 6 In the words of an authoritative history,
"The first hand camera from Konishi Honten had a mechanism and external
design identical to the Little Nipper imported by the Ueda Camera Store
and Asanuma Shokai from W. Butcher & Sons, England." The Cherry Portable
was a straight copy. 17 The company continued to copy cameras from the
West for over three decades while it acquired the knowledge of optics and
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mechanics needed to develop its own models. It produced its first camera
lens in 1931, using optical glass imported from Jena in Germany.18
Rokuosha also tried to bring out a sensitized printing paper in
1903. This effort failed. The paper suffered from dark spotting and
other defects.1 9 The chemistry of photosensitive materials was not yet
well enough understood. The first successful Japanese photographic papers
were produced during the early 1920s by another company. Konishiroku, the
name adopted by the company after its founder's death in 1921, followed
with its own sensitized papers toward the close of the same decade.2 0
During the 60 year product life cycle of the photographic dry
plate, from about 1880 until the start of World War II, few Japanese
enterprises ever managed to acquire the knowledge of how to sensitize
plates with sufficient quality and in sufficient quantity to make a
commercial success of it. Konishiroku was not among those that did,
though it had made efforts to do so starting in 1904. European
technicians and European trained Japanese were hired, but none succeeded.
The products they put out either fogged or were in other ways inferior to
European and American plates.2 1
An attempt to transfer British plate making technology to Japan
was made by Ilford in 1906 following an increase in the Japanese import
tarrif. This attempt came to nothing. There were too many participants
in a proposed Joint venture which was to include Konishi, Asanuma and
Kuwata, all of whom were important photographic merchants dealing in
Ilford products. They were also bitter rivals. The cooperation needed
for such a venture to succeed could not be achieved.2 2 At about the
same time, George Nelson, Dale & Co., an English producer of photographic
gelatins, approached Asanuma and several other Japanese merchants with a
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similar joint venture proposal. Although Sugiura was invited to join, he
refused. This venture did get organized as Nihon Kanpan K.K. and started
to produce a product called the Nippon Dry Plate. This product was
superior to whatever Rokuosha was trying to put out at the time, but it
was not as good as the Ilford product. Konishi and Ilford responded to
the appearance of the Nippon Dry Plate by renaming an existing Ilford
plate and slashing its price severely. The so-called Ilford Alliance
Plate eventually drove the Japanese product off the market. The
combination of superior quality and lower price was unbeatable. Nihon
Kanpan soon disappeared from the scene.2 3
Nearly three decades of trial and error were required for
Konishi to understand the basic chemistry of photosensitive emulsions.
During the 1920a, it had become apparent that the base for carrying these
emulsions was to be a flexible film rather than the rigid glass plates. A
Sakura branded film was put on the market in 1929 by Konishiroku.2 4
This was the second Japanese made film, having been preceded by Kiku, a
brand introduced by Asahi Shashin Kogyo in 1928. Kiku film soon
disappeared, however, for unknown reasons. Sakura thus became the sole
domestically produced film in Japan for a few years, a film largely
intended for amateur use. Konishiroku needed these years to perfect the
product. It was beset by the same problems that had afflicted all early
films. Sakura films fogged during the very hot summers of 1931 and 1933,
and they had other defects as well during these early years.2 5 These
defects became the subject of unfavorable newspaper publicity. This fact
added to the difficulty of introducing the first Konishiroku x-ray film in
1933. Although this film was technically adequate, it was difficult to
wean Japanese doctors and hospital administrators away from Kodak and Agfa
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medical films.2 6 One major reason that Japanese photographic products
of all sorts were very late in winning acceptance, both within Japan and
without, was the widely held belief that such products were inferior to
those produced in the West. This belief was well supported by fact for
many years, but the belief did not die until long after the technical
accomplishments of Japanese manufacturers had made it irrelevant.
Konishiroku brought out a series of films and papers for technical,
industrial and professional users during the 1930s, and these products had
to be accepted after the Japanese government banished all competing
imports late in the decade.
Export Efforts in the 1930s
In view of the above described circumstances, Koniahiroku's
modest internationalization is understandable. Such sales of its own
products outside the Japanese homeland as did take place were made to
neighboring countries which had, by virtue of Japan's military adventures,
become part of the Empire or were within the Japanese sphere of economic
influence. Many of the customers were, in fact, Japanese who had settled
in these neighboring countries.
A Konishiroku export depot was established in 1935 in the city
of Fukuoka on the island of Kyushu, and the sales work was done from a
branch office in Osaka. A traveling representative went from Osaka to
Korea once or twice a month to visit photographers and dealers, solicit
orders and arrange for advertising. In 1937, a distribution depot was set
up in Seoul, and this was upgraded to a sales branch in 1941. A similar
pattern was followed, starting in 1939, in the city of Dairen to serve the
Manchurian market. A Formosan branch was organized in 1941. Sales to
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mainland China were made directly to independent trading houses in the
major Eastern cities such as Peiping, Tientsin, Shanghai, and Canton.2 7
As the military regime ruling Japan in the 1930s increasingly
put the economy on a war footing, Konishiroku became primarily a supplier
to the country's armed forces. Despite technical progress in
photosensitive materials, the company's primary product orientation was
toward the development of cameras and optical equipment.
The Early Post-World War II Era
The appearance of Konishiroku as an international participant in
the photosensitive materials industry is quite recent. As of this
writing, it can be measured in less than two decades. Some of the
circumstances that may account for this recent entry are explored in this
section.
Prior to World War II, the company simply had little to offer
the world outside the Japanese sphere of economic influence. Until 1935,
nearly all Japanese cameras, including those made by Koniahiroku, were
simply copies of Western models, and their quality was not highly
regarded. But after this time, technical development came rapidly.
During the second half of the 1930s, certain signs of originality began to
appear in Japanese cameras, and this technical development continued
intensively throughout the war. The army and navy, cut off from foreign
technology, sponsored considerable research and engineering to satisfy
their needs for a variety of optical precision instruments.2 9 The war
experience taught Japan's camera industry the design technology and
production skills which were to serve as its foundation in peacetime.
Konishiroku was part of this industry. As the company's main camera plant
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was not harmed by the war's air raids, Konishiroku was able to convert
back to peacetime production of cameras as quickly as the difficult
economic conditions of the immediate post-war years allowed. 30
By 1948, the company had given part of its name to its camera
line by branding them Konica. 31 The company's first post-war camera
sales were a form of export made witnin the national territory of Japan.
This was so for the entire photographic industry. Such "exports" were
confined to the post exchanges of the Allied occupation forces.32 This
market received considerable impetus from the Korean War starting in 1950.
Not only did the number of foreign troops in Japan escalate greatly, but
many well known photo journalists passed through Japan on the way to
Korea. They became acquainted with and began to use Japanese optical
equipment on their assignments, and they found it superior in quality to
anything produced in the West at the time.3 3 The favorable publicity
generated by their reports in the U.S. laid the groundwork for the
development of camera export markets in the U.S. and elsewhere in the
West. Konica cameras were an indirect beneficiary of this favorable
publicity. A Konishiroku director made a market inspection tour of the
U.S., South America and Europe in 1952. This visit led to the appointment
of independent distributors to sell, promote and service Konica cameras in
the U.S., Brazil and seven European countries. 34
Encouraged by the initial success of these foreign sales,
Konishiroku turned many, perhaps too many, of its resources to perfecting
its camera products during the 1950s. These efforts succeeded in
generating a number of technical refinements and improvements to which the
Japanese Historical Cameras Screening Committee has attributed historic
significance.35 This was, however, a high risk strategy. Konica
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cameras were not the only brand of Japanese cameras to invade Western
markets. A score of other producers made similar moves. Several of these
- among them, Nikon, Canon, Minolta and Olympus - learned much more
quickly what had to be learned to do effective marketing in the U.S. This
may have reflected their absolutely fierce competition among each other in
Japan. Konishiroku, on the other hand, has historically tried to play the
role of dignified elder statesman in its industry. This role was not
suitable to conditions in which nimble and aggressive marketing was a
requisite for company prosperity. The exported cameras were not cheap,
being high quality precision instruments. Sales of such instruments wax
and wane with the business cycle. As the U.S. economy began to slow down
in the late 1950s, camera inventories began to pile up both in the U.S.
and in Japan. Severe price cutting followed, and financial losses mounted
for several companies. Konishiroku was among the companies sustaining
large losses, and from late 1957 to 1960 the company could not pay
dividends. A level of dividend payout considered meanigful by the
company, 10 percent on the common stock, was not restored until 1962. 36
Decade of Crises
The financial crisis in which Konishiroku found itself during
the late 1950s cannot be viewed as having its origins solely in an
unsuccessful strategy of concentrating on cameras. Among the corollaries
of this concentration was a certain neglect of the photosensitive
materials side of its business. This neglect had long roots. A memoir by
Ryosuke Nishimura, who eventually became the company's President, is
indicative of the company's management style and of its attitude toward
sensitized materials :
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I joined Rokuosha in 1931 from the Osaka
Industrial Testing Center. I was not ordered to
do anything, and I was bored. Then Mr. Keizo
Magahama came to me and said "you better make your
own advertisement here. Nobody will give you any
work if you just wait." I was surprised, but I
said that I would develop 16mm film, and I
started. There was no assistant for me, and I had
to do all the processes myself and all alone.
That was how Rokuosha was operating in those
days.37
Left to his own devices, Nishimura went on to develop a number
of film products. By 1940, he had managed to synthesize a color film.
This was a remarkable achievement, coming as it did without any technology
transfer from the West. Commercialization of such products had to await
the post-war reconstruction, however, and the attention of the company's
top management was on other matters by then.
This neglect of photosensitive materials was to cost the company
dearly. Indicative of this neglect was the so-called Sakura Pan F
Accident. Some time in the mid-1950s, Konishiroku placed on the Japanese
market a very large production run of its Sakura Pan F film. This was a
panchromatic film that the company had been making for twenty years. This
type of black and white film renders the relations among all the natural
colors reflected by the photographed subject so that distortion is
minimized. This quality is achieved by coating the film with a number of
chemical layers, each of which filters certain color values. One or more
of these filtering layers went bad in the mid-1950s. The result was a
seriously defective product. The incident, however, went far beyond a
temporary lapse in production quality control. The news that there was a
defective Sakura film on the market spread rapidly. The debacle was
aggravated by many months of hesitation on the part of Konishiroku's top
management to recall the product. By the time this was finally done, the
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company had lost an enormous amount of credibility and good will among
both the Japanese public and photographic trade. The write-offs following
the recall contributed to the losses reported by Konishiroku in 1957.
Perhaps more important was that the company's loss of film market share in
Japan became permanent following this incident.38
There were some other signs of a management not entirely in
control in the Konishiroku of the late 1950s. The losses of the period
had led to the discharge of some 500 employees, a move which precipitated
a company wide strike lasting three months. Some executive changes were
made following these troubles, but these changes did not get to the heart
of the company's problem, which was that Konishiroku had been run as a
family business for nearly a century, and no coherent business strategy
had ever been formulated. The tacit assumption had been that because the
company was the oldest Japanese photographic manufacturing enterprise, it
must be the best. One Sugiura son or son-in-law followed the next into
the company's leadership, regardless of qualification. In regal
tradition, each assumed the name of Rokuemon Sugiura and added the next
serial number to it. Few gave the company a sense of direction
appropriate to the times, all surrounded themselves with undistinguished
managers.
New Management
The company was in trouble again by the late 1960s. A second
major film defect within a decade resulted in further sales erosion. By
1967, the company was reporting operating losses and again had to pass
payment of its dividend.3 9 This time the action taken by major
creditors was somewhat stronger. The last member of the Sugiura family
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was forced out of the company's presidency in 1968 and with him, his
entire entourage on the board of directora. Ryosuke Nishimura, who had
devoted nearly four decades to research and development of the company's
film products, was named President, and he surrounded himself with a board
of directors whom he considered more in tune with the demands of the day.
He tried to bring about a rather thorough reorientation of the entire
company. This reorientation took several forms. Noteworthy for our
purposes here are the following :
1. Reorganization of the company into a functional structure.
(Hitherto, the divisions responsible for optical goods and
photosensitive materials had operated independently of each
other. The new structure called for the heads of production,
sales, research and engineering to assume company wide
responsibility for their respective functions.)
2. Definition of the company's product markets to comprise x-ray
films, color films, printing materials, exports, new business
and optical goods in that order of priority. (See discussion
below.)
3. Reversal of the flow of management decisions, which had hitherto
been from the bottom up in the organization and would henceforth
be from the top down. (See discussion below.)
4. Reorientation of employees to the market and its needs. (The
inward looking tendency and adherence to how things had always
been done were to cease. The attitude that if the company made
things, the public would buy them was to be abandoned.)
5. Execution of expansion plans without increase in the number of
employees. (Increased production and unit coat reduction were to
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be achieved by mechanization and automation.)4 0
All five points are indicative of the kind of enterprise
Konishiroku had been up to the time of these changes. Most of the points
speak for themselves, but some require a little discussion. The order of
product market definition is significant. Nishimura had devoted his
career to the development of photosensitive materials. It is thus not
surprising that he would give the highest priority to such materials in
redirecting the company's product policy. No doubt the losses sustained
by the company as a result of its participation in the highly competitive
camera field also played a role in changing the product emphasis. The
categorization of exports at the same taxonomic level as films does not,
however, appear particularly rational. In the end, the particular product
the company chose to export was not quite the same total product as the
Sakura film and paper it sold at home but an anonymous one.
The fifth point is consistent with the second. The production
of films had, by the late 1960s, become a far more highly capital
intensive process than camera production had ever been.
In light of what is commonly believed in the West to constitute
the essence of Japanese management style, the third point is remarkable.
It raises the question, among others, of whether the Japanese management
style as seen by Western eyes, is really an expression of deep seated
cultural traits or a veneer that will be stripped off when adversity
threatens the life of an enterprise.
The company's reorientation under Nishimura's direction must be
viewed in somewhat broader context. As a consequence of Konishiroku's own
mismanagement and of Fuji's far more aggressive marketing and quality
emphasis, Sakura products had fallen far behind those of Fuji in sales
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volume and public esteem within the Japanese market. The two local
suppliers to that market were, furthermore, expecting an invasion of the
Japanese market by the products of Eastman Kodak and other Western
producers. Japan had effectively been closed to foreign photosensitive
products since 1937 when the government had banned all photographic
imports. Following World War 11, local photographic producers were well
protected by absolute quantity restrictions on imports and by very high
import tariffs on the few products allowed into the country.
During the 1960s, these restrictions on photographic imports
were gradually liberalized. The loosening of restrictions was a
government response to pressures mounted by the Eastman Kodak Company and
by Western governments during the Kennedy Round of tariff
negotiations.4 1 Japan was one of only two major photographic markets
outside the command economies that was not completely dominated by the
Kodak film brand. (The other market was Germany.) The fears of a Kodak
invasion felt by the managements of the two Japanese film producers are
thus understandable. If they were going to lose a significant share of
their home market to Kodak, other markets had to be found as outlets for
Japanese production.
Konishiroku management had thus decided to reorient its product
policy toward greater emphasis on photosensitive materials and to seek
revenue sources abroad. The management had, however, failed to develop a
strategy for achieving the second of these objectives. It recognized a
most serious weakness, which was that it had little marketing expertise in
its domestic market and none whatever abroad. The resolution of this
problem took three distinct forms. In two of these, the company in effect
sold such knowledge as it had rather than pursuing traditional routes of
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internationalization through product exports.
The first of these three responses was a series of turnkey
projects in the centrally planned economies. The government of the Soviet
Union had first approached Konishiroku for technical assistance with
respect to surface treatment of optical lenses. An agreement calling for
Konishiroku to provide such technological know-how had been concluded in
1966. The two parties were thus not strangers to each other. 4 2 The
Soviets turned to Konishiroku again in 1971, this time to contract for the
design and construction of a photosensitive paper coating plant. The
annual production capacity of the plant was to be six million square
meters. In addition to building the plant, Konishiroku was to provide
know-how in the technology of manufacturing color paper. The value of the
contract was reported to be V. 1.2 billion.4 3 A second such project
followed within a year. This one was in North Korea. Konishiroku was to
supply plant and related technology for making the base material for
films. The consideration for this was reported as i.. 2 billion, though
actual payment was made in deutschmarks.4 4 An x-ray film and color film
plant was built for Romania starting in 1974. The same year saw the start
of negotiations for another turnkey project in the Soviet Union. This
project called for the construction of a 10 million square meter annual
capacity x-ray film plant. Several members of the Mitsubishi group of
companies participated in this project by providing construction materials
and financing.4 5
The strategic thinking, if any, supporting the company's entry
into such turnkey project contracts remains obscure. Each such project is
discrete. When it is complete, that is the end of it. There is no basis
for a continuing business relationship in such projects. As Konishiroku
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never redefined itself to become a chemical engineering supplier, it must
be concluded that it took these projects on as a side-line to keep some of
its excessive personnel occupied. The projects may even have been
profitable for the company. But they must be regarded as a distraction
from long term development of foreign markets.
The second way of exploiting Konishiroku film making knowledge
abroad took the form of participation in a Brazilian production joint
venture dedicated to x-ray films. Negotiations for the formation of this
venture began in 1971 and required three years to complete. The other
partners were a small Japanese trading company active in Brazil, the
Brazilian government's development bank, and a group of private Brazilian
investors. Konishiroku was to build the plant, provide know-how and 28
percent of the equity capital of US$ 2.2 million. The bank eventually
sold its 28 percent of the equity to two private Brazilian firms. These
were Curt, which is one of the larger Brazilian photofinishers, and
3 Irmaos, a holding company with diversified interests. The plant went
into operation in 1977 in Resende which is in the state of Rio de Janeiro.
Following the start-up of the plant, the enterprise was given protection
by the government. Importers of x-ray films, namely Kodak, Fuji, 3M and
DuPont, were given reduced import quotas by CACEX, the Brazilian
government agency responsible for foreign trade. The total of these
quotas represented the difference between total Brazilian market
requirements and the capacity of the new plant. The plant, run by
Konishiroku personnel, is known as Cia. Brasileira de Filmes Sakura Ltda.
Althougn Konishiroku is a minority shareholder, it has effective control
because the remaining shareholders are dispersed portfolio investors and
because Konishiroku controls the technology.4 6
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The third route by which Konishiroku internationalized following
the ascendancy of Nishimura actually involved the sale of products. But
these products were anonymous. Koniahiroku became a supplier of films and
papers to retailers and to other manufacturers. The latter imported the
products in bulk master rolls, alit them and packaged them in boxes
carrying their own brand names. Konishiroku was thus relieved of all
costs and responsibilities associated with the function in which it was
weakest, that of marketing. The conditions for the feasibility of
conducting business in this fashion had been created by Kodak and Agfa
over a long period in their efforts to popularize photography. This
popularization had been achieved by the late 1960s; photography had
finally become a truly mass consumption activity. Characteristic of this
mass consumer market were cheap and easy to use cameras and a general
demand for color photographs.
The characteristics of at least some of the consumers
constituting such a mass market must be made explicit here. First, there
is a segment somewhat less demanding in the quality expected from a
photograph than that which the makers of famous brands pride themselves in
supplying. There is another segment, which may overlap somewhat with the
first, that is highly price conscious. It is perfectly content to forego
whatever psychological assurances accompany the purchase of a renowned
brand. A lower price is the Quid pro quo for this sacrifice. The
emergence of such market segments provided a perfect opportunity for
Konishiroku. The company had neither the financial resources nor the
expertise nor the confidence needed to undertake the marketing function
for its sensitized materials abroad. There were, however, a number of
enterprises willing to undertake the marketing function under their own
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names but who lacked the ability to make color film and paper.
Konishiroku chose to supply these marketers. Several illustrative
examples of now this strategy was implemented follow.
The Spanish market for amateur photography had been dominated by
Kodak, Agfa and Gevaert ever since there had been such a market.
Nevertheless, several minor brands put out by local manufacturers had
emerged in the traditionally protected Spanish market. Among these minor
brands was one called Negra. This brand managed to maintain a precarious
toehold while photography remained predominantly monochrome. But the
coming of color photography threatened the continued existence of the
Negra brand. The Negra management approached Eastman Kodak for a license
to manufacture that company's Instamatic Kodapak film cartridge. It then
negotiated with Konishiroku to supply the color film which would be
packaged in these cartridges and in boxes carrying the Negra brand name.
The result was Negra color film, which was distributed through Spanish
retailers.4 7
In Germany, the European photographic market par excellence, a
number of new photographic retailing channels emerged after World War II.
Starting out as mail order catalog operations offering discount prices,
they succeeded in carving out a niche for themselves in the market for
photographic goods. Their success led to the opening of retail chains
across the country, selling from the same catalogs as those used in their
mail order operations. This led in turn to franchising of the name and
style of operation. Product purchasing remained centralized. Typical of
these operations was a company named Photo Porst with over 500 retail
outlets in the Federal Republic, the overwhelming majority of these being
franchisees. The reputation for quality and good value enjoyed by such a
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name gave the company a large degree of both selling and buying power.
Porst oranded film began to be supplied by Konishiroku in 1972. Porst
took care of all selling, development and printing.48
Similar private label supply arrangements were worked out by
Konishiroku in other countries. The most important of these national
markets by far is the U.S., which currently takes about half the company's
film production. Konishiroku has some 30 direct U.S. customers for its
sensitized products, some of which retail unexposed film and processed
photographs by mail order. Others, mainly drug store and supermarket
chains, perform the retailing function in face-to-face contact with
consumers. The biggest customer, accounting for more than two thirds of
the company's U.S. film sales, is Fotomat Corporation. The latter
operates and franchises kiosks, mainly in shopping center parking lots,
throughout the U.S. Unexposed film and procesased photographs are sold in
these kiosks which serve as free standing single purpose retail counters.
By 1982, Fotomat had over 3,700 kiosk outlets, some of which are
franchised to others. The processing is done in 10 Fotomat laboratories.
Fotomat became financially overextended by the rapid expansion of its
retail network and sustained serious operating losses during the U.S.
economic recession of the early 1960s. A retrenchment began in 1983, and
nearly 1,200 of the kiosks were closed during the next 18 months. The
reluctance of U.S. banks to continue financing a losing operation brought
Konishiroku into the picture in the role of financier, in addition to
being Fotomat's most important supplier. In 1982, the Japanese company
contributed USS 13.5 million to Fotomat by the purchase of convertible
debentures. Late in 1984, the two companies announced that Konishiroku
would pay in an additional US$ 10 million for Fotomat common stock and
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convert the 1982 debentures. These moves, when completed, will give
Xoniahiroku a 60 percent equity in Fotomat and control over the latter's
board of directors.4 9 What, if anything, Konishiroku will do to
exercise this new control over a foreign retailer remains to be seen.
Here and there, beginning in 1963, Konishiroku had begun to make
sporadic attempts to capitalize on the reputation of its Konica cameras by
advertising Konica branded films in the U.S. These efforts have not
proved to be effective since there was virtually no retail distribution
for Konica films. Whether the company would use its new control over a
ready made distribution channel such as Fotomat to introduce its own brand
remains to be told.
Conclusion
The major themes of this thesis are business strategy and
internationalization in the photosensitive materials industry. In this
context, the most significant facts concerning Konishiroku can be
summarized briefly. It is a Japanese company. As such, it was rather
late in mastering the process technology required for survival in this
industry. It was even later in making an appearance with the products of
this technology outside its home base. In exporting these products, it
chose largely to play the anonymous role of private label supplier.
This collection of facts raises a question : Are there some
plausible connecting linka among these facts. The preponderance of
available evidence suggests that the facts are idiosyncratic. They are
not only unique to Konishiroku as an enterprise but to the company's
participation in this particular industry.
As will be shown in the next chapter, Fuji, an even later
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Japanese arrival, chose to use a rather different approach to
internationalize its business. Moreover, Konishiroku itself does not
handle other parts of its international business by the same means as it
uses for sensitized materials. Konica cameras are sold by subsidiaries in
the U.S. and in Germany. The German subsidiary operates a sales branch in
the U.K. In efforts to ensure its corporate survival, Konishiroku has
diversified into several related fields. Like several other Japanese
camera producers, the company has gone into the field of plain paper
electrostatic office copying equipment. Konishiroku copyers are marketed
under the brand name of U-Bix. Separate Konishiroku subsidiaries
domiciled in Germany, the U.K. and France sell and service U-Bix copying
machines in those countries.5 0
The company's policy of private label exporting is thus confined
to photographic film and paper. Such a policy may be appropriate for an
enterprise that lacks the skills required for effective marketing of these
products. But the policy carries with it well defined risks. It trades
off the avoidance of present marketing coats for highly uncertain future
revenue generating capability. In abdicating responsibility for foreign
marketing, the company exposes itself to the mismanagement or bad luck of
a small number of customers in addition to normal commercial risks. Given
Konishiroku'a limited choice of potential and actual customers in an
industry dominated by branded goods, its prospects for long term
prosperity in this industry do not look bright.
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Chapter VII
Fumi i
Introduction
Fuji Photo Film Co. Ltd. (hereafter Fuji) is the youngest of the
companies studied in this thesis. In less than five decades, this
Japanese company has won a world sales ranking in its industry that is
second only to Eastman Kodak. For its 1983 fiscal year, Fuji reported
sales of 4. 634 billion. (in equivalent terms, this exceeded U.S.$ 2.7
billion.) It is estimated that 70 percent of the company's revenue is
generated by sales of photosensitive materials. A third of its production
is exported.2 Its products are sold wordwide in those countries that
have market economies. All products are exported from the company's
Japanese manufacturing base. Serious internationalization of Fuji
marketing efforts did not start until the 1960s. As of the early 1980s,
the company's market share in every country outside Japan was as yet
small. In late 1983, for example, Fuji's U.S. film market share was
estimated at six percent.3
Fuji's senior management has had a cosmopolitan outlook since
the company's beginnings. The relatively recent internationalization of
the company is thus not the result of lack of desire or ambition. It is,
rather, the consequence of a business strategy that assigned the highest
importance to the achievement and maintenance of product quality
leadership and reluctance to sell abroad until this had been achieved.
Fuji was formed by the Mitsui Group. The company's management
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has always used its global scanning capability and that of the Mitsui
organization to keep itself informed of technical developments in
photography everywhere. Fuji entered its industry some five decades after
Eastman Kodak. Fuji management. knew that the company had much technical
catching up to do. Relying solely on its own research and development,
Fuji needed until the 1960s before it could offer to markets outside Japan
photosensitive products that matched or surpassed those of its western
competitors in performance, reliability and consistency. A fanatical
dedication to product quality thus became one of the anchors of the
company's competitive strategy. From its beginnings, Fuji has been
willing to absorb short term losses in destroying large production lots
that fell short of meeting its quality standards.
Fuji played a technical catch-up game for several decades. As
the basic scientific concepts and relatioships underlying photosensitivity
were gradually mastered, the company's management came to understand,
perhaps more clearly than any of its competitors save Eastman Kodak, that
the maintenance of quality and the achievement of low unit coats were the
result of the same capital intensive production process. Scale economies
thus became a second anchor of Fuji strategy. While it was perfecting its
production processes, the company used the time to build a dominant
position in its highly protected domestic market. This meant getting
effective control over Japan's exceedingly complex photographic
distribution system.
In pursuing these strategic goals, Fuji developed a reputation
that tends to perpetuate itself as a self-fulfilling prophecy within
Japan. This reputation is quite simply that it is the best. As such, it
attracts the best graduates of the best universities to become the future
185
cadres of its scientific, engineering and management leadership.4
Fuji reached a stage of technical development enabling its
products to compete on a world scale at a time when external pressures
prompted a more intense search for markets outside Japan. Western
governments pressed Japan to open its market to foreign photographic goods
during the 1960s. The eventual success of these efforts was seen by Fuji
as a threat to its 70 percent share of the Japanese film market. The
eventual abolition of quantitative import restrictions and a significant
reduction of import tariffs were interpreted as an invitation to a massive
invasion of the Japanese market by Eastman Kodak products. To maintain
its production scale economies, Fuji management felt compelled to increase
its export efforts.5
There is a distinction between recognition of the need to
compete abroad and the ability to do so effectively. The outlines for
Fuji's strategy for achieving the latter are still emerging as of this
writing. Two aspects are gradually coming into view. One is the
establishment of a universally recognized and admired brand image. The
other is to price products in markets outside Japan below those of its
western competitors. The eventual outcome of these policies remains to be
written. This chapter traces the developments covered in the foregoing
introductory summary.
Early History
Although Fuji was not formed as a separate company until 1934,
its origins go back to 1919. In that year, two companies significant for
this history were formed. The first of these was Dainihon Celluloid,
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later changed to Daicel Chemical Industries (hereafter Daicel). The
parent company of the then Mitsui zaibatsu acquired some eight smaller
Japanese companies and merged them into the new Daicel subsidiary. Six of
these eight companies were manufacturers of celluloid. The other two were
involved in artificial fibers, products using raw materials and process
technologies at that time similar to those used in the manifacture of
celluloid. The primary purpose of Daicel was to make and sell celluloid.
In this it succeeded and soon became the largest Japanese company in its
field, enjoying a domestic market share exceeding 50 percent as well as a
substantial export business.6
Forward integration of manufacturing operations to include
products using celluloid was contemplated from the start by Daicel. One
of these products was photographic film. When Daicel was formed, the
first Japanese made film was still nearly a decade in the future. But
mitsul'a scanning had already identified the direction of technological
change in photosensitive materials. The film products of Kodak, Agfa,
Gevaert and Pathe were already on the market in the West, and small
quantities of these had been exported to Japan. Daicel saw a major future
business opportunity. Research and process engineering devoted to the
production of celluloids suitable for photographic film began in 1920.
Research into photosensitive emulsions began a year later.7
The other Japanese company formed in 1919 was Toyo Kanpan
(hereafter Toyo). This became the first Japanese enterprise to succeed in
putting out a photographic dry plate that was up to the quality and
performance standards of those produced in the West. Toyo's facilities
were badly damaged by the 1923 earthquake. Lack of capital impeded the
efforts of Toyo to rebuild during the next several years. Toyo approached
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Daicel for a loan that was made in 1926. The quid pro quo for the loan
was the appointment of a Daicel executive as Toyo's Managing Director. A
cooperative relationship in emulsion research between the two companies
was also formed as a result of the loan.8
The research efforts of Toyo and Daicel made slow progress
during the 1920s. To speed up the acquisition of needed knowledge,
several approaches were made to photographic companies in the West. The
purpose of these approaches was to secure the technology of film
manufacture in return for joint venture participation in a Japanese plant.
The first of these approaches was made to Eastman Kodak in 1924.
Technicians were sent from Rochester to Japan for investigations. They
concluded that the excessive humidity in Japan made film production there
quite impossible. A'second negotiation with Kodak took place five years
later. This time Kodak offered to supply film base material to Daicel.
This offer was refused because Daicel had by this time gained sufficient
confidence in its own ability to make base material. Kodak then announced
its intention of starting its own Japanese plant. That threat was never
carried out, but it alarmed Daicel sufficiently to accelerate its own
technical efforts. These were helped along by several research grants
from the Japanese government. A negotiation with the management of
Gevaert in 1932 also came to nothing. With every such failure to acquire
outside technology, the determination of Daicel to procede on its own
became stronger. 9
By 1933, Daicel felt ready to enter the photographic film
business. Partial funding for the construction of a plant was contributed
by the Japanese Ministry of Commerce and industries. The first product to
be made by this plant was cinefilm. Imports of this product had by then
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become a noticeable drainer of Japan's foreign exchange. Upon completion
of the plant in 1934, Daicel formed Fuji Photo Film Co. Ltd. as a separate
subsidiary. Many subsequent increases in Fuji common stock issues were
funded by public subscription, thereby eventually making it an independent
company although it has always retained close informal ties with the
Mitsui interests. Fifty years after the founding of Fuji, Daicel owned
less than three percent of Fuji's equity.1 0
Among the first actions by the new Fuji management was to
acquire Toyo and to absorb it into its own organization.1 1 The
rationale for a newly formed enterprise dedicated to the manufacture of
motion picture film to acquire a company in the business of making dry
plates is not self-evident. Several reasons suggest themselves, although
they must represent pure speculation. One is that Fuji wanted a more
direct and permanent control over Toyo's emulsion making knowledge than
was possible under the previous cooperative relationship. Another was
that Fuji needed sales revenue to get started in business. There was
market potential for Fuji film, but there were as yet no customers. Such
Japanese users of cinefilm as existed were perfectly content to use Kodak,
Agfa and other imported brands. Fuji's first efforts to get its product
into use took the form of giving large quantities of sample film to
newsreel producers with the request that they simply try it. Toyo at
least had a saleable product, a sales force and a network of franchised
dealers and wholesalers. Although Toyo's plates satisfied a rather
different market need, they brought in some revenues while Fuji struggled
to establish itself commercially. Finally, the thinking of Fuji
management has from its beginnings shown itself to be long range.
Cinefilm was not the only product destined to be made by Fuji. Within a
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year of its foundation, the company was putting out roll film for still
cameras. It is arguable that one of the motivations for the acquisition
of Toyo was the same as had been that of George Eastman in acquiring a
number of American and English plate producers earlier in the century.
This was to put the users of an older but still competitive technolgy out
of business and thus hasten the market's acceptance of the products of a
newer technology.
Fuji's films gradually began to win acceptance. Within two
years of the company's startup, a facilities expansion was seen to have
become necessary. The nature of the expansion decision lends support to
the line of thought pursued in this thesis with respect to the
relationship between production scale economies and market seeking. The
majority opinion among Fuji managers was that expansion should take place
in small, cautious stages. This was to prevent the company from becoming
overextended. Facilities expansion should, according to this view, await
market development and shifts in government policy. Fuji has, however,
never been run in a style that conforms to the contemporary stereotype of
Japanese management. The chief executive of Fuji takes advice from his
managers but makes his own decisions. The company's President at the
time, Shuichi Asano, decided on a large expansion. He did so on the
assumption that demand for the company's output would be there regardless
of governmental policy and should be sought, if necessary, in export
markets.
The expansion was financed by a common stock issue that
increased the outstanding common stock equity from *. 3 million to 4. 7
million. (In 1937, the yen was worth approximately one third of a U.S.
dollar. 12 ) The funds were used to increase cinefilm production capacity
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by 75 percent, to nearly 20 million linear meters; they were also
allocated to construction of facilities for production of x-ray film,
still camera roll film, sensitized papers, fine chemicals and a central
research laboratory.1 3 The government helped to ensure the commercial
success of this expansion in 1937 by placing a total embargo on the
importation of all photographic products.1 4
During the five years from its first facilities expansion to the
start of the war with the U.S., Fuji enjoyed vigorous commercial growth.
During this period, the company opened warehouses and sales branches in
such Manchurian, Korean and Chinese cities as Dairen, Seoul, Changchun,
Shanghai and Tientain. By 1941, some 20 percent of the company's
production was going to such places outside the Japanese islands. In view
of the military and political circumstances of the time, it is moot
whether such shipments can properly be called exports. They are, however,
indicators of management thinking and certainly contributed to the
development of markets for the output of the expanded production
facilities. Salesmen with samples of cinefilm were sent as far afield as
England and Czechoslovakia during this period. But import restrictions
imposed by those countries made it impossible to consumate sales
there.15
During the immediate pre-war years, the company sent a number of
technicians to Europe and the U.S. Their assignment was to scan the
technological horizons of the photographic industry. Fuji bought neither
the technologies found in the West nor the products made by the use of
those technologies. But the discovery of what had been developed by other
companies helped to define the direction of Fuji's research efforts.
These efforts bore fruit in three forms. One was a rapidly proliferating
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product line of films and papers with ever increasing light sensitivity.
Another was continued development of faster and more efficient production
processes. Finally, the company and some of its domestic suppliers became
less dependent on imports of certain critical intermediate products like
photographic gelatins and baryta paper. 16
To help the sales of its amateur roll films, Fuji became a
producer of still cameras in 1938. The company had, by the late 1930s,
established a reputation for energetic and effective management. In its
roles as the sole domestic supplier of cinefilm, as an increasingly
important supplier of aerial use film to the military and as a member of
the Mitsui zaibatsu, Fuji inevitably became known in high government
circles. The demand of the military forces for precision optical goods
stimulated a certain pressure from the government on Fuji to acquire
several less well managed manufacturers of related intermediate products
so as to bring them under more efficient management. The pressures of a
war economy thus enabled Fuji to become an important producer of precision
optical instruments during the early 1940s. 17
Like all members of the Japanese photographic industry, Fuji
became, for all practical purposes, a supplier whose entire output went to
the military or other government agencies during World War 11. In his
autobiography, Setsutaro Kobayashi, later to become the company's
President, sums up the war experience in the following terms :
If the war was of any benefit to us, I might say the greatest
gift was that the technical members of the company had the
experience of producing something to the highest quality
demanded without copying others, without depending on others,
using the worst materials for the highest quality, and their
zeal to achieve it. It was a great experience. All the
present Fuji technologies are based on these experiences.18
American air raids on the Japanese islands during the war
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prompted a search for a safer manufacturing location. A branch film plant
was planned for Manchuria. Execution of this plan had gone as afar as
dispatching some sixty people and several ships loaded with equipment when
the war ended. 1 9
Among the products of Fuji's wartime research was a color film.
Immediate commercialization was out of the question under wartime
conditions and even during the immediate post-war period. When the
company was first allowed to resume production in late 1945, the
headquarters of the American occupation confined it to manufacture of
x-ray films and somewhat later to cinefilm.2 0
The Post - World War 11 Era
The Japanese economy gradually developed back to something
approaching normal status in the five years from the end of World War II
to the outbreak of the Korean War. Fuji rebuilt its damaged factories
during this period and eventually resumed production of a full line of
photosensitive materials.
Fuji devoted much of its energies during the first fifteen
post-war years to solidifying its product and process technologies and its
position in its domestic market. It did so by adopting the most modern
process technologies and management techniques then available to become a
low cost, high quality producer. The following are some noteworthy
examples of what occurred.
Starting in 1948, Professors Motosaburo Masayuma and Toshio
Kitagawa instructed Fuji management, from top executives to production
engineers, on the application of probability theory to statistical quality
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control. These efforts were supplemented in 1951 by no less an authority
than Frederick Deming. He was invited by Fuji to supervise the
development of a company wide quality control program. Over the course of
several years, the principles of statistical quality control came to be
applied in every production department of the company. Production line
statistics became the subject of wide ranging discussions throughout the
company. The objective of these discussions was what could be done to
change the story being told by the statistics. These discussions resulted
in almost continuous change and modernization of production equipment
throughout the 1950s. 21 These efforts had begun to be recognized by
1956, the company being awarded the coveted Deming Prize that year.2 2
During the same year*, the International Crystallographic Society judged
Fuji'a x-ray film to be the best in the world among 41 entries which
included Eastman Kodak.2 3
During the 1950s, Fuji undertook the development of a device that
is today in the Ueno Science Museum in Tokyo. It is a precursor of the
modern computer. It was installed to control ambient environmental
conditions in the film production plant. It must count among the earliest
uses in the industrial world of this tool for manufacturing process
controla.24
Fuji was able to afford such innovative experiments beause the
company was operating in an environment of rapid growth in the domesic
market for its products. During the 1950s, Fuji sales of film and
sensitized paper grew at compounded annual rates of 20 percent and 18
percent respectively. The standard of measurement on which these data are
based is square meters of product. By the end of the decade, these unit
measures came to 6.5 million square meters of film and 4.6 million square
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meters of paper per year.2 5
Helped along by Konishiroku's somewhat more complacent attitude
toward product quality, Fuji had surpassed its older rival's market share
by aid-decade. At the end of the decade, Fuji's domestic film market
share exceeded 62 percent.2 6 It was a decade characterized by
significant changes in Japanese distribution channels for photosensitive
materials. As photography came into widespread use, its products entered
mass distribution channels. Film could eventually be bought in almost any
kind of retailing outlet. In a growing market, such outlets supplemented
rather than supplanted the traditional photographic specialty dealers.
Fuji was perspicacious in sensing the change and aggressive in moving its
products through these new channels to widen the distribution of its
films.2 7 To help the company achieve this objective, it persuaded the
five largest wholesalers to carry its photosensitive materials as their
sole Japanese brand.2 8 It was during this period that Fuji adopted the
distinctive green background color used in all its product packaging and
display advertising.29
The company marketed its first color film in 1948, but the
management did not feel this product was up to the standard set by Kodak.
It took a decade of additional research and development to reach this
stage. In its bread and butter product, professional cinefilm, the
company had to solve two related technical problems simultaneously. One
was the perfection of the color process itself. The other was to change
the base carrying the color layers. Under public policy pressure in the
industrially developed countries, the photographic industry had finally
shifted during the post-war period from the use of the highly flammable
cellulose nitrate base to non-flammable cellulose triacetate for cinefilm
195
used in public exhibition. Fuji had to catch up with these developments
before it could consider the export of such films to the West. It took
most of the 1950s to bring Fuji to this stage.3 0
In summary, Fuji devoted its energies and resources during the
first fifteen post-war years to establishing itself and solidifying its
position as the leading domestic Japanese supplier of photosensitive
materials. The major emphases were on research, development, production
engineering and domestic marketing. The company was occupied with meeting
the rapidly growing demand in its domestic market and was catching up to
the West in technical development. In both of these efforts, it was
helped by the import substitution and infant industry protection policies
of the Japanese government. These policies were expressed by traditional
means, such as absolute quantitative import restrictions and a 30 percent
ad valorem tariff, as well as by periodic research and development
grants to local industry. 3 1
International Activities
Although the company's attention was mainly focused elsewhere,
as described above, it was certainly aware of what was going on in the
rest of the world. A veritable stream of top executives visited other
countries throughout the 1950s. While most of these visits had technical
investigations as their primary objective, market prospecting was not
neglected. By the end of the decade, the company had appointed sole
agents or exclusive distributors in some twenty countries. Most of these
were in the Asia - Pacific Basin and did not represent large markets. In
the West, sales of Fuji products were largely confined to its optical
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equipment by distributors in the U.K., Canada, the U.S., Argentina,
Venezuela and Brazil. 3 2 The last named among these countries in fact
became host for the company's first wholly owned foreign sales subsidiary.
This is discussed at greater length below. However, in mid-1958, a trade
publication reported that Fuji, though by far the largest Japanese film
manufacturer, had as yet made no significant export advances.33
Brazil would seen, on first consideration, to have been an odd
choice as a market to start Fuji's first foreign sales subsidiary in 1958.
Several factors must, however, be considered. Fuji has traditionally held
the technical and commercial prowess of Eastman Kodak in awe. Fuji thus
took care to avoid a head-on confrontation with the much larger American
company in its areas of major strength. Although Kodak had organized its
own Brazilian sales subsidiary in 1920, nearly four decades later Brazil
still had a relatively underdeveloped general economy and photographic
market. It was, however, seen as a country with enormous long term
potential. And for Fuji, some of that potential was seen to be more
immediate.
Brazil's population includes a small, though economically
significant, minority of people whose ancestry is Japanese. This minority
was estimated to number 700,00 at the time. It had concentrated its
business activities in certain sectors, one of which was photography. A
well known Brazilian importer and distributor of photographic goods
declared at a 1959 Tokyo press conference that he had about 3,000 dealer
customers and that half of these were Japanese-Brazilian.
Fuji had tried to cultivate this market since 1952, when one of
its Directors, Seiki Matsumoto, had been sent to Rio de Janeiro to
represent the company in a Japanese Commodities Exhibition and to
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investigate local market conditions. He was followed two years later by
Setautaro Kobayashi, then the company's Sales Director. After Kobayashi's
visit, Fuji sent a company sales manager to become resident in Brazil to
assist the local independent distributor in promoting the company's
products. After four years of residence in Brazil, he was appointed
General Manager of the company's newly formed subsidiary. The immediate
purpose in forming the subsidiary was to get a basis for improved control
over the foreign exchange allocations by which Brazil has traditionally
tried to restrain imports. This purpose was frustrated from the start of
the subsidiary and has slowed Fuji's progress in Brazil significantly over
the years. To help overcome this import restraint, the company eventually
opened an operation in which film and paper are imported in bulk master
rolls which are then alit and packaged locally. 3 4
At about the same time as the formation of its Brazilian
subsidiary, Fuji took its first tentative steps toward the export of
sensitized materials to North America. It appointed Ideax Corporation to
be its U.S. distributor for x-ray and industrial use films. 35 Though
perhaps of less importance but attracting somewhat more attention was the
appointment of Ehrenreich Photo Optical Industries as amateur product
distributor for the U.S. and Canada. Ehrenreich had been one of the
American pioneers in the importation of Japanese cameras when they first.
gained fame during the Korean War and had been involved in the
distribution of Fuji optical products for some years. Following the
pattern established in Brazil, the company established its own branch
office in New York to assist and perhaps to oversee Ehrenreich's
promotional efforts. One of the people eventually seconded from the
company's Fukuoka branch to the New York office for five years was an
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aggressive young sales manager named Minoru Ohnishi who was destined to
become Fuji's President in 1980. 36
The significance of these moves was not lost on the Japanese
photographic trade press, though it was played down by Fuji. The following
1958 interchange was indicative :
Q. : Mr. Kobayashi, it seems to me that export of Japanese film
to the U.S.A. is revolutionary. Will there be no danger
of causing troubles or competitions there ?
A. : No, not at all. We are very friendly with Eastman
Kodak... .It is quite absurd to assume that our small
exports might influence Kodak. They said it doesn't
matter.37
The Kobayashi Era
Two major factors influenced Fuji policy during the 1960s. One
of these was the elevation of Setsutaro Kobayashi to the company's
Presidency in 1960. The company has traditionally shown an uncanny
ability to put into positions of top leadership men whose special training
and abilities corresponded to the most important needs of the time.
Kobayashi's predecessor, Sakae Haruki, had been an engineer. Kobayashi
had been involved in trade throughout his entire business career. He had
begun his work in 1923 with Iwai Trading Company, exporting the celluloid
products of Daicel. To help make those export efforts more effective, he
was stationed in London for six years. In his memoirs, he asserts that he
found English a more efficient language than Japanese for the conduct of
business. When Daicel formed Fuji, he was invited to join the new company
as Sales Manager. When he became Fuji's President, he had directed its
marketing activities for a quarter century.38
Although they represent minor digressions from the main path of
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this story, several developments are recited here to illustrate
Kobayashi's readiness to depart from Fuji's traditional policy of
technological self-reliance. In 1962, the company entered into a joint
venture with Xerox Corporation to exploit that company's electrostatic
copying process in the Far East. Fuji supplied manufacturing, marketing,
management and just over 50 percent of the capital needed by the venture.
Xerox supplied the technology through a license and the remainder of the
capital. Fuji-Xerox developed into one of the most successful and lasting
international joint ventures of modern times.
In 1964, Fuji became a licensee of Polychrome Corporation, an
American company controlling the technology of pre-sensitized metal plates
used in offset printing. During the same year, Fuji became the exclusive
Far East distributor of Pako Corporation, an American producer of
automated photofinishing equipment. 3 9 Several times.during the author's
business experience in the 1960s, Fuji approached Polaroid Corporation for
a license to exploit that company's instant photographic processes in
Japan. These approaches were, however, rebuffed, and Fuji eventually
introduced its own instant system.
The memory of Kobayashi is revered in the company. He had a
gift for expressing himself simply and directly, without the stilted
cicumlocutions characteristic of the Japanese language in formal usage.
An example, appropriate to our subject, from his memoirs follows
My policy in selecting an agent was to look for a practical
nurse rather than an academic doctor. In any market, it is not
easy to bring up a product into a commercial product. Unless
the distributor brings up the product as his commercial
product, the sales of the product will not go well. I have
always said, and still do, to the plants of the company, 'Make
commercial goods, do not just make products.' Commercial goods
are the kind the customers or users like to buy and appreciate.
Mere products are the kind that needs a lot of explanations for
selling.4 0
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The second major influence on Fuji policy in the early 1960s was
the beginning of serious pressure from Western governments on Japan to
dismantle its barriers to the importation of a host of products, including
sensitized photographic materials. In 1962, licenses to import color film
were still limited to a global value of $70,000 per calendar quarter; the
import tariff on this film was 30 percent ad valorem, and it was due to
be raised to 40 percent in 1964, the year of the Tokyo Olympic Games.4 1
The government gave its local industry a great deal of time to
adapt to the changing economic environment. It took more than two decades
to eliminate import quota restrictions and to decrease the tariff to its
present negligible level. But the implications of import liberalization
for Fuji were perceived and expressed by its senior management with the
utmost clarity from the outset. In 1962, Fuji Director Matsumoto was
reported in the trade press to state :
We are facing (sic) with trade liberalization of
photographic goods: we cannot limit our economical
activities within the domestic market now, but have to
stand on world-wide viewpoint, and have to compete with
foreign goods in a wide market.4 2
Within two years, President Kobayashi came straight to the heart of the
matter in an interview
Q. : Has the postponement of free imports of color film been
decided because domestic color film cannot meet
competition ?
A. : I shall say humbly that it is true to some extent. But
quality of domestic color film is not inferior to Agfa,
Anaco and other makers except Kodak. As to the question
of international competition, production cost, beside
quality, will be an important factor which is unavoidably
affected by production volume. If sales of domestic
color film were confined within the domestic market only,
we will be unable to put out enough quantity to lower the
price to meet free competition in the world market....
Quality, price and finally sales ability are the deciding
factors to take part in international competition.4 3
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Guided by such thinking, the company began to increase its
export efforts significantly during the 1960s. Fuji announces to its
employees at the start of each fiscal year a short list of major company
objectives for the coming year. The raising of all the company's products
to an internationally competitive level and reinforcement of export
efforts became prominent in these annual proclamations during the 1960s.
The same message was emphasized in Kobayashi's semi-annual letters to
shareholders during this period. 4 4
Such efforts required competitive products and a distribution
network before they could succeed. Much of the decade was devoted to
developing these. By 1964, the network had grown to 80 distributors in 60
countries. By the end of the decade, it had increased to 140 distributors
in 70 countries. Kobayashi's preference for a distributor who "brings up
the product as his own commercial product" was given expression by the
formation of wholly owned subsidiaries in the U.S. and the Federal
Republic of Germany during the 1965 - 1966 period. These subsidiaries had
for some years been preceded by unincorporated branch offices. These
branches had existed primarily for market study and to assist local
distributors in promotion of the company's products. An indication of the
company's thinking about the directions of its international expansion as
the decade ended is provided by the existence of such Fuji representative
offices for market study and sales promotion in Bangkok, Hong Kong, Seoul,
Singapore, Taipei and Buenos Aires.45
To draw attention to itself outside Japan, Fuji needed a product
that could serve as a company promotional vehicle in addition to whatever
commercial potential the product had in its own right. This turned out to
be not so much a product as an entire product system. It comprised a line
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of Bam cameras and projectors and three films suitable for amateur
cinefilm users. The heart of the system was a new thin polyester film
base with sprocket holes for moving the film on only one side of the film,
packaged in a ready-for-use cartridge. The cartridge design and thin film
base made possible a considerable miniaturization of camera and projection
equipment compared to what had hitherto been available on the world
market. It also enabled the user to load camera and projector without the
cumbersome threading of film that had previously been necessary. It
attempted to do for amateur cinematography what Eastman -Kodak had done for
still photography with its Instamatic system in the early 1960s.
Fuji offered use of the entire hardware system design, which
became known as Single-8, to the rest of the photographic industry on a
royalty free basis. A number of manufacturers accepted this offer. Not
among these was Eastman Kodak which soon thereafter brought out a similar
system that came to be called Super-8 and offered a slightly larger
picture size. Fuji brought the Single-8 system to market in Japan so as
to have it in consumers' hands for the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games. The
system was introduced in the U.S. at the New York International
Photographic Exhibition in 1965 and was awarded a prize there as a major
contribution to the progress of photography. A year later, Fuji made its
first appearance at the biannual world photographic trade fair, Photokina,
in Cologne. Single-8 was demonstrated in a 670 square meter stand, the
third largest at the fair, with a flamboyance that caused a sensation. In
the eyes of the trade, Fuji had arrived as a world class competitor.4 6
Having introduced Single-8 to the world and eager to extend its
reputation as a high quality film producer, Fuji set about organizing a
network of photofinishing laboratories in which Single-B films, and
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eventually all its color products, could be developed and printed in
accordance with the company's rigorous quality standards. Some of these
laboratories were wholly owned, some were run as Joint ventures, and some
were run by independent licensees. All were subjected to intense training
and continuous quality supervision by Fuji. By the end of the 1960s,
there were approximately 150 such Fuji laboratories in 28 countries.4 7
The company's insistence on maintaining its demanding quality
standards may have somewhat inhibited the rapid expansion of its
international business. In its 1969 fiscal year, exports represented 11
percent of its total sales, and the operating results of its three foreign
subsidiaries were not yet consolidated in the company's financial
statements, suggesting that their contribution to overall sales and
earnings were still negligible. The company's total sales had, however,
shown a sevenfold increase during the last decade, to Y. 86 billion or
approximately $244 million. The 11 percent share of this represented by
exports was thus not a negligible figure. The Ministry of International
Trade and Industry had cited the company as making a meritorious
contribution to Japan's exports.48
Post - 1970
Kobayashi retired from the company's presidency in 1971, but the
pattern of international expansion that had been established during his
tenure was maintained by his successors. The foreign distributor network
was extended to exceed 200. Sales subsidiaries were formed in the U.K.
and Hawaii, and the Canadian distributor was bought out. The name of the
German subsidiary was changed to Fuji Photo Film (Europe) G.m.b.H. This
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represented more than a nominal change. In addition to sales and
distribution of Fuji products in the Federal Republic, this subsidiary
coordinates marketing activities in Europe. Representative offices opened
in Manila and Sydney; the one in Buenos Aires was closed. To help
overcome import restrictions, the company organized local slitting and
packaging operations in Indonesia and South Korea and extended those of
its own Brazilian subsidiary. The Indonesian facility is operated by the
company's distributor; the one in Korea is a joint venture betwen Fuji and
a local paper company.4 9
As the research for this thesis was in progress, Fuji had
recently announced its intention of building a film and paper plant in
Tilburg, The Netherlands.5 0 Whether this facility will turn out to be
merely a slitting and packaging operation or something more serious
remains to be seen. The announced size of the facility (200,000 square
meters), the intended completion date (1987), and the planned investment
(N.fl. 200 million) all suggest a somewhat more integrated manufacturing
operation. The motivation for this announced investment may well reflect
a heightened political sensitivity by Fuji management more than it does
purely economic considerations. Transportation costs and European
Community import tariffs became minor coat elements following the duty
reductions of the Tokyo Round, which were completed in 1983. But there
was a significant political opinion reaction to the flood of Japanese
products that had been imported into Europe in recent years.
The Japanese government finally abolished all import quotas for
color film in 1971. Under the pressure of this development and its
imagined consequences, Fuji maintained its technical development efforts.
The company chose the occasion of the 1976 Photokina fair for world
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introduction of a 400 ASA negative color film, being the first company to
offer a color film with such high sensitivity.5 1 The other companies in
the industry soon followed this lead, so that it did not prove to be a
source of lasting competitive advantage. But the timing, venue and manner
of introduction sent another signal to the trade, to informed consumers,
to competitors, and perhaps to its own employees that Fuji had arrived at
a stage of technical maturity permitting it to play a leading role in the
global photographic industry.
The results of Fuji's efforts to internationalize can be
summarized by its sales data. The following table tells its own
story.5 2
Fiscal Sales in Of Which Sales
Year- 4. Billions Outside Japan
1970 116.3 12.7 %
1971 129.7 14.3
1972 132.5 15.6
1973 157.7 15.3
1974 192.2 15.9
1975 218.6 21.0
1976 256.4 25.0
1977 298.4 26.6
1978 312.6 24.2
1979 358.6 26.0
1980 465.5 32.5
1981 520.1 32.4
1982 587.4 32.9
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Conclusion
The world abounds in examples supporting the view that the
infancy of infant industries tends to be perpetuated indefinitely when
they are protected from foreign competition by local governments. The
history of Fuji demonstrates, however, that this is not a necessary
consequence of government protection. Fuji used the period of protection
to develop itself into a vigorous and independent adult enterprise that is
capable of holding its own in competing with the most sophisticated
members of its industry.
In its penetration of international markets, Fuji has come a
long way, using the sparest of means. A half dozen foreign sales
subsidiaries operate with relatively meager budgets and rely mainly on low
prices and a reputation for the technically most advanced high quality
products. Such policies may work for the company's commercial, industrial
and medical products. But the observer is tempted to question if the
limits of effectiveness are being approached by these policies in the
marketing of consumer products. Fuji has not yet succeeded in winning an
important share of the large North American and European photographic
consumer markets. The company's behavior in these markets during the
early 1980s may reflect an emerging strategy that must be left to a later
analyst to unravel. In the present, we can only describe some aspects of
this behavior and speculate,as to their strategic significance.
Fuji President Minoru Ohnishi recently announced that "Our goal
is to build an international brand image for the Green Fuji along with the
Yellow Kodak and never to damage the citadel of the American photo-making
giant." 53 The intents, if any, underlying this statement are quite
207
inscrutable. Surely Ohnishi knows that a strong brand image is a means to
an end, not an end in itself. He must also be aware that chemically based
photography represents a nature technology with only low market growth
potential in the economically developed countries. In a low or no growth
market, any significant increase in Fuji sales of photosensitive materials
outside Japan is bound to reflect itself in damaging Kodak, be it in its
own citadel or elsewhere.
Thus far, what has been exposed here is consistent with the
maintenance of a minor U.S. market share. What is not consistent in
Fuji's behavior, given such a policy, is the 1963 expenditure of more than
$5 million for the right to call Fuji the official film of record for the
1964 Summer Olympic Games in Los Angeles. No one watching the American
television coverage of this event would have ever known that this
expenditure had been made. Eastman Kodak blanketed the broadcasts of the
games in the U.S. with over 100 commercial messages while Fuji remained
virtually silent.54
The Olympics expenditure fits a pattern of Fuji promotional
activities in the West. The company sponsors many international sports
events, such as the World Cup Football Games, over which it flies a 60
meter long airship displaying its logo. It also allocates a good share of
its advertising budget to giant neon signs such as those in Times Square
in New York, Picadilly Circus in London and other central locations in
major cities. 5 5
Ohnishi has spent most of his career in marketing and can thus
be presumed to understand that such advertising media are relatively
ineffective in securing for their sponsor a meaningful market share for a
consumer product like photographic film. The history of every successful
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participant in this industry suggests that among the necessary conditions
for the achievement of this objective in modern times are massive and
continuous television advertising, control of the distribution channels
and a dominant display presence at the retail point of purchase. Fuji
learned all this long ago in its own domestic market, and it can be taken
for granted that Ohnishi absorbed these lessons as applicable to Western
markets during the five years he worked in America. Such means for
getting large market shares are expensive. Over an extended period of
time, the incurrence of the necessary costs is not compatible with a low
price policy, given minimal profit objectives. The desire to avoid such
costs is understandable in view of the wish to avoid a head-on collision
with Kodak in that company's area of major competitive strength. The
observer may thus question the ultimate purpose of Fuji's considerable
brand image building efforts since they are themselves by no means free of
coat.
An answer is suggested by the direction of Fuji's product
development. The company has defined itself as "an integrated image
information industry enterprise." 56 This broadening of its mission is
not mere public relations posturing but has genuine substance. The
company is moving into a number of fields in which it can usefully combine
its distinctive competence in materials coating with the emerging
electronic technologies. With the far sighted vision that has long
characterized Fuji, the company began research into magnetic recording
materials in the 1950s. That research led to the development of Japan's
first broadcast quality videotapes by 1959. Over the next 25 years, Fuji
developed itself into the largest Japanese producer of magnetic tapes.
When Sony started the boom in consumer video cassette recorders in the
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late 1970s, Fuji was positioned to exploit its knowledge of videotape
technology. Recent company reports consistently point to these tapes as
the fastest growing contributor to Fuji's sales and earnings. While
available data are not sufficiently disaggregated to support definitive
conclusions, it is quite conceivable that the sharp increase, reported
above, in Fuji's foreign sales percentage starting in 1980 is attributable
to exports of video cassettes. 5 7 Fuji may thus be content to pursue a
market skiming policy with respect to photosensitive materials outside
Japan while it develops foreign markets for the products of newer
technologies.
In a discussion of Fuji behavior and apparent competitive strategy,
a member of the Management Board of Agfa-Gevaert, an enterprise that has
certainly begun to feel the presence of Fuji on its home ground, made the
following observation :
As time goes by, the photographic consumer is becoming ever
more sophisticated. We cannot expect forever to keep his brand
loyalty when he knows that he can buy a film that is the equal
in quality to anything on the market and he can get it for 25
percent less.5 8
Although it never finds its way into print in either the
company's internal or public announcements, there is a common
understanding among Fuji managers. This is that if there are only two
viable photographic enterprises left in the world by the end of the
current century, Fuji will be one of them. The developments described in
this chapter suggest that this is a plausible outcome.
210
Notes and References
1 The research for this chapter was done in secondary sources. For
translation from Japanese language source materials, the help of Ma.
Toshiko Yonemura as gratefully acknowledged. Japanese names are
written in western style in this thesis.
2 Fuji Photo Film Co. Ltd. Annual Report to Japan Ministry of Finance,
year ended 30 April 1983. (Approximate equivalent of 10-K Report
submitted by American companies to U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.) Hereafter cited as Fuji : M.o.F. Report, (year).
3 "Fuji Photo : Sharpening Its Image In The U.S. As It Develops New
Products." Business Week. 23 October 1983. Hereafter cited as
Business Week. 23 October 1983.
4 Interviews with numerous Japanese photographic industry experts,
Tokyo, February - March 1983. See Bibliography for complete list.
5 Japan Camera Inspection Institute. Sekay No Nihon Kamera -
Yuhutsu Sangyo E No Ayumi. Tokyo : Tokyo Shabo, 1975. pp. 255-269;
Fuji Photo Film Co. Ltd. Semi-Annual Reports to Shareholders,
1962-1969.
6 Saburo Ohashi, ed. Sogyo 25 Nen No Ayumi. Privately printed Fuji
company history, 1960. pp. 2-3.
Hereafter cited as Ohashi. Sogyo 25 Nen....
7 Ibid., pp. 4-6.
8 Ibid., p. 8.
9 Ibid., pp. 6-9, 20-21, 35.
10 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
Fuji : M.o.F. Report, 1983.
11 Ohashi. Soqyo 25 Men..., p. 42.
12 R. L. Bidwell. Currency Conversion Tables. London : Rex Collings,
1970. p. 56.
13 Ohashi. Sogyo 25 Nen..., pp. 77-79. Capacity data computed by
author.
14 Ibid., p. 132.
15 Ibid., pp. 135-137.
16 Ibid., pp. 89-101, 131-133.
211
17 Ibid., pp. 104, 154-156.
18 Setsutaro Kobayashi. Watakuahi No Rireki - Sho. Tokyo : Nihon
Keizai Shinbusha, 1977. pp. 66-67.
Hereafter cited as Kobayashi. Watakushi....
19 Ohaahi. Sogyo 25 Nen..., pp. 189-191.
20 Xobayasha. Watakushi..., p. 90.
21 Ohasahi. Soqvo 25 Nen..., pp. 261-263, 368-369.
22 Masayuki Ono. Eizo Media 0 Sogo Suru Fuji Shashin Film.
Tokyo : Asahi Sonorama, 1980. p. 82.
Hereafter cited as Ono. Eizo Media 0 Soqo....
23 Japan Camera Trade News, June 1956.
24 Xobayashi. Watakushi..., p. 95.
25 Ohashi. Sogyo 25 Nen..., p. 378.
26 Computed by author from data published by Photo Trade of
Japan, May - June 1960.
(English edition of Nippon Shashin Kyogyo Taushin).
Hereafter cited as Photo Trade of Japan.
27 Ohashi. Soqyo 25 Nen..., pp. 416-417.
28 Ono. Eizo Media 0 Sogo. ... p. 141.
29 Kobayashi. Watakushi..., p. 95.
30 Ohashi. Soqyo 25 Nen..., pp. 213-214, 236-237, 269, 278-279, 342,
428-431.
31 Japanese Imnort Tariff, 1899 - 1983.
32 Ohashi. Sogyo 25 Nen..., pp. 264-267, 319-320, 433-436.
33 Japan Camera Trade News, July 1958.
34 Ibid., October 1955.
Photo Trade of Japan, August 1958, July - August 1959.
Ohashi. Sogyo 25 Nen..., pp. 266, 435.
Kobayashi. Watakushi..., p. 95.
Interview with Messrs. Juntaro Suzuki and Tautomu Shibata. Fuji
office, Tokyo. 9 February 1983.
212
P5 hoto Trade of Japan, January - February 1959.
36 Japan Camera Trade News, December 1958.
Photo Trade of Jaoan, November - December 1959, November 1960.
37 Photo Trade of Japan, August 1958.
36 Kobayashi. Watakushi..., pp. 20-34.
39 Fuji Photo Film Co. Ltd. Prospectus for Issue of 6 3/4% Convertible
Sinking Fund Debentures Due 1965, 24 November 1970.
Hereafter cited as Fuji 1970 Prospectus.
40 Kobayashi. Watakuahi..., p. 122.
41 Japanese Import Tariff, 1899 - 1983.
Photo Trade of Japan, November - December 1962.
42 Photo Trade of Japan, November - December 1962.
43 Photo Trade of Japan, January - February 1964.
44 Morihiro Nagano, ed. Fuli Film 40 Nen Ryakushi - Sogyo 25 Nen
No Ayumi Tsuiroku. Privately printed continuation of Fuji history,
1976. pp. 31 et seq.
Hereafter cited as Nagano, ...40 Nen Ryakushi....
Fuji Photo Film Co. Ltd. Semi-Annual Reports to Shareholders, 1962 -
1970.
45 Japan Camera Trade News, March and May, 1966.
Photo Trade of Japan, May - June, 1964.
Fuji 1970 Prospectus.
46 Nagano, ...40 Nen Ryakushi..., pp. 86-87.
Japan Camera Trade News, May, 1965; April, July, August, November
1966.
Photo Trade of Japan, January - February, 1966.
Der Photohandler, 15 September 1964.
47 Fuji 1970 Prospectus.
Nagano, ...40 Nen Ryakushi..., p. 148.
Photo Trade of Japan, No. 71, 1970.
Interview with Fuji executives, Tokyo, 9 March 1983.
213
48 Fuji 1970 Prospectus.
Fuji Photo Film Co. Ltd. Semi-Annual Report to Shareholders, June
1968.
49 Fuji Photo Film Co. Ltd. Shin Kabushiki Hakko Nokuron Kensho,
New Stock Shares Issuance Registration Statement. November 1981;
Fuji Photo Film Co. Ltd. Annual Reports to Shareholders, 1970 - 1982;
"Fuji Film, A Corporate Profile." Company brochure. ca. 1982:
hereafter cited as "Fuji Film, A Corporate Profile."
Interviews with Fuji executives, Tokyo, 9 March 1983.
50 Fuji Photo Film Co. Ltd. Annual Report to Shareholders, 1982.
"Fuji Foto Film Naar Tilburg." Bedrijfsvestiging Regio Tilburg. (press
release by city of Tilburg) 10 June 1982. Printed in many large
circulation Dutch newspapers, June 1982.
51 Fuji Photo Film Co. Ltd. Annual Report to Shareholders, 1976.
52 Fuji Photo Film Co. Ltd. Annual Reports to Shareholders, 1970 -
1982.
53 "Kodak's Archrival Fuji Eyes International Image."
Japan Times. 1 October 1982.
54 Business Week, 23 October 1983.
55 "Fuji Film, A Corporate Profile."
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
Kobayashi. Watakushi..., p. 113.
Fuji Photo Film Co. Ltd. Annual Reports to Shareholders, 1980 - 1982.
Asian Wall Street Journal, 27 September 1982.
58 Interview with F. W. Rabenschlag. Leverkusen, Federal Republic of
Germany. 24 May 1983.
214
Chapter VIII
Eastman Kodak 1
Introduction
In its Annual Report for the year 1930, published a year before
its founder terminated his life by his own hand, the Eastman Kodak Company
celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of George Eastman's first patent and
of the enterprise he had started. In marking its then current status, the
company pointed out that it was operating twelve manufacturing plants
around the world. In addition to those in the U.S., these were located in
Australia, Canada, England, France, Germany and Hungary. It owned or
controlled companies operating 244 establishments in 170 cities of 52
countries. These were spread around the globe in the following
distribution
Number of Number of
Establishments Cities
United States and Canada 62 43
Central and South America 12 11
Africa 28 21
Europe and Asia 126 82
Australia and New Zealand 16 13
244 170
In the accompanying commentary, the company stated that its
"policy from the beginning has been to develop markets for its products in
every country of the world. This program has been followed consistently,
and not only provides international service to its customers but also
stabilizes the business." 2 Within a year of the publication of this
report, the editors of Fortune estimated that. some 25 percent of the
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company's $20 million annual profit, a level that had been consistently
maintained during the five years starting in 1926, was generated by its
overseas operations. They estimated that Eastman Kodak accounted for 75
percent of world volume and 90 percent of world profit in its industry.
In addition to its dominant U.S. position, the company was reported to be
the largest photographic company in Great Britain, France, Australia,
Canada and several South American countries.3 Such global spread and
depth by 1932 was unique for the photographic industry and extraordinary
for any industry. Although the company was by no means the first or only
enterprise to have begun internationalizing as early as the 1880s, it was
certainly among the pioneers in this, as well as many other aspects of its
business.
This chapter traces the important developments of the company's
first half century. The events recounted here are confined to those that
occurred during George Eastman's lifetime. This selection is deliberate,
being to some extent influenced by the availability of primary information
sources. In addition, the company's development to a position of
preeminence, a position it continues to enjoy half a century after its
founder's passing from the scene, should not be considered the result of
pure chance. It can perhaps be best understood if seen to be largely the
result of a coherent set of business strategies. The major outlines of
those strategies had all been conceptualized and implemented by George
Eastman. By 1932, the company was largely what it is today, despite
subsequent adaptations to this or that change in the legal, social and
technological environments in which it operates. Further elaboration of
subsequent events is thus deemed to be not strictly necessary for an
understanding of the strategic issues in the company's
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internationalization.
This introduction concludes with an overview of the key
developments in the company's first two decades starting in 1880. It is
followed by a documented discussion of George Eastman's business
strategies as they became apparent beginning in the late 1880s. The
remainder of the chapter is devoted to the company's internationalization.
This is divided into three sections covering respectively the two decades
to 1899, the period from 1900 to World War 1, and that from the war until
Eastman's death. The significance of the 1899-1900 break in this context
is that it identifies a turning point in the company's development. After
1900, manufacturing economies of scale became important in Eastman Kodak
operations, and this had a noticeable effect on the company's
international expansion. The post-war period was an era during which the
company became a truly global enterprise. An appendix is devoted to some
evidence supporting a brief discussion of the economies of international
scope.
In the hope of maintaining minimal coherence in the presentation
of a complex set of facts, all mention of Eastman hereafter in this
chapter refers to George Eastman, the man. Nearly all mention of Kodak
refers to the enterprise he founded; where the reference is to Kodak as
the company's registered trademark or its branded products, this will be
apparent from the context.
The contributions to photography made by Eastman and his company
have been covered in an abundant literature. The reader is referred to
the work of Ackerman and fees for reasonably responsible treatment of the
sub3ect on a popular level, although such work is at times tainted by
company inspired public relations puffery.4 ,5 Taft and Jenkins treat
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the matter in more scholarly depth and with greater objectivity.6 ,7
Suffice it for the present purpose to note that Eastman became
interested in photography as an amateur in 1877 at the age of 23. The
many inconveniences and difficulties of photography as then practiced
impressed themselves on him at an early stage. He taught himself the
essential knowledge through study of contemporary European photographic
journals. By 1880, he had set himself up in the upstate New York city of
Rochester to sensitize dry plates on a commercial scale, using a coating
mechanism of his own invention. The young enterprise managed to survive
two major calamities during its first two years. These disasters involved
his plates losing their sensitivity. In one instance, this occurred and
the problem was not discovered until after substantial quantities had been
sold to photographers. Aided by financial support from Henry A. Strong
and technical help from the British plate sensitizing firm of Mawson &
Swan, Eastman's company overcame these adversities and became a viable
enterprise devoted to sensitizing dry plates and, after 1882, photographic
papers. The operation of a going concern put Eastman in position to take
quick advantage of subsequent developments. Among these were Eastman's
experiments with continuous coating of printing papers and the
establishment of a photofinishing service.
In 1883, he began working with William H. Walker, an inventor
and unsuccessful Rochester manufacturer of cameras. In 1884, the
Eastman-Walker collaboration resulted in a patented photographic system
that could be incorporated into existing dry plate cameras. The system
comprised a paper based roll film and a roll holder. The latter was a
mechanism by means of which the film could be rolled inside the camera.
After exposure of the film, the sensitized gelatin layer had to be
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stripped from its paper base before it could be developed and printed.
Incidental to the defining characteristics of this system, but by no means
unimportant to the company's future, was the idea that the film could be
coated by continuous means.
Paper was not an entirely satisfactory film base. In 1886,
Eastman hired Henry M. Reichenbach, a University of Rochester chemist, and
started him on experiments leading to the development of a film base that
combined the lightness and flexibility of paper with the transparency of
glass. These experiments resulted three years later in Reichenbach's
development of a celluloid film base. Eastman devised a small, hand held
camera capable of using the paper based film in 1887. He called this
camera the Kodak and introduced it in 1888. After the film had been
exposed, it could be sent to Rochester for development and printing. The
celluloid base replaced paper in Kodak cameras in 1889. These
developments initiated a radical transformation of photography as it was
then practiced.
Having achieved a modest initial commercial success with the
Kodak camera and film system, the company was soon in serious difficulty.
Several key people, Including Reichenbach, left the company in 1891. They
took with them their empirically acquired knowledge of film. At the same
time, there were changes in certain raw material sources. As a result,
Kodak emulsions underwent changes in chemical makeup that no one in the
company understood at the time. The consequence was that Kodak films
deteriorated badly while on dealer shelves starting in 1891. The
resulting blow to the company's reputation and an economic recession set
off by the financial panic of 1893 took their toll in rapidly declining
Kodak camera and film sales.
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Eastman dealt with the technical aspect of the problem by hiring
William G. Stuber, a master emulsioneer and photographer who had perhaps
the most comprehensive empirical knowledge of photosensitive emulsions of
anyone of his time. Stuber improved the company's emulsions to a point
where they could again be incorporated in a commercially acceptable
product. He became the voice of the company's quality conscience and was
eventually rewarded for his work by succeeding Eastman as the company's
President. Stuber enjoyed a certain luxury of time in his efforts to
improve the company's emulsions. During the critical 1892-1893 period,
Kodak's total sales remained level at about 0500,000 per year. The
precipitous declines in film and camera sales were offset by corresponding
increases in sales of sensitized papers.8 Profits generated by the
coating and sale of paper saved the company from serious financial
difficulties in the mid-1890s. They provided the funds needed by Kodak to
continue operating while working to extend its film shelf life to a
commercially acceptable standard.
Elements of Business Strategy
More than a few enterprises, in observing Kodak's growing
commercial success and analyzing its presumed causes, adopted one or more
of the elements of Eastman's strategy. That which makes Kodak unique is
the lucidity with which Eastman perceived the mutual interdependencies
among these elements and combined then into a coherent overall business
strategy. It is not possible to describe that strategy all at once
through the medium of linear prose. It is therefore dissected in the
following discussion for the purpose of exposition. It is to be noted,
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however, that many of the elements depended on the definition and
execution of the others for the success of the whole. Their effect on
each other was synergistic. This assertion is the result of reflection
and judgment. It cannot be proven by rigorous logic or supported by an
abundance of quantitative data. It can be supported by noting that to the
extent Kodak's competitors failed to incorporate one or more of these
elements in their business strategies, those competitors fell short of
achieving the same degree of commercial success as Kodak.
It should also be noted that Kodak's mix of strategic elements
did not spring forth spontaneously. The elements developed over a 30 year
period, often in reaction to an emerging threat or opportunity in the
company's business environment. This observation takes nothing away from
their power in establishing Kodak's long-term direction and development as
an enterprise.
The place of George Eastman in the history of business
enterprise is quite secure by any number of criteria. He was either a
leader or major participant in several contemporaneous revolutions. Among
these, we can specify the early development of continuous process
manufacturing, the use of scientific research in the development of
product and process technologies, the start of mass consumer marketing,
pioneering in employee benefit schemes and the internationalization of
business. The interpretation of history offered by this thesis suggests
that he occupy a prominent place in the pantheon of master strategists.
The key elements of his business strategy and the circumstances under
which some of them developed are described in the following pages.
Market and Product Definition. Eastman is generally credited
as the prime mover in the popularization of photography. When he
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introduced the first Kodak camera and film system in 1888, photography
had already been practiced for nearly half a century. During those
antecedent five decades, its practice was that of a craft requiring more
than ordinary &kill and tolerance for a host of inconveniences. As an
amateur photographer and later as a supplier to photographers, Eastman was
well aware of these requirements and burdens. He made it his business to
remove them. His first efforts took the form of developing a substitute
for the costly, fragile, heavy, rigid glass plates in general use as the
base holding photosensitive emulsions. As already noted, this was first
achieved with the Eastman-Walker Roll-Holder aystem.9
Thus far, we do not as yet have market definition but merely one
necessary element of it. We have the perception of a need and the
invention of the means to satisfy it. But the movement toward clear
articulation of the potential market accelerated swiftly after 1885.
Though admired in professional circles and praised in influential media of
communication as a major advance in photography, the Eastman-Walker system
was in fact a commercial failure. Unit sales of the roll holders dropped
from 1,334 during the year they were introduced to 568 two years
later. 10 Annual sales of the paper based film never exceeded
020,000. 11 But it was a failure that stimulated a major change in the
company's direction. Eastman's articulation of that change is nicely
captured by his testimony given during a subsequent patent infringement
trial :
The roll-holders were made to fit cameras that were already in
existence, which were being used for the exposure of glass
plates. We were therefore limited in introducing our films to
such of these camera owners as would accept films. They proved
to be rather amall in number and ....we found that in order to
make a large business we would have to reach the general public
and create a new class of patrons.12
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This testimony was given in 1906 and is on that account suspect
as retrospective rationalization. It nevertheless represents the clearest
possible articulation of the circumstances leading to the company's entry
into consumer photography. Such an articulation represents the
cornerstone on which any business strategy rests. That it constitutes
such a cornerstone is corroborated by Eastman's earlier words, actions and
policies. A case in point is the slogan with which the first Kodak camera
was presented to the public within a year of its introduction. "You Press
The Button. - We Do The Rest" is far more than merely a slick piece of
advertising. Boiled down by Eastman himself from reams of advertising
copy submitted by the J. Walter Thompson Agency, it brilliantly conveys
the policy that has guided the company's product development for nearly a
century. This is that the ultimate customer is to be relieved of all
technical difficulties in getting 'photographs.
The message conveyed in the initial advertising slogan was made
far more explicit by Eastman in a letter to a dissatisfied company
stockholder in 1892 when the company's commercial difficulties caused a
suspension of dividend payments. In defense of his policies and the
direction in which he was leading the company, Eastman drew a sharp
distinction between the true photographic amateur as a picture maker and
the snapahooter as a picture taker. He estimated that the picture takers
outnumbered the picture makers by a ratio of 10 to 1, and he left no doubt
in seeing the company's future market among the picture takers. 1 3 With
the ultimate customer in mind, the company :
introduced new sizes and models from time to time...The
changes, as a rule, either tended to make the camera simpler or
cheaper. We have always endeavored to keep out of our
apparatus superfluous details that some manufacturera call
talking points. The changes that we made were usually useful,
or else they cheapened the construction.14
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It can be noted in this context that Eastman's definition of his
market was sufficiently specific to guide his company's product
development but sufficiently broad to encompass markets geographically
though not culturally remote from the U.S. A view of the market thus
defined helped to pave the way for the company's early
internationalization. There is in fact no evidence that Eastman had a
strategy for internationalization. He simply applied his domestically
developed policies abroad in this, as well as all other, categories of
policy.
A critical concept guiding nearly every subsequent major product
advance introduced by Kodak had been, by necessity, incorporated in the
Eastman-Walker scheme of photography. Eastman's copy for the
advertisement announcing its introduction read
Shortly after January it, 1885, the Eastman Dry Plate and Film
Co. will introduce a new Sensitive Film which, it is believed,
will prove an economical and convenient substitute for Glass
Dry Plates, both for Outdoor and Studio Work.
In connection with this film will be presented New and
Efficient Devices for Exposing the same in Single Sheet and in
the Roll, the whole forming a complete and practical system of
Film Photography.15
The key word here is 'aysten.' To be useable, the roll film
needed a transport mechanism within the camera. The system thus comprised
a durable, the very mechanism in question, and a consumable, namely the
film repeated purchases of which were to be the source of the company's
enormous revenue growth. The interdependence between the components of
the system represented a new combination by means of which the company was
to change the commercial exploitation of photography.
Distribution. Having defined his market, Eastman set out to
reach it by the most direct means feasible and to widen the channels of
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distribution. In selling the output of his factories directly to
retailers, he bypassed the host of jobbers, commission agents and other
middlemen who either would not or could not adapt to the changing
conditions of a rapidly growing and widely dispersed market for packaged
consumer goods. The choice was in part dictated by the organic nature of
the product. The gelatin that binds photosensitive emulsions is made from
the bones and hides of cattle and other animals. This gave film its
limited shelf life. Explaining his distribution policies, Eastman wrote :
The wholesaler or jobber is a detriment to our business because
a large proportion of it is in sensitized goods which are
perishable.... We have therefore organized our distribution
facilities so as to get the goods into the hands of the
consumer as quickly as possible.16
In assuming the wholesaling function, Eastman also minimized a
great deal of potential interference in the carrying out of his marketing
policies. He dealt with entities that were, on the whole, financially
weak and thus somewhat more docile in accepting his policies. This gave
Kodak great power in controlling prices and other conditions of sale.
In his effort to reach the general public, Eastman was well
aware that the relatively small number of photographic specialty retailers
might frustrate such an effort. The number of points of sale was limited,
and photographic retailers were not easily accessible. The atmosphere in
many of these stores was intimidating to a consumer who had no technical
knowledge of photography.
Eastman dealt with this problem in two ways. He opened or
bought a string of retail shops around the world. These shops either
carried Kodak products exclusively or concentrated their selling efforts
on these products to an extraordinary degree. Although these shops
performed normal retailing functions, their main purpose may well have
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been to perform the missionary work needed to publicise the existence of
the product and to make potential customers comfortable with the ease of
its use.17 More importantly perhaps, Eastman was the first to extend
distribution of photographic goods to opticians, jewelers, hardware
stores, stationers, druggists and other high traffic non-photographic
outlets.18
Advertising and Publicity. Despite his somewhat reclusive
personality, Eastman had a genius for exploiting the available media of
communication to draw public attention to Kodak products, and he let few
opportunities to exercise it slip by. Starting in the late 1880s, the
company was an exhibitor at every international exposition or fair of
consequence. The first Kodak camera was launched with a long article in
Scientific American. Although the language of this article does not
bear the marks of Eastman's characteristic writing style and may have been
edited, the minute detail in which the product is described suggests a
high probability that the author was Eastman himslf.19 According to
Eastman's biographer, Kodak was among the first to display an illuminated
billboard (Charing Cross, London), omnibus posters (Paris), and to use
full page advertisements in American newspapers and magazines.2 0 By the
end of the century, Kodak was spending $750,000 annually for advertising
in American magazines with a monthly circulation of six million. The
expenditure was one third of the company's sales revenue for 1899 and thus
represented a considerable commitment.2 1
Product Quality and Reputation. Within the limits permitted
by the state of the art, Eastman placed heavy reliance on superior product
quality as a strategic weapon. When the company fell from grace, as it
did on several occasions during its first dozen years, he was literally
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willing to risk its continued existence to satisfy the claims of customers
who had been disappointed by spoiled products. The length of Eastman's
planning horizon was expressed with his characteristic succinctness in
1887 :
If our business was likely to be temporary and we were obliged
to boom it and drop it like a new toy it would be different but
the business is likely to be permanent if built on a sure
foundation which foundation is good goods.2 2
His views on the importance of consistency in product performance were
articulated in these terms :
Now, it is not that anybody cannot make the same kind of film,
but it is making film exactly the same every day, and the man
that can do it must get the trade, because there is so much
dependent on it.2 3
In pioneering the commercialization of roll film, Eastman was at
some disadvantage in this respect. Producers who concentrated their
attention on dry plates moved well ahead of Kodak in the sensitivity and
chromatic fidelity of their products. It was in this area of concern that
Eastman demonstrated his leadership. He had to deal simultaneously with
the problems of driving his company forward to improve its products and
persuading the public to be patient. He articulated his insight into this
relationship as follows :
There is always a forked road of policy. One may make a thing
and make it well and consider his business as primarily a
making of things. Or, one may set up an ideal and consider
those things which he makes only as steps toward the ideal.
The first method held no attraction for me; it is a journey
with but money as a destination. I adopted the second because,
with an ideal, the journey's end is never reached : there is
always the experiment, the hazard of going beyond where anyone
else has gone.. .Continuity depends on certain broad policies
that are wrought out of experience. Of those, the most
important is that of having an ideal and then selling an idea
instead of a thing.24
Patents and Trademarks. Eastman had sought the protection of
patents from the start of his enterprise. This was a-matter of patenting
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his inventions and those of his associates. As the large scale commercial
possibilities of photography became apparent, it was inevitable that the
field would attract numerous other inventors. Eastman realized that he
could not possibly anticipate every development or invention. He
therefore set out to buy nearly every patent he considered important. He
spelled out the strategic motivation for these acquisitions in an 1890
letter :
We have got so many patents that if we got beaten on one we
could try another and it would take our competitors ten or
fifteen years to break them all down. I do not believe but
what our patents are strong however and that we could sustain
enough of them to keep our monopoly. I would chance it any how
because success means millions, where failure means only
hundreds of thousands.2 5
Eight years later, the U.S. Patent Office granted a patent that
had first been applied for in 1887 by Hannibal Goodwin. This patent
covered the use of celluloid as a base for photographic film. Eastman had
started using this material in 1889 on the basis of Kodak experiments and
patents. The subsequent finding by the Patent Office that this invention
had been anticipated by Goodwin might surely constitute a fundamental
threat to Kodak. It prompted an interview by a Rochester newspaper.
Eastman expressed his confidence in his own position in that 1898
interview :
This company makes more than 90 percent of all the film that is
manufactured in the world, and its business does not depend on
any one patent or process, but it has been built up through
many years of laborious experiment which has led to many
inventions, all of which have been patented; and the
proposition that any one man can come into the business at this
late date with one patent and control it, is absurd on its
face.2 6
Eastman's policy was vindicated in 1914, by which time the scale
of losing had itself grown from hundreds of thousands to millions. The
Goodwin patent had been bought by Anthony and Scovill (later Anaco) after
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Goodwin's death. Eastman felt so confident of his position that he
invited Ansco to sue Kodak for infringement of the Goodwin patent. This
Ansco did, and after seven years of litigation, the court held that Kodak
had indeed infringed.2 7 Eastman settled the matter out of court by
paying Ansco the sum of $5 million. This happened to be the amount of
uncommited cash in the balance of one of Kodak's bank accounts.28
The Kodak trademark was first registered in 1888. 29 For
nearly a century it has been brilliantly exploited as a means of
differentiating the company's products from those offered by its
competitors. In its early years, Kodak came to be associated in the
public's mind with a unique photographic system. As a result, the company
assumed a substantial risk that the very success of that system would make
the Kodak name generic. Thus, the company had to introduce another
slogan, "If it isn't an Eastman, it isn't a Kodak." 30
Continuous Product Innovation. According to an unidentified
secondary source, the company's ledger for 1886, the year Eastman hired
Reichenbach, shows $1,302 for expenses called 'experimenting.' This is
reported to have been captured in a separate account from that year
forward.3 1 Ten years later, Eastman had occasion to state that "...1
believe in experiments as much as anyone and in fact our entire business
has been founded upon them..." 32 The experiments to which he alluded
were, however, ad hoc efforts to solve specific problems. They
established precedents and thereby paved the way for what was to come.
Later in 1896, the strategic importance of product innovation
became somewhat more clearly articulated by Eastman when he wrote
I have come to think that the maintenance of a lead in the
apparatus trade will depend greatly on a rapid succession of
changes and improvements, and with that aim in view, I propose
to organize the Experimental Department in the Camera Works and
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raise it to a high degree of efficiency. If we can get out
improved goods every year nobody will be able to follow us and
compete with us.3 3
To be sure, he is discussing cameras here, a product in which annual model
changes were relatively easy to accomplish. Progress in sensitized
materials did not come with such predictable regularity. It is
nevertheless apparent from the flow of Kodak film improvements during the
early 1900s that similar thinking also stimulated that aide of the
business. Such improvements included a non-curling film and the far less
flammable cellulose acetate film base.
The prospectus that had been issued in the flotation of shares
of Kodak Ltd. in 1898 had included the following description :
Special chemical and mechanical departments with a staff of
skilled hands are maintained for experimental purposes in order
to keep in advance of all demands for improvements in every
branch of photography.3 4
The institutionalization of the innovation function for
sensitized materials became definitive in 1912. In that year, Eastman
engaged C.E.K. Mees, an English photochemist, to set up a central research
laboratory in Rochester. The mission of this laboratory was nothing less
than "the future of photography." 35 Not quite coincidently, it was
also the future of the Eastman Kodak Company.
Pricing. Several of the foregoing themes came together in
Eastman's views on pricing. Successful execution of the aforementioned
policies depended, in his view, on Kodak's ability to control the resale
price of its products. In a letter urging the legalization of resale
price maintenance, he summarized the bases for his policy :
...Until recently there has been in this country an opportunity
for the manufacturer to do business by either one of two
radically different methods : The first by making the best
goods possible and building up a reputation on quality; and
the second by making the cheapest goods, without much regard to
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quality. The only way the first plan can be made successful is
to standardize the price to the consumer and allow a fair
discount to the dealer for distributing the goods. This plan
has been adopted and used by the manufacturers of the best
goods almost without exception but the public has always had
the opportunity to buy cheaper goods sold by the other plan.
This competition has kept the 'fixed price' manufacturers from
charging exorbitant prices for their wares and compelled them
to fix the lowest possible discount which would pay the dealer
for handling the goods. So long as they were able to prevent
price cutting they were able to count on the regular
distribution of their goods and were thus enabled to maintain a
standard quality and make it known through continuous
advertising. Inability to fix the selling price of their goods
will, in our opinion, drive all the manufacturers into one
class, making cheap goods the standard price of which is
unknown to the public.. .The contention that money spent for
advertising is wasted is in our opinion unsound. In what other
way can the public be informed as to the existence of any
goods, or the qualities they possess. It is not sufficient for
the benefit of the public to invent something new and file a
description of it with the Patent Office. Unless it is
advertised and made known to the public it might be hidden for
a hundred years.3 6
This letter, to be sure, contains elements of self-serving
disingenuousness. It was written in 1914, by which time Kodak had driven
nearly all effective competition from the field in consumer roll film
photography. It is, nevertheless, a lucid exposition of the strategic
considerations driving Kodak pricing policy at the time.
Manufacturing. The first Kodak camera sold at retail for $25
and came loaded with a film roll. The consumer could have the photographs
developed and a fresh roll loaded for $10. To bring such a product into
widespread popular use required a considerable lowering of prices. A
quantum leap in manufacturing efficiency was required to make such price
reductions feasible within the constraint of maintaining handsome dividend
payments, the standard by which Eastman evaluated profitability. Although
he had been preoccupied with methods for achieving increased manufacturing
economies since before he had even established a business enterprise, this
quantum leap was not made by Kodak until the end of the nineteenth
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century. The early Xodak film production process involved the pouring of
nitrocellulose ingredients in liquid form on to glass topped tables. Ten
of these 42 inch by 20 foot tables were placed end to end, making one
surface 200 feet long. The film made on it was, of course, marked every
20 feet by the juncture of the glass tops. When the celluloid had dried,
it was coated with the photosensitive emulsion by means of a hopper
traveling the length of the table. When this had dried, the film was
stripped from the table, alit and packaged.
In essence, this was a batch manufacturing process. This began
to be replaced in 1899 by a capital intensive process of continuous flow
in casting and drying the celluloid base. A pilot plant using a 21 inch
wide casting drum was so successful that the company immediately doubled
this width in building the first production wheel. The new casting wheel
had a diameter of.15 feet and moved the material at a rate of 150 linear
feet per minute.3 7 Continuous casting of the film base enabled the
company to turn to continuous film emulsion coating, a process it had
begun to use in sensitizing papers fifteen years earlier, having quite
probably been the first in the industry to do so. The change to
continuous casting increased the company's film capacity by a factor of
three and reduced unit labor costs by 80 percent.38
The promise this change held for Eastman's approach to the
market was quite clear to him. As the experimental work was under way in
the middle of 1899, he wrote to Strong :"...If the continuous scheme for
making film works I propose to give away cameras for the benefit of the
film department..." 39 The tone here is jocular but not the intent. In
1900, the company introduced the first in a long lived series of cameras
called Kodak Brownie. The Brownie brought to market in 1900 carried a
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retail price of one dollar.40
By the end of 1899, the anticipated success in transforming its
method of film production enabled Kodak to reduce prices for all its
consumer products by one third. Eastman was already thinking of further
price reductions in the range of 15 to 20 percent for 1901 and beyond.
The competitive implications were clear to Eastman. He wrote that "we
will then be where the pirates can't attack." 41 The pirates he had in
mind presumbly were Anthony & Scovill who were soon to start making film
under the Goodwin patent.
The change was significant in other respects. It marks the
passing of Kodak's manufacturing management from the hands of inspired
inventors into those of university trained engineers. These people were
not content to rest on their laurels once the initial problem was solved,
and they soon developed their own agenda. In their continuing efforts to
improve production process technologies, the company's commitment to
technical change in this sphere became institutionalized.4 2 In a sense,
this transformed the task of the company's top management. A much later
Kodak chief executive defined this as making policy choices that represent
an economically feasible balance between 'technology push' and 'market
pull., 43
The change also helped move Kodak closer to Eastman's quality
ideals. The continuous machine casting of celluloid made possible a
consistency of film thickness that could never have been achieved by the
essentially manual methods that had been used earlier. This helped the
company to exploit the extraordinary opportunity provided by the explosive
growth of the cinema early in the twentieth century.
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Monopolization. Much of the foregoing discussion can be
subsumed under the general rubric of the search for security through
exploitation of proprietary knowledge and other intangible assets.
Ownership of such assets gives the owner a monopoly for their exploitation
that is legitimized by law at no less a level than the Constitution of the
United States.4 4 Reliance on such legitimate monopolies was not,
however, sufficient to give Eastman a feeling of security in the business
environment he was facing. He therefore set out systematically to
restrain and eliminate his competitors by means that went far beyond what.
American law of the time considered tolerable. The means used included,
among others, the acquisition and dissolution or merger of competing
manufacturers, the monopsonization of certain key raw paper supplies, the
acquisition of important links in the distribution chain, and the
imposition of sales terms on dealers forcing them to stock Kodak products
exclusively.
Between 1a95 and 1907, the company acquired 22 competing
American photographic manufacturers.4 5 The immediate motivation for
each of these acquisitions varied from one to the next. Some were made to
acquire key people, some to get control of an important patent or process
technology; in some instances, the intent to eliminate competition was
explicitly stated in the minutes of the company's directors' meetings.4 6
Whatever the proximate motivation had been, the fact remains that soon
after most of these acquisitions had been completed, the acquired entity
was dissolved and its brands disappeared from the market. In a number of
instances, the acquisition agreement enjoined the officers and owners of
the acquired companies from future participation in the photographic
industry for periods up to 20 yeara.4 7
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As related in another chapter (see Gevaert, p. 73), the General
Paper Company was formed in Brussels in 1898. The purpose of this company
was to act as sales agent for a cartel involving the two European paper
mills known throughout the photographic trade as the producers of the
purest material suitable for sensitizing of printing-out-papera. Eastman
secured the exclusive North American purchasing rights to these papers
soon after the formation of this cartel. Following execution of this
agreement, Kodak acquired and dissolved or merged eight American paper
sensitizera. By restricting customers for these papers to buying
exclusively from Kodak and making their ability to buy such papers
conditional on purchase of all other Kodak products, the company achieved
effective control over the North American market for
printing-out-papers.48
In 1902, Kodak purchased Sweet, Wallach & Co., a prominent
Chicago photographic retailer. In commenting on that acquisition, Eastman
wrote :
Personally I have been opposed to having any thing to do with
the retail trade in this country but for strategic reasons I
have lately modified these views.4 9
Although he did not spell out precisely what his strategic
reasons were, they can be inferred from the record of the company's
behavior. In the next ten years, Kodak acquired 15 other large American
photographic retailers. By 1912, some 86 percent of the value of purchses
made by these retail houses represented purchases of Kodak products.5 0
Those dealers who remained nominally independent of the company
had imposed on them terms that were highly restrictive. A dealer buying
from Kodak had to agree not to stock goods made by any competing
manufacturer. Photographic goods were to be sold by such dealers at
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prices fixed by Xodak.5 1 Eastman justified this method of selling in
explicit, if somewhat disingenuous, terms to his legal counsel :
Our terms were not instituted with the idea of obtaining or
maintaining a monopoly. The real object of our system is the
prevention of substitution.. .The quickest way to attack the
problem is through the dealer. We accomplish it by putting him
in a position where there is no temptation, viz.: by
restricting him to our goods. Under such a restriction we can
spend our money for advertising with reasonable certainty that
we will get the benefit of it.5 2
In combination, the foregoing policies resulted in the company
enjoying a U.S. market share by 1912 of 86 percent in film cameras, 88
percent in film and 67 percent in photographic papera.5 3 In his 1915
verdict summarizing why he had found the company's actions to be in
violation of the Sherman Act, Judge Hazel found it difficult to avoid the
conclusion that such practices were in furtherance of an intention to form
an illegal monopoly and served to erect perpetual barriers to the entry of
others into the business.5 4
In having been found guilty of violating the Sherman Act,
Eastman's company lost a battle. But the efficacy of his general
strategy, of which the violations were an integral part, was not seriously
challenged. The legal appeals took nearly six years, and under the
direction of Attorney General of A. Mitchell Palmer, the government and
the company came to an understanding in 1921. The company withdrew its
appeal to the Supreme Court and acquiesced to the most innocuous of
consent decrees. The decree called for the company to divest itself of
seven of its earlier acquisitions. Three of these had been camera or
parts suppliers, three were dry plate producers and one sensitized papers.
None was essential to the company's business. The decree enjoined the
company in perpetuity from the acquisition of any competing American plant
or business.5 5 Kodak's hegemony remained undiminished in the U.S. and
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was destined to extend to much of the rest of the world.
To conclude, any attempt to evaluate the significance of
Eastman's strategies should place them in perspective of the times in
which he lived. This perspective suggests that few of Kodak's innovations
or of Eastman's strategic actions, viewed singly, were either unique or
completely novel. The use of paper as a negative base by W.H.F. Talbot
antedated Eastman's work by nearly half a century.5 6 The search for a
base material embodying the flexibility of paper and the transparency of
glass had been adumbrated in an English patent issued in 1855. 57 Many
articles and letters published in the European photographic press during
the early 1880s had speculated on the use of celluloid as such a base
material. 5 8 The Eastman-Walker Roll-Holder system was an improvement on
an invention introduced by Leon Warnerke during the 1870s in England.5 9
The U.S. Patent Office, and eventually a Federal court belatedly decided
that the Goodwin patent had anticipated by two years Kodak's practical use
of celluloid as a film base.6 0 The design of the roll holder and the
first Kodak camera incorporated several features that had been patented in
1881 by a North Dakota inventor named Houston and licensed to the
Rochester firm.6 1 Indeed, in light of the acronym, Nodak, formed by
Houston from the territory of his domicile in naming his apparatus,
Eastman's coining of the word Kodak must count as a most remarkable
coincidence.6 2 Continuous roll casting of the film base had been done
by Celluloid Co. for nearly a decade by the time Kodak adopted this
method.63
Chandler has drawn attention to the widespread contemporaneous
adoption of continuous process technologies in the cigarette, match,
flour, cereal and canned food industries.6 4 Among the contemporary
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suppliers who became their own wholesalers, for largely the same reasons
as Kodak, were Swift, soon followed by the rest of the seat packing
industry, United Fruit and Pabst Brewing.65 Research based innovation
became a key element in the growth strategies of General Electric, Western
Electric and DuPont among many other American enterprises that could be
cited. 6 6 It had already characterized the German dye industry for a
generation when Eastman began his activities.6 7 Kodak was one of 63
American enterprises listed by Chandler in achieving successful mergers
during the period. The attempt to achieve industry integration through
mergers was common.6 8
In the foregoing recital, there is no intent to belittle
Eastman's achievements. On the contrary, the evidence is compelling that
Eastman represents the archetypical example of that exceedingly rare kind
of individual whose economic function Schumpeter describes as the molding
and forging of new combinations. 6 9 By leading the means of production
and distribution into new channels, opening new markets for new goods and
creating a new organization of an industry, Eastman satisfied Schumpeter's
criteria of what constitutes entrepreneurial leadership.70
The conscious, deliberate conceptualization of such new
combinations before they are carried out is what the author of this thesis
views to be the essence of business strategy. The remainder of this
chapter and its appendix will present a considerable body of evidence
suggesting that the same strategies which enabled Kodak to achieve its
commercial dominance in the U.S. were also followed in other countries.
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Internationalization 1879 - 1899
Following the publication in 1851 by F.S. Archer of his wet
collodion plate process, this process came into widespread use by the
relatively small number of photographers then practicing. The adoption of
this process precluded the development of an industry catering sensitized
materials to photographers. The process required that the plate be
sensitized immediately before exposure. The same was true for the many
varieties of albumenized printing papers then in use. At best, then, this
created a basis for commerce in materials. In such a technological
environment, there was no incentive for secrecy. New developments in
photography were discussed quite openly. Among the major media through
which such knowledge became diffused were the British Journal of
Photography, which has been published continuously since 1853, and the
Bulletin de la Soci6te Francaise de Photographie, which started
publication in 1855. After some initial instruction from a local
photographer in Rochester, New York, Eastman learned his photography from
such internationally circulating media. It was from the British Journal
of Photography that Eastman first learned of the gelatin dry plate.
In view of this setting, it may hardly be surprising that
Eastman's first substantive business transaction took place not in his
native America but in England. He had developed a mechanism for coating
dry plates, and in 1879, before he had even set himself up in business to
produce plates with this mechanism, he went to London, the trip having
three purposes. He wanted to get his mechanism patented in Europe.
Having done so, he wanted to raise funds by selling the rights to the
foreign patents. Finally, he used the opportunity to get a first-hand
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impression of the state of photographic commerce in Europe. During the
trip, he made a three day excursion to Paris to survey the state of
photography there.
In London, he presented himself and the drawings of his coating
mechanism to the editor of the British Journal of Photography. The
latter saw the merit of Eastman's invention and identified the important
people for Eastman to contact. With this information in hand, Eastman
made the acquaintance of Hazeltine, Lake & Co., a law firm that took care
of the patent filings in England, France, Germany and Belgium. He also
met the directors of Nawson & Swan Ltd. who bought the English patent
rights for £500. After deducting the expenses of the trip and legal fees,
Eastman cleared $1,000 from this transaction.71 This augmented the
03,000 he had managed to save from his salary earned as an assistant
bookkeeper in a Rochester savings bank. Starting with this capital, he
established a dry plate factory in 1880. The glass, gelatin, and nearly
all chemicals had to be imported from England.7 2
Hazeltine, Lake & Co. must have found ways to publicize the
existence of Eastman's patent. Among the inquiries concerning German
rights to its use that the law firm received and forwarded to Eastman was
one from Romain Talbot in Berlin. Talbot was a Belgian trader who had
seen bigger opportunities in Germany than were available in his native
land. He had established himself in Berlin as that city's most prominent
merchant in photographic goods, and he kept his eyes open to new
developments in the field. Talbot's 1880 inquiry began a relationship
that eventually blossomed into his being appointed as Eastman's first
German agent.7 3
The idea of advertising his wares was in Eastman's plans from
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the start of his business. His 1880 correspondence identifies this
intent. In a letter to E. & H.T. Anthony & Co., he proposed that Anthony
advertise and recommend Eastman plates in consideration for an extra
discount.74 Anthony was the oldest and quite probably the largest
American photographic supplies jobber at the time. As such, the house of
Anthony had a widespread clientele that may have included a number of
expatriate Americans. Eastman had appointed Anthony to be his first
exclusive jobber. It is uncertain when Eastman's plates were first
advertised in Anthony's house organ. There is a presumption that it was
early in their relationship which lasted from 1880 to 1885. It is quite
likely that Eastman began to receive inquiries about his product from
abroad as a result of such advertising. On the occasion of the 1884
announcement of the Eastman-Walker Roll-Holder system, a Rochester
newspaper wrote, perhaps with a little journalistic hyperbole, that
Eastman's plates were being sent all over the world.7 5
The inquiries from abroad stimulated Eastman's thinking about
advertising outside the U.S. In 1885, Eastman answered an inquiry from
Chile to assure his addressee that his plates were suitable for use in
warm climates.7 6 Soon thereafter, he sent his own inquiry to a New York
agency :
We contemplate advertising in Spanish America. Can you give us
an idea of the best publications to advertise in, and some of
their rates ? 77
The same year saw him asking a printer in Buffalo for the price of
printing a booklet in Spanish.78
Despite such active efforts to stimulate foreign business, the
available evidence suggests that, by and large, the company's early
exports were largely reactive. When orders or inquiries were received,
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they were filled or dealt with in some appropriate way. This casual
manner of conducting foreign business is perfectly understandable for a
young enterprise still struggling to master its basic technologies and to
define a business strategy.
The year 1885 marks a departure from the reactive style,
however. By then Eastman had something unique to offer the world, and his
travels to Europe had given him an appreciation of where his potential
markets might be. He sent Walker to London in the spring of 1885 with two
objectives. The first was to exhibit and demonstrate the Eastman-Walker
Roll-Holder system at the International Inventions Exhibition. The system
was awarded several medals at this exhibition and was widely praised in
the English presa.7 9 The favorable publicity helped to amoothe the way
for success in achieving Walker's second objective. This was the opening
of a wholesale distribution branch in London.8 0 By September, Strong
was in London to observe progress. This was such that Strong had to
inform Eastman of many local dealers complaining about backordera.8 1
In photography, neither the psychological nor the cultural
distance between London and Paris was very great at the time. In October
of the same year, Eastman wrote to a Prof. Stebbing that it was his desire
to open an agency in France and only the pending resolution of some patent
matter stood in the way.8 2 That matter must have been resolved within a
reasonable time. By the middle of 1887, Eastman was writing to Nadar in
Paris to thank him for "pushing our goods."8 3 G.F.T. Nadar was perhaps
the most famous French photographer of the nineteenth century. As such,
he had access to the high society of Paris, the media of communication and
other opinion molders. Having somehow learned of the Eastman-Walker
system, he acquired it and demonstrated its use at a press conference in
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1886. Under such circumstances, it was not surprising that his son, Paul
Nadar, also a photographer, would become Eastman's first French agent.
At approximately the same time, Romain Talbot became Eastman's
agent in Berlin. Other, though less well known, people were appointed to
represent the company in various countries. In answering an 1889 inquiry
from the South Australian city of Adelaide, Eastman could point out that
there were agencies for the company's products in Sydney and
Melbourne. 8 4
Coincident with introduction of the first Kodak camera, Eastman
turned his attention to direct retail distribution. The first company
owned store was opened on Oxford Street in London in 1888. 85 In 1891,
Strong was in Paris, looking over a store on the Place Vendome. 8 6 That
store was opened, and a year later Eastman noted that it was doing
well,87
The introduction of the first Kodak and the substitution of
celluloid for paper in the film base led to more than the opening of a
handful of retail shops abroad. By the standards of a later day, the
initial market reception of the Kodak was exceedingly modest. Some 8,000
units were shipped during the year following its introduction. An 1890
Kodak advertisement in England stated that more than 12,000 units were in
use throughout the world. Shipments during the 1890-1891 period numbered
less than 24,000 units. 88 However modest, the early market receptivity
was sufficient to encourage the inflation of Eastman's ambition. In an
1890 law suit deposition, he stated that a factory was being built in
England to satisfy the rapidly growing demand for film in that
country.89
His contemporary correspondence does not, however, support this
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statement. 1888 shipments to England were invoiced at 951,000 and a year
later these had grown to 957,000. 90 The construction of an English
factory may thus have been based more on hope for the future than on
present reality. A film factory was nevertheless built in the London
suburb of Harrow, and by 1891 it was running well enough to enable Eastman
to stop further shipments of film to Europe from Rochester.91 By 1896,
Harrow was turning out cinefilm, and some time during the 1890s, it began
to coat papers.92
The Harrow plant was built as the property of Eastman Photo
Materials Company Ltd., an English corporation formed in 1889 (later
supplanted by Kodak Ltd.). Some 22* of this company's 2150,000
capitalization was provided by English investors.9 3 Five of its seven
directors were outsiders and Englishmen. Walker, who was an American,
served as the Managing Director until 1893. Walker's next three
successors, George Dickman (1893-1898), George Davison (1898-1908) and
William S. Gifford (1908-1919), were all Americans.
Once formed, the English subsidiary served as more than the
corporate shell for the Harrow factory. It rapidly took on responsibility
for the conduct of all aspects of Kodak's business outside the Western
Hemisphere. When foreign agents and distributors were appointed, this was
done in this company's name. The managers of Kodak's foreign branches
were hired and fired in London. When additional foreign subsidiaries were
formed, it became the parent company. It also provided a base of
operations for Joseph Thatcher Clarke who for a generation was Eastman's
scientific and technological scanner and negotiator in Europe. The
English company thus became the flagship of Kodak's foreign fleet. This
was a role it was to retain until well after World War 11.
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The expansion of marketing efforts to other European countries
was on Eastman's mind by 1892 despite the evident difficulties his product
was then experiencing. He wrote to Walker :
If we can only make a good showing I think we ought to start
companies in France, Austria and Berlin this fall or
winter.94
The formation of such additional companies took a few more
years, but this did not impede foreign distribution efforts. A second
French store was opened in Nice in 1892, and at some point in the next
year, Nadar was relieved of his Kodak agency to enable the company to do
its own wholesaling In France. Nadar sued the English affiliate for
400,000 francs as damages for this precipitous termination. The court
awarded him 40,000 francs, a trivial sum, but the experience made Eastman
somewhat more cautious about the appointment of agents abroad. The Paris
branch opened a second location, on the Avenue de l'Opera, in 1896 and
conducted both retail and wholesale business from there. The French
branch was incorporated the next year as a wholly owned subsidiary of the
English company.9 5
While Eastman was on a four month trip in Europe in 1896 to
scan further business opportunities there, Strong wrote to him to express
his hope that he "remain until you have all of Europe, Asia and Africa
thoroughly organized for a grand push of our goods." 96 The complete
organization of those three continents took some additional years, but
while Eastman was in Berlin, he wrote that he was ready to repeat the
Paris experiment. He arranged for the opening of a retail store at what
was then the choicest location in the city, thi corner of Unter den Linden
and Friedrichatrasse. A wholesale operation was simultaneously started
about a mile away. The German distribution operation was incorporated as
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a wholly owned subsidiary of the English company the same year. 97
Once the precedents for moving into foreign markets were
established, the pattern was repeated in major cities of the world. The
prospectus for the formation of the Eastman Kodak Company of New Jersey
shortly after the turn of the century indicates that Kodak was then
operating wholesale houses in :
London, Liverpool and Glasgow in the U.K.
Paris and Lyon in France
Berlin, Germany
Brussels, Belgium
Vienna, Austria
St.Peteraburg and Noscow in Russia
Milan, Italy
Melbourne, Australia
Every one of these cities also had its separate Kodak retail shop, five
such stores being operated in London at the time.98
The company also formed a Canadian subsidiary in 1899. Although
it was described as operating a factory in Toronto, its initial operations
were in fact confined to slitting and packaging. Canadian distribution
was achieved by Kodak's purchase of Palmer & Craughton and the absorption
of that entity's management and staff by the new subsidiary.99
As the nineteenth century and Kodak's first two decades drew to
a close, the company had developed the embryo of an international
operation. It had one factory overseas and one quasi-factory on the
opposite shore of Lake Ontario. Its distribution network included an
unidentified number of independent agents and distributors. Twelve
foreign wholesale houses were operating under its direct control as
branches or, in four instances, as subsidiaries. It was also running its
own retail shops in most of the foreign cities where it had wholesale
operations. The establishment of this network was based more on hopeful
plans than on present reality. Two years earlier, Eastman had informed
246
his directors that :
During my visit to Europe this past summer I visited most of
the principal cities on the continent where the company has
been endeavoring to establish its trade with a view to
ascertaining what plans could be adopted to further extend the
business, and it is expected that the knowledge thus gained
will lend a considerable aid in further campaigns, much of the
territory being at the present time practically
undeveloped.100
International Expansion 1900 to World War I
It has been related above that as the new century dawned, the
company was in the midst of a fundamental transformation of its film
manufacturing methods in Rochester. There can be no clearer indication
that scale economies became important in the course of this change than
that the Harrow plant ceased to manufacture film as soon as the continuous
process of film making was running smoothly in Rochester. Eastman said as
much in frequent correspondence to Davison at the time.101 The Harrow
plant was thereafter confined to coating paper and plates. Film
manufacture did not resume at Harrow until 1916. The immediate stimuli
for this resumption were the transport disruptions of World War I and the
imposition by the U.K. for the first time of tariffs on the importation of
photographic materials in 1915. The duty rate of 5 pence per linear foot
of negative cinefilm was particularly onerous. It was the equivalent of
233 percent of the market price of the film.102
Having established in Rochester a film manufacturing facility
capable of satisfying the world's need for this product, Kodak intensified
its efforts to stimulate international demand for it. In Europe, Xodak
Ltd., set up wholly owned sales subsidiaries in Italy (1905), Austria
(1906), Denmark and Switzerland (1910). 103
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The Western Hemisphere was territory managed by the Rochester
sales organization. An export department was organized by Domingo
Delgado, a Puerto Rican who had come to Kodak after working in the
shipping business. He became known as being indefatigable in developing
Kodak's business throughout Latin America. Traveling by foot, mule back,
river boat and every conceivable kind of vehicle, he appointed Kodak
agents, dealers and distributors wherever he went during the first two
decades of the new century. Starting with Argentina in 1916, Delgado
organized Latin American sales subsidiaries at the rate of one new company
per year for the next 10 years. Having organized the Latin American sales
territory, Delgado turned his attention to the Far East and spent some
years in the region. 1 0 4
Dry Plates. Despite Eastman's prodigious efforts to convert
photography from dry plates to roll film, the dry plate industry kept
growing during the first decade of the twentieth century. In 1900, Kodak
sales of dry plates were 8 percent of its film sales; by 1910, the
comparable figure had grown to 62 percent.1 0 5 These percentages are
based on data that include sales revenues of three American dry plate
producers acquired by Kodak between 1902 and 1904. These were the
Standard Dry Plate Co., H.A.Seed Dry Plate Co., and Stanley Dry Plate
Co.10 6 The Stanley acquisition fitted into Eastman's Canadian plans.
While Stanley machinery was moved to Rochester, some key Stanley
technicians were transferred to Toronto to teach emulsion making and
coating skills to the Canadian Kodak Company. Eastman had learned that
some $15,000 per year could be saved in Canadian import duties if the
sensitizing were done locally. 1 0 7
Eastman's correspondence of the period suggests that the
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acquisitions of three significant U.S. plate sensitizers were not isolated
incidents but part of a grander global strategy. He spelled out his ideas
in 1903 with an explicitness that leaves little room for subsequent
interpretation :
Whether any agreement with the principal manufacturers as to
price would benefit us depends greatly on what our main ob3ect
is. Of course the one we started out with was to dominate the
trade in England , 3ust as we do here, by means of purchase or
amalgamation. The lat thing to decide is whether conditions in
England are such that it will be impossible to control the
trade through the small dealer; whether by amalgamation with
some larger concerns we can control enough of the trade to tie
up the small dealer, or whether the jobber, drawing upon the
German and French manufacturers, could break up any such
proposition. Another point to be considered is whether the
time is ripe any way for any kind of coalition, or whether, if
we get the enemy on the run, we should not keep him running
until he loses a little flesh.. .As a general proposition I do
not look with favor upon a mere price agreement and do not
think it could be relied upon to last long because as
conditions change the interests of the various parties change,
and usually change enough to break up any combination. If we
conclude to go in for a domination of the trade I do not see
how a price concurrence could help us now. It would simply
help our competitors to make more money and force us to pay the
highest prices for their plants when we buy them.108
Thus, while he was buying up the U.S. plate producers, he also
acquired Cadett & Neall Ltd., an English dry plate manufacturer.109
During the same year, 1903, he tried to acquire Ilford Ltd., although this
attempt failed. It was one thing to buy out smaller, privately owned
competitors who "think they see in the steady advance of the Kodak Co. an
avalanche that may overwhelm them - and they want to get on top of it
instead of under." 110 It was quite another matter to make a hostile
takeover bid for the shares of a publicly held foreign corporation. The
London financial press made lively reading in May 1903. Writers to the
editors of The Financial Times and other papers, signing themselves as
'Sick of the Americans,' 'Anti-Trust,' and 'Anti-Kodak,' used such phrases
as 'hauling down the flag,' 'surrendering to Yankees,' 'degradation of
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patriotic sentiment,' 'American monsters,' 'timorous defenders of British
trade,' 'Advance America and take our blood,' 'behave like men and not
like a lot of old women,' etc., in expressing their opposition to the
Kodak proposal. Eastman had plainly overplayed his hand in this instance,
and the proposal was eventually defeated by Ilford ahareholders.1 1 1
To get the services of C.E.K. Mees to organize and direct the
Kodak central research laboratory, Eastman had to buy Wratten & Wainwright
Ltd., an old English plate sensitizer of which Mees was then Managing
Director and in which he had an equity interest. By making this
acquisition, Kodak inherited a contractual obligation to construct a dry
plate factory in Vac, a suburb of the Hungarian capital of Budapest.
Eastman was not enthusiastic about this pro3ect, feeling that a factory of
the size planned would have a capacity much larger than the market
opportunity offered by Austria-Hungary. He could not, however, escape the
contractual obligation.1 12 World War I halted the construction of this
plant, but it eventually went into operation in 1919, sensitizing plates
and papers. Although Eastman visited it once, he paid little attention to
it, and it would appear that his subordinates did not either. The plant
was never profitable, in part because over a twenty year period its
general manager raked off a percentage of everything entering and leaving
the factory. The plant was sold to the Hungarian government at the
conclusion of World War II. 113
Paper. Among the seven U.S. paper sensitizers acquired by the
company following execution of its contract with the General Paper Co. so
as to extend Kodak control over the U.S. photographic paper market was the
American Aristotype Co.1 1 4 That company had an agreement with the
Vereinigte Fabriken Photographischer Papiere AG, a consortium of seven of
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the largest paper sensitizers operating in the German city of Dresden.
This consortium had acquired the business of Carl Christensen in 1902 and
with it, the rights to Christensen's collodion emulsions for coating
papers.115 Vereinigte had licensed American Aristotype to use the
Christensen emulsions in the U.S. Eastman wanted to sell this paper in
Europe but was blocked by the original license. After some negotiations,
a new contract was executed. This gave Kodak the right to sell these
papers in France, Spain and Portugal. The terms prohibited Vereinigte
from selling in the U.S. and Kodak from selling in Germany and Russia.
Kodak paid Vereinigte with $171,000 par value of non-assignable Eastman
Kodak Co. common stock.116
Cinefilm. Kodak sales revenues grew vigorously during the
first decade of the twentieth century, increasing from $2.6 million at the
turn of the century to $13.8 million ten yeras later.11 7 This can be
attributed to three major factors. One was the secular growth of
photography, greatly stimulated by Kodak's own actions. The second was
the consolidation of the many other enterprises acquired by Xodak during
the decade. The third was the explosive growth after 1906 of the cinema.
Kodak had played no role in the creation of demand for cinefilm. But as a
result of its pioneering research in roll film, process engineering and
successful conversion to continuous production of celluloid, the company
was uniquely qualified to supply the film in high volume once the demand
emerged. Subject to minor differences in detail, the product was
identical to Kodak still camera roll film.118 Such was the growth in
the demand for this product that by 1909 Kodak cinefilm sales revenue had
caught up to still films at $2.1 million. Three years later, Kodak
cinefilm sales had grown to more than $5.8 million while those from still
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films had increased to 03.2 million. The comparison of physical unit
volume was even more dramatic. Kodak production of cinefilm in 1912
exceeded 389 million linear feet of 35mm film. On a comparable basis,
this was nearly 2.7 times the company's production of still film.119
There are several contemporaneous indications in Eastman's
correspondence that more then half, in some years substantially more than
half, of Kodak's cinefilm production was exported to Europe during this
era.12 0 Kodak's largest single cinefilm customer by far was the French
company of the brothers Emile and Charles Pathe. They had been among the
pioneers of the French cinema. Having bought Edison's Kinetoscope in
1897, they became leaders in the theatrical exhibition of films. As such,
they needed positive cinefilm. Pathe was almost completely dependent on
Kodak during most of the decade. Three English firms, Ensign, Edwards,
and Barnet, tried to make film but eventually fell by. the wayside. The
only other competitor was Lumiere, but this French firm was at a serious
disadvantage. It was still producing the base material on glass tables, a
method Kodak had abandoned at the turn of the century. The quality of
Lumiere film was distinctly inferior to Kodak's.12 1
The demand for film grew to such an extent that Path6 began to
recycle used Kodak film. This meant removing the original emulsion from
the base and recoating it. Such conditions led Path6 to begin
construction of its own film factory in 1907 in the Parisian suburb of
Vincennes. Its planned scale was such that it would satisfy not only
Pathe's internal film needs but enable Pathe to become an active Kodak
competitor. Pathe was, however, at a coat disadvantage. They did not
know how to make the film base and thus bought it from the American
producer, Celluloid Co.122 Path6 had succeeded in trading one
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dependency for another.
As a result of Pathe's backward integration into film coating,
Kodak's sales to Path& slipped from 55 percent of the company's cinefilm
revenues in 1907 to 25 percent in 1909. Growth in demand from other
customers more than compensated for the loss of Path&'s business.123
But Eastman reacted to the loss by attempting to organize the European
cinema industry along lines that had developed in the U.S.
The business had been somewhat chaotic following Edison's
invention of the equipment necessary for the production and exhibition of
movies. A number of others developed such equipment. These people,
knowing that the market for such equipment was quite limited though the
market for its use was not, entered the business of producing movies. To
avoid the claims and counterclaims against the infringement of their
equipment patents by each other and to develop a source of continuing
rents, seven of these enterprises formed the Motion Picture Patent Co. in
1908. The purpose of this entity was to pool all their patents under one
agency, thereby creating the common control necessary for the collection
of monopolistic rents. Kodak became the key player in this game. It
became the exclusive supplier of raw film to the producers in this pool.
Added to its own price of three cents per linear foot of film was a
royalty of one half cent per foot. The royalty was collected from the
motion picture producers and passed on to the pool which distributed it to
its members. All participants in this scheme had to agree to maintain the
same prices for their output. The agreement went into effect on the first
day of 1909.
No sooner had agreement been reached than Eastman went to Europe
to extend the agreement to the industry there. He was advised by Raymond
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Poincare, then his French legal counsel (and later to become President of
the 3rd French Republic), that the scheme was illegal in France. (Indeed,
several American courts subsequently found it to be illegal in the U.S. as
well.) Thus, the scheme was never incorporated in a formal agreement in
Europe, but several movie producers there joined the scheme
informally.124
The arrangement did not last long in Europe. It broke down
largely because of the emergence of competing raw film suppliers. These
included, besides Pathe, Agfa and Gevaert. Like Path&, Gevaert was at
first dependent on Celluloid Co. supplied base. Agfa thus became the only
really serious threat perceived by Eastman. Through intelligence provided
by European customers and his roving technical adviser, J.T. Clarke,
Eastman kept a close watch on every technical and commercial development
at Agfa. By 1911, Eastman conceded that he had no means to prevent Agfa's
entry into the business. At the beginning of 1913, he noted that Agfa had
established itself as a significant factor in the trade.125 A series of
discussions, described elsewhere in this thesis (see Agfa, p. 42), led to
an agreement between Kodak and Agfa in August 1913. That agreement called
for Kodak to limit itself to 60 percent of the European cinefilm market
and Agfa to take the remaining 40 percent. Any excess over these
specified percentages was to be settled by compensating royalties.126
A German secondary source indicates that the same agreement
provided for the total exclusion of Agfa from the American cinefilm
market.127 This seems improbable. The agreement was executed two
months after Kodak had been indicted for violations of the U.S. anti-trust
law. It is hardly conceivable that Eastman would not know, under these
circumstances, that such an arrangement would be considered a flagrant
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restraint of American interstate commerce. In fact, he did know. Within
six months of the execution of the Agfa agreement, Eastman was approached
by Pathe with a proposition that in return for an annual payment of
$250,00 from Kodak, Pathe would stay out of the U.S. market. Eastman told
Pathe that he could not enter into such an arrangement under the Sherman
Act. 1 2 8
Australia. The formation of Kodak Australasia Ltd.
represented a marriage of convenience. The English Kodak company had
opened a retail store in Melbourne in the late 1890s. This establishment
was not profitable for two reasons. One was the physical remoteness of
Australia. One-way communication by boat took 45 days from London at the
turn of the century. Commenting on the store's losses, Eastman wrote
It is very difficult to carry stock conservatively at branches
as far away as Melbourne or Cape Town and the losses from
overstock and consequent deterioration of goods is almost sure
to drag the branch into the hole.1 2 9
The other reason was that the store was sub3ect to vigorous
competition from a neighboring shop run by a local enterprise, Baker &
Rouse. Thomas Baker had opened a plate sensitizing factory near
Melbourne. J.J. Rouse was an aggressive merchandiser of photographic
goods. The two had gone into partnership and had built their business
into the largest of its kind in Australia. When Eastman tired of the
continuing losses of his Melbourne branch, he had sold it to Baker & Rouse
in 1903. The latter became Kodak's exclusive distributor in
Australia.1 30
Within a year, however, Eastman was thinking that Australia
would be an "awfully nice country to cinch by a combination;" Baker and
Rouse were thinking along similar lines.1 3 1 They had a factory and a
distribution network. Kodak had superior product and technology. It took
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until 1907 to come to agreement. A new company, capitalized at k150,000
was incorporated. Baker & Rouse got 49 percent of the shares. Kodak got.
the remaining 51 percent and first call on the Baker & Rouse shares after
the sixth year, an option that Kodak eventually exercised. For their
shares, Baker & Rouse contributed their tangible assets. The capital
contributed by Kodak went into extension of the dry plate factory and
later into facilities for sensitizing of film and paper. Baker was to
provide his services for two years and Rouse his for five years.1 32 The
expansion anticipated in the agreement came rather quickly. In 1908,
Australia enacted a highly restrictive tariff. In commenting on its
passage, Eastman wrote that "we could not have improved the photo part
much if we had actually framed it." 133
World War I to 1932
France. Eastman had thought about manufacturing in France
from an early stage. The first indication that the subject was on his
mind appeared in 1891. It came up again ten years later. 134 By 1907,
the scale economies achieved in Rochester caused him to reject the idea of
a French factory.135 A year later, Eastman was offered an opportunity
to buy the business and factory of the brothers Lumiere in Lyon. The
Lumieres had begun to manufacture dry plates in 1883 and are generally
credited with introducing cinematography to France in 1895. But they had
not kept up with the changing technology, and late in the first decade of
the twentieth century they were still sensitizing film on 50 meter long
glass tables. Eastman rejected the opportunity to buy out Lumiere.136
By 1916, Eastman had developed a plan for a French factory to
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make film, paper, plates and cameras on a scale large enough to supply
France, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, Spain and Portugal. 137 That plan
may well have had its stimulus in the U.S. government's anti-trust suit
against the company. The 1915 verdict in that suit hinted at a possible
separation of the American Kodak company into two or more independent
entities.1 38 Eastman was, however, ambivalent about where to put this
planned factory. A year later, he was still undecided as to whether to
put up such a plant in France or in Russia. The same indecision was still
visible a year after the Soviet revolution had occurred.1 3 9 No doubt
the economic chaos brought on by World War I kept such plans from being
executed. The idea kept coming up, however. Eastman rejected the idea
again in 1924 when he justified his reluctance to spread production any
further by expressing the view that "safety lies in concentration." 140
To put that decision in perspective, it is to be noted that when he made
it, Eastman was approaching the age of three score and ten, and he was
getting ready to turn responsibility for active management of the company
over to Stuber and Frank Lovejoy in Rochester and T.C. Mattison in London.
After 1925, Eastman was consulted only on really major decisions.
One such major decision was not long in coming. The idea of
manufacturing expansion into France was kept alive by Mattison and his
associate, Charles 2. Case, who was responsible for special developmenta
at Kodak Ltd. in London. They entered into negotiations with Charles
Pathe in 1926. Path6 was then 64 years old and ready to withdraw from the
burdens of managing his film manufacturing business. After the war,
Pathe's company had expanded into production of x-ray and industrial use
film and had integrated backward into making his own film base. Pathe had
also developed a 9.5mm format cinefilm system for amateur use. Path&'s
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company had become the largest photographic enterprise in France by the
1920s. Following passage of the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act by the U.S.
in 1922, Pathe had entered into a joint venture with E.I. DuPont de
Nemoura 9 Co. to get access to the American market from behind its highly
protective tariff barrier. While negotiating with Kodak, Path& was
simultaneously holding talks with DuPont to expand this venture.
Those talks may have convinced Eastman to act. Although the
record is quite sketchy, it seems quite plausible that Eastman was in the
end swayed by the desire to avoid the sudden expansion of a major
competitor in his domestic market. He could tolerate the U.S. presence of
Ansco and Defender, weak local producers which represented no threat to
Kodak. But confrontation with an enterprise that combined the financial
resources of DuPont and the photographic knowledge of Path& was quite
another matter.
Eastman approved the agreement Mattison and Case had negotiated
with Pathe, and it was concluded in 1927. 141 This called for the
formation of a new company, Kodak-Pathe S.A. Kodak took 51 percent of the
shares. The 49 percent taken by Path4 was subsequently acquired by Kodak.
Pathe kept his theaters but turned the Vincennes factory over to
Kodak-Pathe. In addition to his shares in that company, Path& received
134 million francs (about $5.3 million). 14 2
Germany. Patht was also indirectly involved in Kodak's next
major acquisition. The chemistry and raw materials used in the production
of celluloid film base were closely related to those used in some of the
artificial textile fibers that emerged in the 1920s. It was thus a
perfectly natural diversification for Agfa to get involved in the
production of such fibers. One of the few companies that had escaped the
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consolidation of the German chemical industry brought about by the
formation of IG Farben in 1925 was a fiber producer named Vereinigte
Glanzatoff Fabriken AG. The management of this company did not view
kindly Agfa's entry into its domain. It therefore decided to retaliate by
entering the photographic film business.
Glanzatoff learned rather quickly that manufacture of film
required a great deal of knowledge that went well beyond its knowledge of
cellulose compounds. Lacking thia extra knowledge, Glanzatoff engaged
Pathe to build a film factory in Berlin. With Glanzat-off paying the
bills, Pathe spared no expense in building the most elaborate film plant
in Europe. The $6 million cost became a source of serious financial
embarrasament to Glanzatoff. The plant was completed and ready to start
operations under Pathe technical guidance in the spring of 1927, a time
closely coinciding with Charles Pathe's desire to get out of film
manufacturing. Under these circumstances, it was virtually ineluctable
that Path4 would bring Kodak and Glanzatoff together. The negotiations
between these two companies led to the formation of a joint venture in
which Kodak held a majority interest and a Glanzatoff subsidiary in effect
became a silent partner. Kodak later acquired the Glanzatoff minority
equity interest.143
The 1927 Annual Report of the Eastman Kodak Company covered
these major expansions with the laconic statement that "during the year,
the company's European business was reorganized. The facilities have been
extended to include manufacturing plants in Copenick, Germany and
Vincennes, France." 144 * The company's consolidated balance sheets
showed a 1927 increase in fixed assets and capital investments of 33
* C''penick is the Berlin district in which the
Glanzatoff film plant had been built.
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percent, to nearly $53 million.1 4 5
The reorganization mentioned in the report divided the world
into sales and administrative areas corresponding to the national markets
served by the three major European factories. The Harrow plant shipped to
the U.K. and its dependencies throughout the world. Vincennes shipped to
France, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Capenick shipped
to Germany and all other countries in central and eastern Europe.
Cbpenick became a victim of World War 11. As Kodak Ltd., the
British subsidiary, was the nominal parent of Kodak AG., the German
government seized the Cbpenick plant as enemy property after the outbreak
of the war in 1939. Cbpenick was located in the sector of Berlin assigned
to the Soviet occupation forces in 1945. They, in turn, not only seized
the plant as enemy property but dismantled a substantial portion of its
equipment and sent it to the Soviet Union.1 4 6
Kodak made one more important acquisition during Eastman's
lifetime. The intent motivating this acquisition represented an
interesting twist in the company's traditional policy and, in retrospect,
it makes a fascinating contrast with that which was emerging at Kodak's
major competitor in Germany. As related elsewhere in this thesis (see p.
47), Agfa was to learn in its highly successful 1932 box camera promotion
that there was indeed a potentially large market in Germany for cheap and
simple mass consumption cameras. This was not, however, the prevailing
wisdom at the time. Following the 1925 introduction of the first Leica
camera, the camera as a highly sophisticated optical precision instrument
came to be widely accepted among German photographers as the standard of
what a small camera ought to be.
Having acquired a film plant of enormous capacity in C~penick,
260
Kodak needed to expand the German population of film users. Although the
Harrow plant had begun to manufacture cameras in 1927 and had been
reasonably successful with this venture, these cameras were the typical
Kodak mass consumption products. The company felt it needed something
more serious for the German market. Having little company capability in
sophisticated precision instruments, despite its by then formidable
technical resources, Kodak decided to buy this capability rather than to
develop it from within. Through the good offices of Victor Hasselblad,
who had been Kodak's Swedish distributor since 1904, Kodak negotiators
made the acquaintance of August Nagel, a German camera engineer. Nagel
had formed his own company in 1908, and he had sold it to the Carl Zeiss
interests in 1927, agreeing to stay with the company. He was, however,
not satisfied with the arrangement and left Zeiss a year later to form a
new Nagel camera works in Stuttgart. It was this factory that Kodak
bought in 1931, retaining Nagel's services as camera designer and
manufacturing engineer.
The first result of the Nagel-Kodak collaboration was a 35mm
precision camera called the Kodak Retina. Its design had enough features
for it to be taken seriously in Germany, but it could be made so as to
sell at retail for 75 marks. It thus opened a new market niche somewhere
between the traditional cheap Kodak product and the highly sophisticated
and expensive cameras put out by Leitz, Zeiss, Voigtlunder and other
famous German producers. In time, this camera came to be exported all
over the world.147
Other 1920s Expansion. The expansion of Kodak's international
marketing network became explosive during the 1920s. After every major
population center in the industrially developed world had been covered by
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the establishment of a company owned retail or wholesale outlet or by the
appointment of independent distributors, penetration continued into
secondary cities and some fairly exotic places in the rest of the world.
To celebrate the 25th anniversary of the founding of the Eastman Kodak
Company of New Jersey, the company in 1928 published an Annual Report that
gave a little more information about itself than the previously issued
reports which had provided only the most condensed financial statements.
This became a regular feature of the reports thereafter. It is possible
to glean some indication of where the company was already operating by
reviewing how far afield it was going in the late 1920s in its development
of markets :
1927 Within the year, the company has increased its direct
representation by opening establishments in ... ;
Vancouver, B.C.; Lima, Peru; Hong Kong, China; Osaka,
Japan; Soerbaja, Java; Nedan, Sumatra; Warsaw,
Poland.148
1928 : Subsidiaries were founded to distribute at wholesale
from Panama City, Lima, Honolulu and Manila, and
branches of existing subsidiaries were formed for the
same purpose at Hong Kong, Tientain, Breslau and Madras.
The last-named two serve retail trade also....In Paris,
a new shop opened, the sixth there... .New stations for
processing Cine-Kodak Film began work in Honolulu,
Johannesburg, Manila, Medan, Nairobi, Panama, Budapest,
Warsaw and Colombo, making a total of 47 now serving
amateur movie makers of the world.14 9
1929 : Wholesale or retail or photo finishing activities were
added to the existing establishments in Genoa, Venice,
Leipzig, Lodz (Poland), Bucharest, Prague, Calcutta, and
in East Africa... .Growing demand has necessitated the
opening of five additional developing stations for
Cine-Kodak Film in such widely separated cities as
Wellington, New Zealand; Algiers, Algeria; Lima,
Peru;.. 150
The above mentioned Cine-Kodak processing stations require a
little elaboration. The company introduced an amateur use cinefilm sytem
in 1923. This system brought with it some special requirements. The film
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format was 16ma, a little less than half the width of the 35mm that was
standard in the professional cinema. More important was that it was a
reversal film. In its unexposed state, it was a negative. After
processing, it became a positive.1 5 1 The processing of exposed negative
into positive required special techniques and equipment. These special
requirements became even greater in 1928 when the company introduced color
to its amateur cinefilm system. 1 5 2 The desire to control the quality of
the processing and to appropriate the profits from a unique process thus
became a significant force in the company's international expansion during
the 1920s. Each processing laboratory became a small manufacturing
operation. The means of transportation then available stimulated the
international decentralization of this manufacturing operation. By 1930,
the company was operating 54 such processing laboratories, and the great
majority of these were in countries outside the U.S. 153
Photofinishing laboratories for still films also played an
important role in the company's foreign operations during the 1920s. In
the U.K., the company achieved a good measure of control over the trade by
acquiring a controlling interest in 27 such laboratories. Thereafter,
these finishers used Kodak chemicals and papers exclusively. The largest.
13 of these houses took on film wholesaling functions. Their steady
deliveries of finished photographs to retailers, at whose stores the films
had been dropped off by consumers, placed them in an excellent position to
deliver new unexposed film rolls to these retailers.1 5 4
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Conclusion
The place in which Eastman's company was spawned happened to be
a provincial American flour milling city. A business such as the one he
entered needs more than a geographic locus, however. Photography requires
knowledge, and those who possessed it operated in an intellectual
environment that recognized few national frontiers. Eastman acquired much
of his early photographic knowledge from practioners in England, the
country in which photography first flourished. The means by which he
acquired this knowledge made it possible for him at the same time to
acquaint himself with the possibilities for its commercial exploitation
outside the U.S. It thus seems not at all extraordinary that Eastman
should have begun to operate on an international scale at an early stage.
This having been stated, it should also be observed that this
international scale was rather modest for the first twenty-five years of
the company's history. It first became large as a result of growth in the
cinema industry early in the twentieth century. Excepting the cinema,
none of the manufacturers whose histories are covered elsewhere in this
thesis emerged as significant roll film producers before World War 1.
This suggests that, while Eastman was ready for the world outside the U.S.
before 1920, the rest of the world was not ready for him.
Eastman Kodak blossomed into an enterprise operating on a truly
global scale during the 1920s. Although it was a decade during which
Eastman gradually withdrew from active management of the business, he had
appointed like-minded successors at Kodak Ltd. These people were prepared
to continue the policies he had formulated many years earlier. Those
policies bore rich rewards during the 1920s. Kodak's twenty-five year
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technical lead over its European competitors in roll film based
photography and its early development of an international distribution
network enabled it to seize a commanding commercial position once the
markets had developed. It was also a decade that saw a vast extension of
photography to a variety of commercial and professional uses other than
the cinema. Many of these were the direct result of the industrial
research that Eastman had institutionalized earlier in the century.
Once the systematic search for market outlets for the product of
that research had been set in motion, it took on a life of its own. This
eventually led to a search for additional manufacturing opportunities
behind the tariff barriers that had been raised in the aftermath of the
first World War. Given these developments and Kodak's history of less
than exclusive reliance on its proprietary knowledge for its competitive
advantage, it was a natural outcome that its major foreign manufacturing
expansions during the 1920s would come by way of acquisitions in France
and Germany. The 1921 U.S. Consent Decree enjoining further U.S.
acquisitions no doubt contributed to setting the stage for the company's
moves in France and Germany.
In 1894, Eastman had written to Strong
The manifest destiny of the Eastman Kodak Co. is to be the
largest manufacturer of photographic materials in the world or
else to go to pot. 155
Reflection on the industrial and commercial context in which
that letter was written suggests that the first of those alternative
destinies was not at all manifest at the time. The company was just
emerging from a major crisis the eventual outcome of which was then by no
means certain. In full recognition of the risks involved, Eastman was
trying to reassure Strong and perhaps himself. The company's subsequent
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rise to a position of preeminence was the result of Eastman's strategies
which did not discriminate between domestic and foreign expansion.
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Appendix
Eastman Kodak and the Economies of International $cope
Stephen Hymer postulated that the internationalizing firm enjoys
certain advantages that must be large enough to compensate for the many
disadvantages that inhere in operating abroad.156 Charles Kindleberger
summarized the sources of these advantages to include, among others,
product differentiation, special marketing skills, retail price
maintenance, administered pricing, patented technology, internal and
external economies of scale. 157
One thrust of this chapter has been to demonstrate that the
Eastman Kodak Company enjoyed these advantages. Furthermore, it has tried
to elucidate that Kodak's advantages had their roots not so much in a
vaguely generalized set of market imperfections as in a consciously
deliberated business strategy the execution of which created many of those
imperfections. Eastman's strategy developed In the American business
environment of his time. To the extent that the policies constituting
that strategy turned out to be effective, they may be considered a
valuable form of proprietary knowledge and skill.
The transfer of such knowledge and skill from a company's home
country to a foreign country can be interpreted as an exploitation of the
economies of scope. Panzar and Willig have used this term to cover the
avoidance of costs where two or more product lines can be the joint
beneficiaries of common inputa.158 As Teece has observed, one of these
inputs is organizational knowhow, the public goods nature of which makes
its use in non-competing applications possible without diminishing its
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value.159 This line of thought is extended here to cover situations in
which the knowhow, once acquired through the painful and often costly
accumulated experience in Country A, may be transferred to Country B at
relatively little incremental cost to the proprietor. The means by which
such transfers are made abroad from the country of origin has become a
fertile subject of inquiry by students of international business. This
Appendix tries to make a modest contribution to the understanding of such
means by citing some representative examples, drawn from Eastman's
voluminous business correspondence, of how, by means of the written word,
he tried to extend the understanding of the basis of the company's
American success to other countries.
Narket Definition. Eastman's conceptualization of his market
as one of consumers for whom photography was to be made easy did not
relegate the professionals to a negligible role. The arrangement under
which the first Kodak cameras were sold required the camera and its
exposed film roll to be returned to Rochester for development and printing
of the pictures and reloading of the camera. If the market was to grow,
this was clearly an impractical arrangement, and it turned out to be short
lived. Pictures had to be developed and printed close to wherever the
consumer happened to be. That was a job for professionals and one that
Eastman was happy to externalize until new conditions of film technology
and market growth made it attractive to internalize the function again.
An ultimate objective was to have satisfied consumers. One
immediate commercial opportunity to be exploited as a means to reaching
that objective was to sell sensitized paper to professionals doing the
photofinishing. The issue of promotional policy implied by this market
definition was how to position the product. That issue was at first too
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subtle for the management of the English Kodak subsidiary. Eastman made
it explicit in 1892 :
I told Mr. Walker when I was in London that he was making a
great mistake in pushing his papers for amateur use. There is
five or ten times the business among professionals... .We pay no
attention whatever to amateurs. If they find the professionals
use it they will fall into line fast enough; whereas the
professionals look askance at any thing that has an amateur
flavor.160
It will be recalled that the year 1892 was a very troubled one
for the company. Until the problem of Kodak films losing their
sensitivity was solved, revenue from sales of paper remained critical to
the company. One of the products Kodak introduced in 1892 was Solio, a
gelatin printing-out-paper that required special treatment, such as
over-exposure, by the photographer. Eastman instructed his U.K. managers
that the key to winning professional acceptance of this product was to
have the company's demonstrator spend several days if necessary with
individual professionals to make sure they learned how to use it
properly.16 1
Eastman's instructions concerning such operational details were
guided by his broader views of the market. In a rather testy tone, he
expressed those views in late 1892 by writing :
You are continually harping on the alleged differences between
the English & American trade. There is nothing in your
experience whatever to show that there is any substantial
difference in the trade of the two countries.162
Eastman's views of the consumer camera market were spelled out
to his U.K. managers in 1893
We could go on for years trying to make a combination camera
that would suit every crank that came along. The question with
us is not to suit every crank but whether we can suit the mass
of camera buyers.163
Eastman made his views on the interdependency of the durable and
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consumable parts of his photographic system explicit to his U.K.
management In 1895 :
We ought to make at least as such off from the film used in it
as off from the camera itself; probably more. I believe that
every camera is good for at least twenty spools of film.. 164
The nature of the camera market and its relationship to the ultimate
objective of selling film came up again in 1896 when he wrote to Dickman
I consider that there are two entirely different kinds of camera
trade; one kind that wants a complicated camera with every device
that can be put on it; and the other that either wants, or ought to
have, the simplest possible camera. The latter class includes all
new trade...The money to be made is almost entirely in this
class...there are five people at least wo will pay $8.00 for a camera
to one who will pay $15.00 or $20.00. On a complicated camera we
would do well if we made $3.00, whereas on five of the cheap cameras
we would make about $14.00, and beside have five people using the
cartridge system instead of one.165
The epistomolgical ice on which we are skating here appears
thin. The study of scope economies is concerned with the transfer of
knowledge. The evidence cited thus far does not reveal knowledge as
conventionally defined so much as Eastman's viewpoints, attitudes,
desires, etc. Nevertheless, by expressing his ideas to the managers of
his U.K. subsidiary as he does in this correspondence, he is implicitly
saying "I know (or believe, hope, expect, pray) that whatever I am telling
you to do will be the basis for the company's business success." To the
extent his ideas indeed did form the foundation for the company's success,
it is perfectly legitimate to consider them to be a form of knowledge.
From a managerial perspective, it may be the most valuable form of
knowledge that an enterprise can possess.
Distribution. Among the cornerstones of Eastman's U.S. sales
policy was the direct sale of Kodak products to exclusive dealers. The
evidence of Eastman's efforts to extend this policy abroad began to show
up in 1899. A competing film, most probably one made by Lumiere, made its
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appearance on the French market that year. Eastman wrote to Strong
I have advised Davison to refuse to sell French dealers who
handle the new film as it is put up in rank imitation of
ours.1 6 6
A British press clipping from the year 1900 indicates that the same policy
was at work in the U.K. It quotes the Chairman of the British
Photographic Trade Association as characterizing Kodak's exclusivity
policy to be "not only un-English and unfair, but it is totally
unnecessary." 167 To enforce the exclusivity concept, Eastman priced
the product so as to make it possible to pay periodic rebates to dealers
who complied with Kodak's terms of sale. Starting in 1900, Eastman
directed his London managers to adopt the same system in the U.K. 168
In addition to auch fundamental strategic concepts, Eastman directed his
U.K. subsidiary management to adopt the minutest operational details of
the company's U.S. marketing. Thus, in 1900 he asked Davison to follow a
new U.S. billing system under which customer statements were sent out on
the fourth, rather than the tenth, day of the month.169
One of the means used by Eastman to develop the consumer market
was through operation of Kodak owned retail stores. This was done abroad
perhaps even to a greater extent than in the U.S. Nowhere was Eastman's
rationale for this policy made more explicit than in a 1901 letter to a
group of French dealers
I an in receipt of your letter of recent date protesting
against the opening of a Kodak retail shop in Lyons and have
given the matter careful consideration. To begin with I will
admit that if your evident assumption is correct that there is
only a certain fixed amount of trade in our goods to be had in
your locality, and that our own object is merely to get away
from our already established customers as much of that trade as
possible for our own retail establishment then our action would
be detrimental to your interests and quite unwarranted.
Experience has shown us, however, beyond all question that the
amount of Kodak goods that can be sold in any given territory
is largely dependent upon the advertising that they receive and
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the prominence with which they are presented to the public. It
follows naturally from this that wherever we have established
branch houses the trade in that locality has grown very
materially and that the effect has been, not to decrease the
sales of our dealer customers but, on the contrary, to increase
them... .Our policy all over the world has been, and still is,
the protection and encouragement of our dealer customers and I
am quite sure that no move has been made in the present
instance which will be detrimental to your interests unless you
make it so yourselves.1?0
It may be of interest to note in this context that the transfer
of wisdom from the company's accumulated experience did not always go only
in one direction. In explaining the acquisition of the first U.S. retail
outlets to his U.K. management, Eastman wrote :
The general policy in purchasing these established businesses
is to exploit both the wholesale and the retail business. The
retail business can be very materially stimulated by our
example, as it has been in Europe.171
Pricing. To appropriate the benefits of Kodak's advertising
efforts and to keep the loyalty of his dealers, Eastman felt it necessary
to enforce a system of rigid resale price maintenance. After he had
adopted this scheme in the U.S. in 1894, he urged his London manager to do
the same.172
When Eastman felt comfortable that the company's manufacturing
scale economies permitted it, he lowered prices to attract a wider public.
He had occasion, from time to time, to remind his European managers not to
confuse form with substance. They sometimes reduced prices
indiscriminately, and this aroused his ire. Thus, in 1903-1904, we find
him writing :
Heretofore, the business has been run too much like a
Government office... Almost every time that we have gone out for
the trade over there we have tried to do it by cutting prices.
The result is that it will finally leave us nothing to work
with.. .The thing to do is keep prices to the highest notch and
get out and hustle for the trade.173
The one fatal error we must avoid in Germany & elsewhere is the
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reduction of prices to a point where we cannot make any
money.. .We ought to make quality our fighting argument.174
Protection of Proprietary Intangibles. In the 1890 letter
outlining his patent strategy (see p. 227), Eastman instructed Walker
Next year when you get to earning plenty of money the best
investment you can make will be to put out 4,000 or 5,000
pounds into patent litigation.. .25,000 would put our patents
in England on a foundation that would be unassailable.175
There was discussion between Eastman and Walker in 1892 concerning the
extension of the company's operations into Germany. The correspondence
puts Eastman's views of the policy issues into perspective. He outlined
several options to Walker. Among these was the licensing of outsiders.
He rejected this on the ground that just one licensee would create
competition sufficient to destroy the value of any patents and to take all
the profit out of the business.176
Among the policies on which Eastman placed heavy reliance was
the maintenance of secrecy with repect to the company's chemical
formulations. The head of each department in Rochester was under written
orders not to communicate formulas in his custody to anyone else without
the explicit written consent of Eastman himself. He had occasion more
than once to upbraid his Harrow managers for violations of this rule.177
Eastman's policy with respect to the conservation of
proprietary knowledge was spelled out in his reaction to an inquiry from
the Asanuma company in 1906. Aaenuma and other Japanese merchants were
seeking a partner in establishing a dry plate manufacturing operation.
(See Ilford, p. 139 and Konishiroku, pp. 161-162)
The intention is very apparent that the Japanese would like to
get some American or European experts to install their factory
for them and then absorb it themselves. No prospective trade
in Japan would induce us to take the risk of making them
acquainted with our secrets. We prefer to sell what plates we
can there as long as we can and then drop it.178
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Xonopolization. In the company's early internationalization,
Eastman never relied as heavily on competitor acquisition as he had done
at home. It is nevertheless clear that he was driven by the same ideas.
As he was completing the consolidation of the American photographic paper
industry at the turn of the century, he wrote his U.K. counsel that "it is
possible that the Kodak organization will hereafter want to absorb other
branches of the industry both in the U.S. and abroad." 179 In 1902, he
sent Charles S. Abbott to London. Abbott had come to the company via the
acquisition of American Aristotype Co. of which he had been a partner.
Eastman announced the purpose of Abbott's visit to his U.K. manager as
follows
I want him to thoroughly discuss with you the sub3ect of a
general European operating policy and get a plan outlined as
far as possible before I come over, say a month later. The
general question to be considered will be how far we can go
toward pursuing the same policy that we have in this country in
securing control of the whole business by the purchase of
manufacturing and distributing concerns. Mr. Abbott will also
take up the preliminaries of a combination with the Dresden
syndicate.180
It was such thinking that led within a year to the acquisition of Cadett &
Neall and the unsuccessful attempt to take over Ilford. In connection
with the Ilford attempt, Eastman had advised his U.K. manager that
So far we have not bought any declining businesses unless they
were needed to make up an absolute control of the class of
goods involved. 181
Conclusion
The evidence cited in this Appendix is, to be sure, somewhat
fragmentary. Any conclusions drawn from it must remain tentative. All of
it, however, points in the same direction, and in no instance encountered
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in the course of the present research does it point in a different
direction. Eastman knew what he wanted to accomplish. He had tested in
America the efficacy of whatever means he thought necessary to reach his
goals. He then transferred his understanding of those means to the
managers of his foreign affiliates. The result was a global business
strategy, one that did not differentiate between home country and foreign
countries in its basic elements.
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Chapter IX
Conclusion
Summary of Findings
Competition was very good in its way, but it was good for
the consumera and not for the producers.
W. Ashmole at extra-ordinary general meeting of
Ilford Ltd. shareholders, 25 June 1903, as
reported in The Financial Times (London),
26 June 1903.
The photographic manufacturing industry, Kodak says, has
always been on an international basis; because of the
coat savings of large scale production there are few
factories and all manufacturers (including the Eastman
Kodak group) are supplying some important markets by
exporting to them over a tariff barrier since, in their
view, this is more economical than setting up local
factories.
The (U.K.) Monopolies Commission, "'A Report on
the Supply and Processing of Colour Film,"
London : N.M.'s Stationery Office, 1966, p. 75.
It has been suggested in the Introduction that the carrying out
of strategic intents by members of the photochemical industry led to
certainty in the incurrence of fixed costa. If an enterprise is to
survive in the long run, it must over the long run generate variable
margins that exceed those fixed costs. Such generation is anything but
certain, and while this uncertainty can never be completely eliminated, it
can be substantially reduced. The effort to reduce it took two major
forms, the restraint or elimination of competition and the search for
markets wherever they were to be found or developed. Those entrepreneurs
who clearly understood these relationships and their implications were
pioneers in seeking and developing markets abroad.
Despite a number of idiosyncratic twists and turns, the history
of the photochemical industry is broadly consistent with this generalized
interpretation. The remark by Ilford shareholder Ashmole quoted at the
beginning of this chapter serves as a proxy for the following events
1. The consolidation of Agfa and Bayer photographic interests
by IG Farben.
2. The acquisition of Ansco by IG Farben for the benefit of Agfa.
3. The European cinefilm market sharing agreement by Agfa and Kodak.
4. The price fixing arrangement entered into by the European
photographic industry between the two world wars.
5. The consolidation of the English photochemical industry by Ilford.
6. The wholesale acquisition of competing firms by Kodak.
7. The imposition of exclusionary sales terms in the U.S. and
the U.K. by Kodak.
8. The acquisition and consolidation of Ilford, Lumiere and
Tellko operations by Ciba-Geigy.
9. The acquisition of Perutz by Bayer for the benefit of Agfa.
10. The fusion of Agfa and Gevaert operations.
11. The restriction of x-ray film imports by the Brazilian
government once a local production facility had been
established by Konishiroku.
12. The restriction of the largest Japanese wholesalers by
Fu3i to carrying only its own photosensitive materials.
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These events and the discouragement of hundreds of early
entrants led to the development of an oligopolistic industry structure.
While oligopoly is defined by there being a small handful of producing
enterprises, it is quite possible that a so defined industry could operate
many factories. A distinguishing feature of the photochemical oligopoly
is, as suggested by the second quotation opening this chapter, that it
operates very few factories. Each of the few manufacturing facilities is
capable of satisfying the demand for its output in markets larger than
that provided by the nation in which the particular facility is located.
The need to find users for the output of this small number of
factories led to the development of marketing networks the scope of which
is more or less global. The international operations of the photochemical
industry thus in large measure comprise marketing activities. Although
there are minor plants of limited significance scattered around the world
in response to various government imposed trade impediments, the only
truly multinational manufacturers are Eastman Kodak and, to a more limited
extent, Agfa-Gevaert. The multinationality of the industry largely
consists in the operation of sales and distribution subsidiaries in those
countries where economic development has progressed to a level that
promises repetitive sales in volume sufficient to sustain the operations
of these subsidiaries.
Although the present research has uncovered specific instances
of nearly every conceivable type of relationship in conducting business
across national frontiers, most of these have no strategic significance
for the enterprises. By this is meant that if such relationships had
never been entered into, this would have had little effect on the ultimate
prosperity of the individual firms.
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Significance of the Findings and the Industry's Experierence in Perspective
Internationalization of business is a complex and imperfectly
understood economic phenomenon. Its pervasive presence has stimulated the
production of a large body of economic theory that attempts to explain it.
The continuing appearance of new and revised formulations attests to
varying levels of dissatisfaction with what has thus far been proposed.
The findings of the present research are far from complete and
at least for this reason far from conclusive. The experience of the
photochemical industry can nevertheless be examined in the light of
several strains of relevant theory. The purpose of this examination is
not so much to claim empirical support for any given theory or to deny its
validity as it is to suggest how some theoretical formulations might be
modified so as to broaden their generality or to deepen their insight.
There are linkages between what has been proposed and reported in the
preceding chapters and other recent studies of internationalization. The
following discussion explores those linkages by focusing on two major
themes that run through much recent theoretical work. These are the
conception of markets and the characteristics and economic value of
knowledge.
It is to be noted at the outset that some expansion of taxonomic
domains is necessary for the discussion to be useful. The central concern
of such recent literature is confined to two highly visible aspects of
international business, Foreign Direct Investment (hereafter FDI) and the
institution that emerges from FDI, the Multinational Enterprise (hereafter
NNE). Good summaries of this work have been published by, among others,
Calvet,1 Cavea2 and Grosse.3 With the somewhat rare exception of
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passing mention of other business functions, this literature generally
treats manufacturing as the object of FDI. A typical example of this
treatment is given'by Caves when he writes : "An important numerical
proportion of foreign subsidiaries or branches takes the form of sales
agencies, representing a vertical integration forward; the capital
invested in them is small, however, and they will be neglected here as
comprising adjuncts to their parents' export sales activities unless they
undertake production and become 'horizontal'." 4
This is an unnecessarily narrow conception, and at least two
considerations call for broadening it. The essence of all business
activity, whatever form it may take, is the creation and exchange of
utility potentials. The physical transformations characteristic of
manufacturing create potential functional utilities only, and those
potentials are not normally realized at the factory door. The factory's
output must get to the party that will use it, and ultimately there must
be exchange with that party. The activities incident to getting a
manufactured product from the factory to ultimate users fall within the
domain of marketing, although they may with equal validity be described as
the creation of locational utility. In the absence of such locational
utility creation, the conduct of business would be reduced to a primitive
level indeed.
It is generally accepted that FDI consists in the transfer of
income producing assets abroad with the intent that those assets will be
managed by the transferor. There is nothing in this definition that
necessitates the transferred assets to be used solely in manufacturing,
and it does not preclude the possibility of asset use in creating
locational utility. To be meaningful in the present context, the concept
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of FDI must cover the hundreds of instances in which the photochemical
industry invested abroad to facilitate the performance of marketing
functions.
A central concern of economic analysis of international business
has for a generation been with one or another variety of market
imperfection. Such analysis has nevertheless paid insufficient attention
to elucidating what actually occurs in performing the marketing function.
One intent of the following discussion is to suggest how some of the gaps
might be filled. Before this can be done, an elaboration of the notion of
markets is needed.
A market is an institution or set of institutions for
facilitating exchanges between independent actors. Such actors are
presumed to be protective of their self-interest and to behave accordingly
as they enter into transactions and relationships leading to the execution
of exchanges. The behavior of actors in markets is governed by rules that
may or may not be codified. In either event, markets operate on the
presumption that participants know and understand the rules and do not
generally violate them. The knowledge of market institutions and of the
rules governing behavior in those institutions is part of the cultural
legacy of a given society. It is a sub-set of cultural knowledge and will
here be referred to as market knowledge. Insofar as market institutions
may include distribution channels specializing in a related group of
products, some aspects of market knowledge may be highly product-specific.
Market knowledge is necessary if the marketing function is to be carried
out with reasonable efficiency and effectiveness.
Enterprise managers concerned with strategy have a related but
somewhat broader conception of markets. To them, a market comprises the
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set of buyers who ultimately realize the utility potentials created by
sellers. The institutions used in the performance of the marketing
function are conduits for reaching this set of ultimate users. To the
extent that these conduits are seen to be necessary, they are certainly
not forgotten, but the importance attributed to them is subordinate to
that given to end users.
The nation-state plays a pivotal role in establishing the
business environment in which market institutions operate and ultimate
users reside. At the very least, it provides the locale in which market
institutions and users are to be found. All market institutions and end
users resident in a given country thus constitute a national market.
There are gradations of similarity and difference among national
markets with respect to end user utility functions, characteristics of
market institutions and operative transaction rules. The greater the
differences, the more they become sources of transactional friction
impeding exchange. Market knowledge serves as the lubricant easing such
frictions.
The relevance of these ideas for the conduct of international
business has been studied by scholars at the University of Uppsala. The
essence of their findings, as summarized by Carlson, is that firms face
frontier uncertainty as they begin to extend their transactions and
relationships abroad. This frontier uncertainty is seen to arise from
lack of cultural knowledge. The extent to which institutions and business
practices differ from country to country is indicated by what Carlson
calls cultural distance. The more they appear to differ, the greater the
cultural distance is perceived to be. To minimize the psychological
discomfort that accompanies frontier uncertainty, firms typically begin
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their internationalization by dealing in countries characterized by the
shortest cultural distance from home. They move progressively from the
more familiar to the less familiar, and they hesitate to commit additional
resources to a foreign country until the cultural or market knowledge
needed to operate in that country has been acquired and the cultural
distance between the two countries has thereby been shrunk.
This would appear to go quite far in accounting for the
frequently observed country pattern in moving from independent
distributors to marketing subsidiaries and eventually to manufacturing
subsidiaries. It is noted, however, that Carlson reports it simply as an
empirical observation rather than as an explanation.5  It is also noted
that cultural distance as defined by Carlson or lack of market knowledge
as defined above is the source of the foreigner's commercial disadvantage
identified by Hymer as one of the bases for his discussion of market
imperfections as the source of compensating advantage. 6
If the notion of cultural distance is stretched somewhat, there
is much in the experience of the photochemical industry that conforms to
the Uppsala model. Eastman Kodak set up its first permanent foreign sales
establishment and its first foreign factory in England, a country the
cultural distance of which from the U.S. can be presumed to have been
minimal. The uses to which the English Kodak subsidiary was put extended
beyond manufacturing and marketing in the host country. Eastman's
permanent establishment in London was at the center of an empire that
stretched around the world. His correspondence indicates that he was
quite aware of the colonial market. It is taken for granted that the
skills requiring application of market knowledge needed to reach users in
the colonies were more likely to be found in London than anywhere else.
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The managerial functions assumed by Kodak Ltd. also spread to foreign
countries outside the British Empire. Because the cultural distance
between Rochester and London was short, Eastman was able to communicate
with his U.K. managers with relative ease. Kodak Ltd. thus became an
instrument through which Eastman was able to multiply the effectiveness of
his policies in many countries outside the Western Hemisphere.
In this hemisphere, Domingo Delgado possessed sufficient
knowledge to begin the expansion of Kodak marketing activities in Latin
America. This knowledge had been acquired in the course of his Puerto
Rican upbringing and his experience in shipping and exports before joining
the Kodak organization. The specific additional knowledge needed to
establish Kodak in any given national market in Latin America was acquired
easily enough by Delgado as he went along. The significance of this last
point will be explored below.
The second and third foreign manufacturing ventures by Kodak
were organized in Canada and Australia, countries that obviously were not
culturally distant from the U.S. Perhaps as important in this context was
what the company did not do. Eastman rejected several proposals to become
involved in manufacturing in Japan. The xenophobic tone of his
correspondence on this subject suggests that his frontier uncertainty was
at its maximum with respect to commitment of resources to that country.
The first Gevaert permanent sales establishment in France is
consistent with the Uppsala model. Although the evidence is weak, it
could also be argued that Spain as the host country for Geveert's first
foreign manufacturing investment fits the same pattern. Spain exercised
sovereignty over the Lowlands for a century and a half. During that time
it left a cultural legacy remnants of which are still in evidence in
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Belgium to the present day. It may thus not have been entirely fortuitous
that the Garriga and Gevaert families and firms found themselves to have
enough in common to make mutual understanding quite easy. Similar
observations can be made about Gevaert's relatively early commitment to
company distribution facilities in South America. Here also the ties of
managerial hierarchy were eventually cemented by the marriage of one of
Lieven Gevaert's daughters to an Argentinean who acted as the company's
distributor in several South American countries.
Finally, the psychic discomfort that arises from the perception
of cultural distance was eased for both Japanese companies by their
dealing with Japanese expatriates. The early exports of both Konishiroku
and Fuyi were made, either directly or indirectly, to their own countrymen
who had settled in nearby countries. Konishiroku's first and thus far
only substanial foreign manufacturing investment was made in Brazil, a
country that was also the host for Fu3i's first foreign subsidiary. Were
it not for the presence in Brazil of a large and economically important
population segment of Japanese immigrants and their offspring, both
Japanese companies would have found that country to be far too exotic for
ma3or resource commitments.
On the other hand, we should be hard pressed to invoke cultural
distance in dealing with some other events in the internationalization of
the photochemical industry. Among these are
1. The establishment by Gevaert of distribution facilities in
Russia eight years before doing the same in the Netherlands.
2. The establishment by Agfa of a sales subsidiary in Spain
before doing the same in any of its Scandinavian neighbor
countries.
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3. The establishment by Agfa of a sales subsidiary in Italy
before doing so in Austria.
4. The establishment by Kodak of sales subsidiaries in France
and Germany before doing so in Canada.
5. The lapse of fourteen years between the first Kodak
permanent foreign establishments in England and Canada,
two countries presumably equidistant in a cultural sense
except for Canada's bicultural heritage.
These exceptions point to an aspect of the Uppsala model that
may limit its applicability. To firma seeking markets abroad, the
apparent potential of a given national market may be a more important
consideration than the obstacles posed by cultural distance. In any
event, firms find ways to surmount or circumvent these obstacles.
If cultural distance is shortened by market knowledge, the
perception that such distance exists must be a highly sub3ective
phenomenon that is the product of ignorance. The limitations on
international commerce imposed by ignorance can be overcome in a variety
of ways. Carlson suggests that it is overcome in the course of
accumulated experience and that thia accumulation can be modeled by a
learning curve.7 During the time period in which this learning curve is
taking shape, use of the requisite market knowledge can be acquired in a
number of ways. The purest illustrative example of this is Gevaert's use
of commission agents to sell its goods in several countries. As these
agents had no other assets, all they were able to offer Gevaert was the
use of their knowledge of local market conditions. Alternatively, the
requisite knowledge can be internalized within the firm by employing
people who either have the knowledge to begin with or who can quickly
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acquire it at minimal cost. The Kodak experience with Domingo Delgado is
a case in point. Another way to internalize market knowledge is to
acquire a firm that already has it, which was done by Kodak in Canada
among other places. The placement of its own employees into the
organizations of some of its independent foreign distributors helped to
decrease Agfa's ignorance of local markets, and the establishment of
representative offices by Fuji served the same purpose. The foreignness
of foreign markets was a rather temporary perception for those firms that
took internationalization seriously, and the need to acquire market
knowledge or its use does not appear to have been an insurmountable
obstacle to the successful photochemical firms.
Although market knowledge may be the lubricant of international
commerce, it is not the fuel. If the term, national market, is to take on
operational meaning, the end users in a given country must indicate
sufficient potential demand to make any marketing effort in that country
worthwhile. They must, in ahort, have purchasing power.
The significance of purchasing power was elaborated by Linder,
who tried to develop a more satisfactory model to explain actual
international trading patterns than that offered by the traditional
Heckscher-Ohlin elaboration of the theory of comparative advantage. The
notion of internal demand in both importing and exporting country is at
the core of Linder's model. Purchasing power is a necessary condition for
internal demand in the importing country to be satisfied. For lack of
better data, Linder used per capita income as the indicator of
purchasing power. He concluded that trade in manufactured goods will be
most intense between countries the per capita income of which is at more
or less the same level.8
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The experience of the photochemical industry fits the Linder
model in that most of the international commerce in its output, both in
value and in physical volume, flows from factory to foreign sales branches
and subsidiaries; such extensions of the fire's own facilities have
generally been set up in countries which either had the requisite
purchasing power or, in a later day, those which had reached a stage of
economic development that showed promise of reaching it within a
foreseeable future. To be sure, the pioneers in the internationalization
of this industry did not have the benefit of per capita income
statistics in their market seeking deliberations and relied instead on
other indicators of market potential. Where their output was an
intermediate product for another industry, as in motion pictures, they
went where the customers were. Where their output was a final product
intended for individual consumption, they used indicators such as the
proliferation of publications catering to satisfy the information needs of
users. It can be argued that the existence of such qualitative indicators
and quantitative indicators such as per capita income are joint
manifestations of a certain level of economic development.
It is noted in passing that Linder perhaps overstated his case
somewhat in his basic proposition that it is a necessary condition that a
product be consumed at home before it can be an export product.9 Few
observers would quarrel with the generality that exported manufactures are
usually sold first in the country where they are produced. The early
experience of the photochemical industry suggests, however, that a
confounding factor is introduced when Linder extends this generality to a
necessary condition.
The Eastman-Walker system of photography was, for all practical
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purposes, introduced simultaneously in the U.S. and the U.K., as was the
first Xodak system. The early internationalization of Gevaert may perhaps
be dismissed as an idiosyncratic aberration. While Gevaert's output found
its first demand within Belgium, one of the smaller nations of the world,
the company surely would not have lasted very long had its sales efforts
been confined to its domestic market. Finally, the early experience of
Agfa is instructive. The product which propelled Agfa to become the
world's second largest photochemical producer had no market whatever in
its home country at the time it was developed.
These experiences suggest that the need and search for markets
explain exports at a higher level of generality than that proposed by
Linder. Success in domestic marketing is by no means a necessary
condition for exports. The initial domestic marketing successes of
Eastman in America, Ilford in England, Monishiroku and Fupi in Japan serve
only to show that the necessary market demand was close at hand. This
obscures the more fundamental notion that the nationality of a market is
of secondary importance to a market seeker. Exports generally enter the
picture when there is asymmetry between the production capacity needed to
operate with reasonable cost efficiency and domestic demand. The purest
case is that of Agfa's entry into cinefilm production, where the required
capacity was large indeed and the effective domestic demand for the output
was zero.
Once the conditions propelling a photochemical firm to seek
markets abroad had developed, some part of the marketing function was
undertaken either by independent local agents and/or distributors or by
branches and/or subsidiaries of the manufacturer. In any given national
market, the former usually preceded the latter, although in a few
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exceptional early instances, the use of independent middlemen was avoided
entirely. At a minimum, the function undertaken by these intermediaries
included that portion of locational utility creation which comprised the
physical movement of goods from the factory to whatever distribution
channel was appropriate for a given product in a given national market.
In the extreme case, exemplified by Konishiroku, the entire marketing
function was undertaken by another party.
At a superficial level of observation, these alternative means
of foreign distribution appear to conform to the abstraction that models
economic activity in terms of markets and hierarchies, these being viewed
as polar alternatives for executing transactions.lO It is implicit in
this formulation that markets are perfectly competitive. In the analysis
of why one alternative institution is used rather than another, the
decision criterion generally is net transaction cost. Netting has to be
brought into the computation because the use of managerial hierarchies
entails the incurrence of governance costs that are avoidable when markets
are used. As Caves expresses it by use of Darwinian metaphor, the NNE
emerges and tends to prevail wherever it enjoys net transactional coat
advantages over markets.1 1
This formulation requires some analysis if its insight is to be
reconciled with two aspects of reality. Examine first the costs incurred
in creating locational utility. At a minimum, these costs arise from
performance of the following functions : Export packaging and labeling,
documentation, transportation, customs clearance and other formalities
related to crossing of national frontiers, warehousing, selling to
intermediaries, distribution, demand promotion, and after-sales service if
any. To keep the comparison fair, governance costs and the ability of the
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MNE to manipulate transfer prices so as to minimize import duties are set
aside. As Hirsch has pointed out in generalized form, the costs incurrred
are completely independent of who has title to the goods and of who owns
the organization that undertakes the above functions.12
Secondly, photochemical firma strive to create products that are
either in objective fact unique or that users come to believe to be unique
as a result of differentiation efforts. The independent distributor is in
virtually all instances given the right to import and sell the product
exclusively in a given national territory. The relationship between
manufacturer and independent foreign distributor in this industry is thus
best described as a bilateral monopoly. This is a most imperfect market
situation indeed and has in common with the operation of markets only that
the two parties are dealing with each other at arm's length.
The foregoing analysis suggests that application of the markets
and hierarchies model to internationalization really subsumes two separate
issues. One is the choice between perfect and highly imperfect market
mechanisms, and the other involves the choice between such highly
imperfect market mechanisms and an extension of the manufacturer's own
organization to a foreign country.
The coat efficiency argument may settle the first of these two
issues. There are minor scale economies that arise from concentration of
functions. The documentation and related customs clearance costs are
largely the same regardless of volume comprising a given lot of product.
The costs assigned to each unit in such a lot will accordingly be less if
the lot is large rather than small. These scale economies are here
identified as minor to distinguish them.from the major scale economies,
discussed below, that arise from marketing operations usually conducted by
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an organizational extension of the manufacturer.
Minor unit coat economies may thus account for the choice of a
highly imperfect, meaning non-competitive, market institution for
transferring goods abroad as opposed to a more competitive one. But the
choice between such an imperfect arm's length institution and an equally
imperfect internal organization remains as a separate issue.
This issue has been described and discussed by several scholars
as a phenomenon of internalization. While the concept is relevant, its
uncritical use in discourse sometimes leads its users to stray from the
path of clarity. The idea that firma internalize markets was first
broached in an international business context by Hymer.13 The idea was
picked up by Buckley and Casson for whom internalization of markets across
national frontiers was the centerpiece of a theory of the MNE.14 Rugman
wrote of transporting knowledge within the internal market of the MNE.15
Caves wrote of internalizing the market through vertical integration;1 6
and this usage is beginning to find its way into textbooks.17
The cause of clarity may be served by introducing the opposite
concept and delineating more precisely what may be the obJect of either
internalization or externalization. Internalization implies the taking
into the firm of something that was originally and inherently external to
it. A cow grazing in pasture can in some sense be said to internalize
grass, and in the same sense a firm may internalize skills, knowledge,
rights, transactions, and at best, one or more institutions in the
distribution chain, but never a market as that word has been defined
above.
In the present context, the concern is with the right to sell
photosensitive materials in countries that, from the point of view of the
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manufacturer, are foreign. To keep the discussion simple, it is assumed
that the government of the importing country sets up no inhibitions to the
disposal of these materials within the territory under its jurisdiction by
foreigners or organizational extensions of foreign firms. The materials
belong to the manufacturer, and among the rights that inhere in property
ownership, the right of disposal must count as central. If the right of
disposal inheres in the firm that owns the property, it is surely
appropriate to ask why the firm does or does not externalize this right.
This is the crucial difference between title transfer to an independent
distributor and to a subsidiary. By doing the former, which is to say by
effecting title transfer to a separate economic entity, the firm
externalizes the right to resale. By doing the latter, it keeps that
right within the same economic entity and thereby maintains something that
was internal in the first place.
It is general practice in the photochemical industry to
externalize foreign distribution rights for quite limited time periods.
Renewable one year and three year contracts are fairly typical. In the
overwhelming majority of instances, these rights are reclaimed with the
formation of sales subsidiaries in those countries where large potential
market demand is believed to exist. The transformation of such potential
demand into effective demand and the satisfaction of this effective demand
require an expansion of marketing efforts that go well beyond those needed
for physical distribution. The exertion of these efforts results in the
incurrence of costs the behavior of which brings into existence the
possibility of achieving major scale economies. This is because such
costs are largely independent of physical unit volume. Moreover, such
costs can often be recovered only over a relatively long time span.
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Independent distributor and manufacturer can be assumed to be
equally capable of generating the mayor scale economies arising from local
marketing once the requisite market knowledge has been internalized by the
latter. But when the possibility of achieving these economies comes into
sight, the strategic interests of the two parties usually diverge. The
independent distributor may be quite reluctant to incur costs the benefits
of which may accrue only over the long run when he knows that resale
rights may be revoked at the end of the current contract period.
By virtue of prior ownership of the goods, the manufacturer
faces no such threat in most foreign countries. In the face of a
necessarily short planning horizon imposed by the manufacturer, the
distributor usually seeks to maximize short run profits by absolute cost
minimization and charging relatively high prices. The manufacturer, by
contrast, faces both a planning horizon long enough to encompass the
eventual recovery of large scale marketing costs and the supply
inelasticity that results from investment in large scale manufacturing
facilities. These conditions make it far more likely that it will be the
manufacturer that appropriates the benefits of large scale economies in
marketing. The institution by means of which these economies are realized
is the sales subsidiary.
In summary, the conclusion of the foregoing analysis is quite in
accord with the view that managerial hierarchies enjoy transactional unit
cost advantages over alternative institutions for bringing goods to a
foreign market. The reasoning leading to this conclusion is, however,
somewhat different in that the economies are seen to arise from strategic
choice rather than from inherent market infirmities.
However, no business hierarchy ever survived for very long by
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transferring product to itself, no matter how efficiently such transfer
may have been carried out. Sooner or later there must be exchange with
another economic entity, and it is this necessity that makes the
internalization of markets an inappropriate notion. Low unit costa in
marketing are of no consequence unless revenue is generated in the course
of exchange and as a result of performance of the functions in the course
of which costa are incurred.
As previously mentioned, the need or desire to generate revenue
in a foreign country gives rise to what Carlson has described as frontier
uncertainty. The view taken here is that this uncertainty reflects two
separate phenomena, cultural distance as described by Carlson and ordinary
commercial risk. It can be assumed that the market knowledge needed to
shrink cultural distance has been internalized through all the previously
described means by the time a manufacturer is ready to form a foreign
sales subsidiary. The ordinary commercial risks remain, however, and in
their efforts to minimize those risks, manufacturers of sensitized
materials employed marketing strategies that had contributed to their
survival as participants in emerging oligopolies.
- The techniques of choice for achieving this survival are those
that succeed in differentiation of product and producer in the minds of
users. In the early years of the photographic industry, such
differentiation could take the form of physical differences. As the
industry matured and its products became physically standardized,
successful differentiation came increasingly to depend on psychological
factors.
The nature of photosensitive materials and their use give these
psychological factors the importance they have in the minds of users. The
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rearrangement of components comprising a photosensitive material takes
place at the molecular level. The physical combination of molecules
making possible the satisfaction of the user's wants and the necessity to
keep it enveloped in total darkness before use prevent the user from
assessing the presence or absence of desired characteristics prior to
purchase. The performance of a photosensitive material cannot be
demonstrated without at the same time destroying its future utility.
Furthermore, there is time lapse in conventional photography between the
exposure of the film and the visible result. During this time lapse the
opportunity for capturing the image satisfactorily often disappears. End
users thus perceive themselves to take on a considerable risk when buying
a photosensitive product. It is among the purposes of the producer's
differentiation efforts to persuade users that this risk is minimal when
that producer's brand is purchased. The means used to deliver this
reassurance include continuous advertising and ubiquitous display of the
producer's trademarks.
When the use of such means succeeds, it affects both the firm's
revenues and its unit marketing costs. On the revenue side, it
consistently commands a price premium that is disproportionate to the
costa incurred in generating the sales. In addition, it minimizes the
power of intermediaries in the distribution chain, such as retailers, to
influence the users' choice as to which brand is purchased. On the cost
aide, it is the success of these differentiation efforts that creates the
decreasing unit costs characteristic of scale economies in marketing. The
role of such marketing scale economies in perpetuating oligopolies was
noted by Bain whose work provided one of the conceptual foundations for a
good part of Hymer's original market imperfections thesis.ie The point.
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is also discussed by Bergaten, Horst and Moran in an exposition of the
role played by marketing scale economies. 1 9
Differentiation thus provides the means by which producer and
user resolve their respective uncertainties in a happy symbiosis. The
producer's uncertainty of achieving repeated patronage is lessened, and
the user's need for reassurance is satisfied. To the extent that the need
for this reassurance is product-apecific but not country-specific, it
provides the opportunity for producers to cater to it in many countries.
Photochemical producers thus tend to act out their oligopolistic reactions
in conformity with the international behavior described by Knickerbocker
except that they do it in their market behavior rather than by
cross-hauling of investments in manufacturing facilities.2 0 The only
major instance in which the latter occurred in this industry took place
during the 1927-1928 period when Kodak acquired a German film factory and
IG Farben bought out Anaco in the U.S.
A successfully executed differentiation strategy may constitute
an effective entry barrier in that it preempts a national market. The
most telling examples are provided by the two industry leaders as they
face each other in their respective home markets. Kodak effectively
dominates the American market, enjoying a market share that exceeds its
nearest rival by a factor of four, and the same is true of Fuji in Japan.
Neither company gives much indication of making an effective effort to
increase its minor market share where its opponent is most strongly
entrenched. Both countries represent major national markets for
photographic goods, and any cultural distance between then can be presumed
to have shrunk to insignificance after decades of marketing by each
company in the other's domain. Yet Fuji's efforts to stake out a
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significant U.S. market position remain modest, and Kodak products are to
the present day still marketed in Japan by a minor local trading company.
The great mass of end users in each country have come to believe
that the brand to which they are loyal is the best. It is this belief
that gives each company the effective control of the distribution channels
that it enjoys in its domestic market. Such beliefs develop only as the
result of experience accumulated over long time periods by both producers
and users. To shake these beliefs requires the expenditure of vast
resources over equally long time periods if the opponent maintains its
product quality. With the end of the chemically based photographic
product life cycle in sight, each company no doubt prefers to devote its
resources to other, more promising business projects.
The extreme example of company recognition that a national
market has been preempted is provided by Monishiroku'a presence in the
U.S. The company maintains a precarious foothold in this market by
exporting to it a completely undifferentiated commodity. It is able to do
so because the above described user need for assurance is not universal
and may, with the passage of time, dissipate as segments of user markets
become more sophisticated.
These experiences suggest that there need be no quarrel with the
formulations of Kindleberger and Caves that attach the utmost importance
to differentiation in the internationalizing firm. 2 1 , 2 2 But there is no
need to succumb to the seductiveness of their suggestions that
differentiation is a determinant of internationalization. When it is
effective, differentiation is a means of crowding out competitors, thereby
creating the imperfections in goods markets noted by these scholars. But
the central proposition of the present thesis seems to this observer to
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provide a somewhat more satisfactory generalization. This is that the
pressures impelling firms to generate goods markets imperfections and to
internationalize those goods markets have a common source.
No amount of differentiation effort on behalf of photosensitive
materials can be effective over the long run unless the product
consistently makes good on its implied promises in actual use. The
achievement of this consistency requires the producer to possess
knowledge. While the requisite knowledge is that of physical rather than
social phenomena and it is used in manufacturing rather than marketing,
the theoretical issues and their resolution are quite similar to those
already discussed. These involve some distinguishing characteristics of
knowledge, the requirements for efficient markets and the relationship
between markets and knowledge.
As summarized by Williamson and Caves, the preference for
transfer of knowledge within the firm over its externalization arises from
transaction cost considerations.2 3 ,24 Efficient markets do not develop,
according to this line of thought, because knowledge carries a heavy
burden of infirmities making exchange in arm's length transactions
difficult. Among these are :
1. The public goods nature of knowledge.
2. The impactedness of knowledge, ie., the difficulty of
separating it from the process in which it is employed or from
the people who possess it.
3. The possibility of opportunistic behavior by its possessor
in dealing with parties that do not have it.
4. The existence of the information paradox, meaning that
its value cannot be determined by a potential buyer unless
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it is disclosed but once this happens, the sales value to
the seller is dissipated.
S. The risk aversity arising from the possibility that
the information will be used improperly.
6. The difficulty of negotiating, executing and enforcing
contingent claims contracts.
All of the foregoing difficulties are thought to lead to thin
markets and therefore high costs. As in the above discussion of marketing
transfers, it is to be noted at this point that the costs incurred in the
actual transfer are quite independent of ownership; they will be the same
whether the information is transferred to an outsider or within the firm.
Therefore, the costs that make a difference are those that arise from the
need to negotiate with strangers. For this reason, it is considered more
efficient, net of governance costs, to transfer the knowledge within the
firm.
The evidence on this point coming out of the present study is
somewhat mixed. George Eastman encountered no difficulty in selling the
foreign rights to his first invention. While the Ilford Joint venture
proposed by several Japanese traders failed to come to fruition, this
failure cannot be attributed to the difficulties of negotiating and
agreeing on the value of Ilford's knowledge contribution to that venture.
The value of this contribution was precisely defined in that negotiation
and in Ilford's realized Joint venture with Valca in Spain. The sale by
both Ilford and Koniahiroku of technical knowhow to East European
governments was not impeded by the highly Imperfect market conditions
under which those sales were concluded. Gevaert was not inhibited by any
of the above considerations in licensing a peripheral and obsolescent
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document copying technology to Remington Rand.
By contrast, there were several occasions that provided
opportunities for the externalization of knowledge but no sale was made.
Both Kodak and Gevaert rebuffed several approaches for technical help from
Daicel on behalf of its nascent Fuji subsidiary; later, when Fuji was well
established, Polaroid rejected licensing requests from Fu3i for the use of
proprietary technology. George Eastman made clear on several occasions
that he considered the externalization of his company's technical
knowledge to carry with it an intolerable long-term competitive threat.
Efficient markets require willing sellers and buyers, and if sellers do
not appear for reasons they consider to be strategic, such markets will
not develop.
In general, the externalization of strategic core knowledge has
been exceedingly rare in the photochemical industry. The technical
knowledge has been guarded jealously by individual firms and has been
exploited abroad through direct investment rather than licensing. A
strategic perspective suggests that there is no need to abandon the
minimal cost argument in explaining this phenomenon. However,
understanding of why economic institutions develop and behave as they do
may be enriched by accommodating the notion of cost minimization within a
somewhat broader conception. The profits sought by firms are a function
of both cost and revenue, and those responsible for the strategic conduct
of the firm are primarily interested in maintaining a realistic long-term
relationship between cost and revenue.
Firms generate revenue by satisfying the craving of ultimate
customers for utility. While sellers seek to recover their costa in
making exchanges, buyers do not buy bundles of cost; they buy only bundles
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of potential utility. The technical knowledge required to produce an
acceptable photosensitive material has no utility per se for the party
that wants pictures. Its value comes into being only after it has been
combined with a host of other production factors to make a product that is
useful at a given time and place. In this sense, technical knowledge may
well be impacted once it has been acquired, but photochemical firms
acquire it in the first place as a means rather than as an end.
A firm may well have a hypothetical choice between externalizing
its technical knowledge and using it in its internal operations. It may
also be in the nature of knowledge that its use does not diminish the
amount of it available for further use. But it would be fallacious to
conclude from this that its value is not diminished by making it available
to outsiders. Externalization decreases the value of technical knowledge
to its original owner in that it helps to create the conditions for
decreasing the original owner's long-term revenue potential. Whatever
value the knowledge may have for the buyer does not inhere in the
knowledge itself but in the right to sell the product in the manufacture
of which the knowledge is used. A licensee, in short, does not buy
knowlege so much as the right to exploit it. For all the reasons already
described, reasons involving the appropriation of scale economy and
differentiation benefits in marketing, the original owner will show a
distinct preference for retaining those rights unless there are serious
impediments to their exploitation. To act on this preference is to use
the knowledge exclusively within the firm rather than to dissipate its
long-term revenue potential by externalizing it. The sale of technical
knowledge by Ilford and Konishiroku in Eastern Europe represents a second
beat solution employed only when the choice offered by a monopaonistic
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buyer is that of selling it or selling nothing at all.
To summarize, two kinds of knowledge played a critical role in
the internationalization of the photochemical industry. To the extent
that either market knowledge or technical knowledge had not yet been
acquired by individual firms, such ignorance proved to be a source of
serious disadvantage. This was not, however, a permanent condition, and
it was overcome by the expenditure of resources over time. There was a
large asymmetry in the resources and time needed to acquire the two types
of knowledge.
Although market knowledge, a sub-set of cultural knowledge,
appears difficult for a foreigner to come by because it seems vague and
eludes codification, the time needed to master it is measurable in years.
The number of facts about market institutions and their transaction rules
is relatively small, and the relationships among these facts are
relatively simple. Market knowledge was acquired cheaply and quickly, and
until it was internalized by photochemical firms, its used was hired in
several ways.
Physical nature, by contrast, yielded its secrets most
grudgingly, and the time needed to reduce then to precise algorithmic
formulation was beat measured in decades. The Eastman Kodak strategy of
maintaining technical leadership over its rivals increased the
differential in resources and time needed for acquisition of the two kinds
of knowledge.
A strategic perspective suggests that early movers in the
acquisition of technical knowledge of photochemistry en3oyed an enormous
long-term economic advantage. They created technological gaps that took
late entrants, such as Fuji, nearly four decades to close. The time
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interval during which the gaps existed were used by the pioneers to
entrench themselves in all but unassailable market positions in many
countries. Successful execution of this policy depended on minimizing the
externalization of resale rights at critical links in the chain of utility
creation. The imperfections in both goods and factor markets that
characterize the photochemical industry are the outcome of strategic
choices made by the surviving firms.
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Japan Camera Inspection Institute
Nihon University
Konishiroku Photo Industries Ltd.
Nippon Shashin Kogyo Taushin
Konishiroku Photo Industries Ltd.
Konishiroku Photo Industries Ltd.~
Japan Camera Inspection Institute
Nippon Polaroid Ltd.
Nihon University
Fuji Photo Film Co. Ltd.
Asanuma Ltd.
Fuji Photo Film Co. Ltd.
Japan Camera Inspection Institute
Japan Camera Inspection Institute
Date
4 February 1983
2 February 1983
3 March 1983
18 March 1983
15 February 1983
7 March 1983
14 February 1983
28 February 1983
25 March 1983
21 February 1983
21 February 1983
15 February 1983
15 March 1983
7 March 1983
9 February 1983
3 March 1983
9 February 1983
15 February 1983
18 March 1983
* Japanese names are given in western style.
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London, U.K.
Brian W. Coe
Sydney T. Ferris
Philip Jenkins
George A. Jones
Kodak Ltd.
Ilford Ltd.
Ilford Ltd.
Ilford Ltd.
Leverkusen and Cologne, Federal Republic of Germany
Heinz Berger Agfa - Gevaert
G&nter Gotzman Agfa - Gevaert
Martin Holder Agfa - Gevaert
Helmut Loehr Agfa - Gevaert
F.W. Rabenachlag Agfa - Gevaert
Mortsel, Belgium
Rene Bosaaerta Agfa
Hendrik Le Page Agfa
Laurent Roosens Agfa
A.Van der Auweraer Agfa
- Gevaert
- Gevaert
- Gevaert
- Gevaert
Correspondence
Enrique Garriga
M. Lois Gauch
Hans Jensen
Agfa - Gevaert
Eastman Kodak Co.
Polaroid do Brasil Ltda.
Esteban Negra Valls Negra Industrial S.A.
Hendrik Le Page
Laurent Roosena
Agfa - Gevaert
Agfa - Gevaert
5 January
12 April
22 March
29 March
11 May
16 February
3 May
1 August
23 October
April
April
April
April
June
June
June
June
May
1963
1983
1963
1963
1983
1983
1983
1983
1983
1983
1983
1983
1983
June
June
June
June
1984
1984
1983
1983
1963
1984
1984
1964
1984
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Company Annual and Semi-Annual Reports
Agfa - Gevaert Group Annual Reports, 1964 - 1982.
Eastman Kodak Company Annual Reports, 1926 - 1930.
Fuji Photo Film Co. Ltd. Semi-Annual Reports to Shareholders,
1962-1969.
Fuji Photo Film Co. Ltd. Annual Reports to Shareholders, 1970 - 1982.
Fuji Photo Film Co. Ltd. Annual Securities Report to Japan Ministry of
Finance. Tokyo : Printing Office of Ministry of Finance, 1983.
L. Gevaert & Cie. Rapports sur les Op6rations de la Societe, 1894 -
1919.
Gevaert Photo Producten N.V. Veralage over de werkzaamheden, 1920 -
1963.
Koniahiroku Photo Industry Co. Ltd. Annual Securities Report to Japan
Ministry of Finance. Tokyo: Printing Office of Ministry of
Finance, 1982.
Ilford Ltd. Annual Reports, 1974 - 1980.
Periodicals and Yearbooks
Asian Wall Street Journal. 27 September 1982.
Berkshire Eagle (Pittsfield, Mass.) 4 November 1940;
12 June 1953;
20 June 1953.
Berliner Tageablatt, 29 June 1927.
British Journal Photographic Almanac 1932.
British Journal Photographic Almanac and Photographer's Daily
Companion, 1885, 1889, 1890.
British Journal of Photography, Vol. 29 (1882), Vol. 32 (1885).
Bulletin de l'Association Belge de Photographie, Vol. 9 (1882).
Bulletin de la Societe Francaise de Photographie, March 1882.,
June 1882, May 1883, July 1883.
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Business Week, 23 October 1983;
10 December 1984.
Camerart, 1976 - 1979.
Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 June 1927.
Economist, 7 January 1967.
Eder's Jahrbuch, 1902.
English Mechanic and World of Science, 4 December 1885.
Financial Times (London), 19, 20, 21, 22 & 23 May 1903;
26 June 1903;
4 December 1907;
3 January 1967;
8 February 1968;
25 October 1968;
10 July 1970.
Flightime, March 1975.
Fortune, May 1932.
Gaceta de Madrid, 30 June 1928.
Investors' Guardian (London), 22 August 1903;
3 October 1903;
28 November 1903;
7 December 1907;
Japan Camera Trade News, 1956 - 1966.
Japan Times, 1 October 1982.
Licht en Schaduw, June 1936 - January 1937.
Moniteur Belge, 20 May 1936.
Moniteur de la Photographie (Paris), Vol. 24 (1885).
Moody'a Industrial Manual 1970 - 1978, New York: Moody's Investors
Service;
Moody's Manual of Investments, 1909 - 1939.
New York Times, 1 and 2 February 1921;
17 March 1927;
30 July 1948;
10 December 1950;
3 January 1967;
24 June 1982.
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North Adams (Mass.) Transcript, 23 September 1939;
25 September 1939;
5 December 1940;
7 May 1941;
6 November 1945;
19 November 1948;
11 June 1953;
20 June 1956.
L'Obiectif. No.28, n.d. but ca. 1960.
Perspective, February 1960.
Photographic Journal (London), Vol. 116,
November - December, 1976.
Photographic News (London), Vol. 5 (1881), Vol. 26 (1882).
Die Photographische Industrie, 4 July 1927.
Der Photohindler. 15 September 1964.
Photo Trade of Japan (overseas edition of Nippon
Shashin Kvogyo Taushin), 1958 - 1970.
Rochester Democrat & Chronicle, 14 September 1898.
Rochester Union, 13 December 1884.
Springfield (Mass.) Sunday Union and Republican,
11 August 1940.
Standard & Poor's Stock Reports, 12 June 1984.
Statist (London), 23 May 1903;
22 August 1903;
31 May 1947.
The Times (London), 11 August 1885.
Voor lederen, 15 November 1922 - 15 January 1923.
Wall Street Journal, 8 January 1972;
21 February 1978;
20 November 1984.
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